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ABSTRACT

QUANTIFICATION AND PARADOX
FEBRUARY 2018
EDWARD FERRIER
B.A., THOMAS AQUINAS COLLEGE
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA GREENSBORO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin Klement

I argue that absolutism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is
possible, is to blame for both the paradoxes that arise in naive set theory and variants of these paradoxes that arise in plural logic and in semantics. The solution is
restrictivism, the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is not possible.
It is generally thought that absolutism is true and that restrictivism is not only
false, but inexpressible. As a result, the paradoxes are blamed, not on illicit quantification, but on the “logical” conception of set which motivates naive set theory. The
accepted solution is to replace this with the “iterative” conception of set.
I show that this picture is doubly mistaken. After a close examination of the
paradoxes in chapters 2–3, I argue in chapters 4 and 5 that it is possible to rescue naive
set theory by restricting quantification over sets and that the resulting restrictivist set

v

theory is expressible. In chapters 6 and 7, I argue that it is the iterative conception
of set and the thesis of absolutism that should be rejected.
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CHAPTER 1
ABSOLUTISM AND RESTRICTIVISM

1.1

Introduction

Quantification in natural languages is almost always restricted, either explicitly or
implicitly. Suppose I am dropping off a friend (Smith) at the airport. Before driving
away, I want to be sure he has all his things. So I ask, “Do you have all your things?”
In doing so, I explicitly restrict the application of ‘all’ to Smith’s belongings. But
did I really mean to ask whether Smith has all his things? That would be a rather
odd question. It’s more likely that I meant to ask whether he has all of a certain
subset of his things, for example, whether he has all of the things he brought from
home or acquired during his trip, and which he intends to bring back. One way to
convey this question is by means of a narrower, explicit restriction. I might ask, “Do
you have all the things that you brought from home or acquired during your trip
and which you intend to bring back?” This formulation, however, is cumbersome.
It is also unnecessary, for I am able to convey my intended question by means of an
implicit restriction imposed by context. In the present case, facts that are well known
to Smith and myself, for example, the fact that the only belongings he can bring on
the plane are those that he brought from home or acquired during his trip, and the
fact that he only wants to bring some of these—we may assume, for instance, that
he does not wish to bring the leftovers from last night’s dinner—make the intended
restriction on ‘all’ clear. In fact, I might have communicated the same question, had
I placed no explicit restrictions and let context do all the work, that is, had I simply
asked, “Do you have everything?”
1

Restrictions that have been imposed can subsequently be lifted. I can lift the
restriction of ‘all’ to (some of) Smith’s belongings by asking a second question, e.g.,
whether the travelers on Smith’s flight (Smith included) have all their things. And,
it seems, I could go further. I could lift all restrictions, and speak of absolutely all
things. Waxing metaphysical, I might ask whether all things are self-identical, or
actual, or concrete. In asking these questions, I take myself to be quantifying over
absolutely all things whatsoever.
Like quantification in natural languages, quantification in formal languages may
or may not be restricted. However, it is important to distinguish between two sorts of
restrictions: absolute restrictions and restrictions relative to a logical type. Consider,
for example, the standard view of second-order quantification as quantification over
all classes (or properties) of those things in the range of the first-order quantifiers
(individuals).1 This view imposes absolute restrictions on both first and second-order
quantifiers: second-order quantifiers are absolutely restricted to classes (or properties), while first order quantifiers are absolutely restricted to individuals. This view
of second-order quantification corresponds to a general picture of typed logical languages, according to which quantifiers of different logical types range over entities
of different logical categories. According to this picture, every typed quantifier is
absolutely restricted. Absolutely unrestricted quantification is directly forbidden by
the rules of logical syntax.
These rules do not forbid relatively unrestricted quantification, i.e., quantification
in which a typed quantifier ranges over absolutely all entities of the corresponding
logical category. Consider the language of first-order logic, in which the first-order
quantifier, ∀1 , ranges over all the individuals in the domain, D1 . ∀1 is unrestricted
relative to its type if absolutely every individual is a member of D1 . Similarly, in
1

See Enderton (2015) for a presentation of the standard view. See Quine (1986, 66–68) for
discussion and criticism of the standard view.

2

the language of second-order logic, the second-order quantifier, ∀2 , ranges over all the
classes of individuals (properties of individuals) in the domain, D2 , which is usually
represented as the powerset of D1 . ∀2 is unrestricted relative to its type if absolutely
every class of individuals (property of individuals) is a member of D2 . Of course, this
will be the case only if absolutely every individual is a member of D1 . In general, for
any (n + 1)th order logic, the (n + 1)th-order quantifier, ∀n+1 , is unrestricted relative
to its type only if every entity of type n is a member of Dn .
Restrictions in a formal language are imposed by a model, M = hI, Di. I is
an interpretation that assigns meanings to the non-logical vocabulary (predicate and
constant letters), and D is the domain of quantification. In a standard model, I
assigns standard, intended meanings to non-logical vocabulary and D stands for a
standard, intended (and usually restricted) domain. In the standard model for Peano
arithmetic, for example, D is the (restricted) domain of natural numbers and I assigns
standard, intended meanings to arithmetical vocabulary: the number 0 to ‘0’, and
the functions Successor, Addition and Multiplication to ‘s(x)’, ‘+(x, y)’ and ‘×(x, y)’
respectively.
If the language is associated with a standard model, lifting restrictions may require
changing languages. For example, lifting the restriction to natural numbers imposed
by the standard model of Peano arithmetic may require switching from the language
of Peano arithmetic to the more inclusive language of real analysis, whose domain
(under the standard interpretation) includes the natural numbers as a proper subset.
Similarly, one might lift the restrictions to propositions and possible worlds imposed
by propositional and modal logics by switching to more expansive languages. Finally,

3

it seems that one might lift all restrictions by switching to an untyped language whose
quantifiers are interpreted as ranging over absolutely everything.2
As a first pass, we might say that absolutism is the view that it is possible to lift all
restrictions in a natural or (untyped) formal language; consequently, that it is possible
to speak of absolutely everything. The alternative to absolutism is restrictivism, which
we might describe as the view that it is impossible to lift all restrictions in a natural or
formal language; consequently, that it is impossible to speak of absolutely everything.
Related to absolutism and restrictivism simpliciter are absolutist views according to
which it is possible to speak of everything within some domain, or of some kind, and
restrictivist views according to which it is impossible to speak of everything within
some domain, or of some kind. To illustrate, we might define a numbers absolutist as
one who holds that it is possible to speak of every number, and a numbers restrictivist
as one who denies this. Similarly, we might define a propositions absolutist as one who
holds that it is possible to speak of every proposition and a possible worlds absolutist
as one who holds that it is possible to speak of every possible world. In general,
we might say that an F -absolutist is one who holds that it is possible to speak of
every F , whereas an F -restrictivist is one who denies this. F -absolutism is weaker
than, and entailed by, absolutism simpliciter. F -restrictivism is stronger than, and
entails, restrictivism simpliciter. (Henceforth, ‘absolutism’ and ‘restrictivism’ are to
be understood as absolutism simpliciter and restrictivism simpliciter, respectively.)
Restrictivism should be distinguished from the view that there is no universal
kind, such as thing, or object, or entity. I call this view “sortalism” since it is generally accepted by sortal theorists.3 Restrictivism neither entails, nor is entailed by
2

Unless otherwise noted, I use the terms ‘thing’, ‘object’, and ‘entity’ interchangeably. Thus
‘quantification over everything’ expresses the same thought as ‘quantification over every object’ and
‘quantification over every entity’.
3

See, for example, Strawson (1959), Wiggins (1980), Hirsch (1982), and the discussion by Xu
(1997, 368–369).

4

sortalism. Suppose that restrictivism is true. One might still hold that there is an
absolutely general kind. Restrictivism only requires that it is impossible to quantify
over all instances of this kind, presumably because of some expressive limitation endemic to logic and/or language. Next, suppose that sortalism is true. One might still
hold that restrictivism is false. The reason is that the nonexistence of a universal
kind does not entail the nonexistence of an absolutely general term. To illustrate,
suppose, as seems plausible, that there is no kind grue. Nevertheless, it doesn’t follow
that ‘x is grue’ (defined as ‘x is observed before some time, t, and is green, or else x
is not so observed and is blue’) fails to have an extension. One can deny that grue
is a kind and still hold that the predicate ‘x is grue’ is satisfied by all and only the
things that are grue. Similarly, from the assumption that no absolutely general term
denotes a universal kind, it doesn’t follow that there are no absolutely general terms.
One can deny that thing is a kind and still hold that the phrase ‘all things’ can be
used in an absolutely unrestricted sense.4 Since this is all that is needed to make
sense of the claim that it’s possible to quantify over all things, sortalism does not
entail restrictivism.
At present, absolutism is widely accepted as true, while restrictivism is widely
rejected as inexpressible or self-defeating. This verdict is based on the observation
that the restrictivist seems to be unable to express her own view—that it is impossible
to speak of absolutely everything—without speaking of absolutely everything. David
Lewis (1991, 68) makes this point quite forcefully when he writes that the restrictivist,
“violates his own stricture in the very act of proclaiming it!” Since expressibility is
closely tied to intelligibility, many philosophers have concluded that restrictivism is
simply incoherent.5
4

A sortal theorist who holds that reference is only possible relative to a sortal will reject this
argument. Since ‘thing’ does not name a sortal, ‘thing’ fails to have any determinate reference.
5

Among these are McGee (2000), Williamson (2003) and Shapiro (2003, 467).
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This dissertation consists of four projects. The first (chapters 2 and 3) is a close
examination of the three infamous paradoxes of set theory: Cantor’s paradox, Russell’s paradox and Burali-Forti’s paradox. The second (chapter 4) is an articulation
of the logical conception of set as the extension of a concept and an argument that
by restricting quantification we may be able to secure a consistent set theory that
preserves this concept. The third (chapter 5) is a defense against the charge that
restrictivism is inexpressible. I propose a way of expressing restrictivism based on
Bertrand Russell’s notion of typical ambiguity that does not require absolutely unrestricted quantification. The fourth project (chapters 6 and 7) is an argument that
popular absolutist strategies for blocking these paradoxes fail for two reasons: (a) the
iterative concept of set, which motivates the non-quantificational restrictions needed
to block the paradoxes in standard set theory is unsatisfactory and (b) absolutism
leads to variants of these paradoxes outside of set theory to which the absolutist has
no clear solution.
The plan for the rest of this chapter is as follows. In 1.2, I present a working
definition of absolutism and I briefly consider what I take to be the primary motivation for adopting absolutism. In 1.3, I discuss two non-restrictivist arguments
against absolutism based on the Quine/Putnam theses of semantic indeterminacy
and conceptual relativism as well as a third argument against absolutism based on a
(possibly Cantorian) view I call mysticism. In 1.4, I present a working definition of
restrictivism that distinguishes it from each of these views and I discuss an argument
for restrictivism based on the principle that quantification is always over a set or class.
I then explain how restrictivism differs from Michael Dummett’s thesis of indefinite
extensibility, from Timothy Williamson’s generality relativism and from Kit Fine’s
limitivism.
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1.2
1.2.1

Absolutism
Defining absolutism

Above, I described absolutism as the view that it is possible to speak of absolutely
everything. This description has the following shortcoming: it leaves room for a
pseudo-absolutist view we might call “piecemeal absolutism”. According to piecemeal
absolutism, you can speak of everything, just not all at once. To illustrate, assume
(as seems reasonable) that everything is either abstract or concrete. The piecemeal
absolutist might then say that it’s possible to speak of everything insofar as it’s
possible to speak of all concrete entities, on the one hand, and it’s possible to speak
of all abstract entities, on the other. But she will deny that it’s possible to speak
of both all concrete entities and all abstract entities at once. Therefore, she will not
accept the meaningfulness of utterances such as, “Everything is either concrete or
abstract,” in which ‘everything’ purports to range simultaneously over all abstract
entities and all concrete entities.6
Frege’s views of language and ontology may commit him to piecemeal absolutism.
In “Function and Concept” (1891) and “Concept and Object” (1892b), Frege presents
a logical type theory that assigns the referents of each syntactic type of a logical language to a unique logical category. According to Frege’s theory, singular expressions
have syntactic type 0 and predicate expressions have syntactic type n ≥ 1. The referents of singular expressions are “objects” and belong to the first logical category.
The referents of predicate expressions are “concepts” and belong to different logical
categories, one for each syntactic type of predicate expression. Predicate expressions that apply to objects have syntactic type 1. The referents of these predicate
expressions—sometimes called first-order concepts—belong to the second logical category. Referents of predicate expressions of higher types (predicates that apply to
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For more details, see the discussion of mysticism below.
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predicates) belong to higher logical categories. In this way, each entity in the universe
is assigned to a unique logical category.
Piecemeal absolutism follows from Frege’s prohibition on quantification across
types. Unrestricted first-order quantification is restricted to quantification over absolutely all objects. Unrestricted second-order quantification is restricted to quantification over absolutely all first-order concepts (those concepts that are instantiated by
objects). Unrestricted third-order quantification is restricted to quantification over
absolutely all second-order concepts (those concepts that are instantiated by concepts
that are themselves instantiated by objects). And so on. Therefore, while it’s possible
to quantify over all the objects there are and it’s possible to quantify over all the concepts of a given category, it’s impossible to quantify simultaneously over absolutely
everything.
A better statement of absolutism, which closes this loop-hole, is that it is possible
to speak of absolutely everything at once. Alternatively: it is possible for a single
quantifier to range over absolutely everything. Call such a quantifier and the resulting
quantification absolutely unrestricted. I define absolutism as the thesis that absolutely
unrestricted quantification is possible, or coherent.
Absolutism Absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible, or coherent.
While absolutism does not make a claim about the expressive resources of any
particular language (in particular, it does not claim that absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible in English, or first-order logic), it does make a claim about the
possible expressive resources of language in general. Call a context or formal language in which quantification is absolutely unrestricted maximal. We might then
say that absolutism is committed to the possibility of a maximal formal language or
that absolutism is committed to the possibility of a maximal context for a natural
language.
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Absolutism is independent from particular ontological theses (claims about what
there is). It does not tell us what things there are or how many things there are.
Suppose you ask whether F s are included in a maximal context. If there are F s, the
answer is yes. If there aren’t F s, the answer is no. In either case, the answer is fixed
by ontology, not absolutism.

1.2.2

Motivating absolutism

Why be an absolutist? One reason is that the truth conditions of certain utterances seem to require absolutely unrestricted quantification. Consider, for example,
the atheist’s claim:
(1) There is no God.
Intuitively, (1) is true only if, for absolutely every x, it’s not the case that x is
God. Expressing this truth-condition requires absolutely unrestricted quantification.
Philosophical contexts provide other examples. Consider the theses:
(2) Everything is self-identical.
(3) Nothing is abstract.
(4) For any things, there exists a fusion of those things.
A philosopher who endorses any of these is committed to there being no counterexamples whatsoever. Consider the nominalist, who asserts (3). Suppose that sometime
after making this assertion, he is convinced by some discovery or proof that there are
abstract objects. It would be quite odd if he were to defend his original assertion
of (3) on the grounds that all the things in some restricted domain (e.g., all of the
things studied in physics) are concrete. Surely, he did not mean to be so cautious. It
was his intention to make an absolutely general claim.
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Timothy Williamson (2003, 435–444) suggests that absolutely unrestricted quantification may also be required to express the truth-conditions of statements that
employ restricted quantification. Consider an utterance of the sentence
(5) There are no talking donkeys,
in which the quantifier ‘there are’ is plausibly understood as restricted to (absolutely
all) donkeys. The absolutist might understand the truth condition for this utterance
of (5) as given by
(6) (∀x)(Donkey(x) → ¬[Talks(x)]),
in which the quantifier ∀ ranges over absolutely everything. On this interpretation,
(5) is true iff absolutely everything is such that: if it is a donkey, then it doesn’t talk.
The restrictivist must find some other way to understand the truth-condition for
this utterance of (5). Let D be a restricted domain variable interpreted according to
context and let ‘∀D x’ express unrestricted quantification relative to the domain D.
So long as D includes absolutely all donkeys, the restrictivist might understand the
truth condition for an utterance of (5) in which ‘there are’ is restricted to (absolutely
all) donkeys as given by:
(7) (∀D x)(Donkey(x) → ¬[Talks(x)]).
On this interpretation, an utterance of (5) is true iff everything in D is such that: if
it is a donkey, then it doesn’t talk.
Of course, if there are donkeys outside of D, (7) will not be equivalent to (5).
Suppose, for example, that D is the collection of all things on this planet. If there are
talking donkeys on Mars, (5) will be false, but (7) will be true. Williamson argues
that the restrictivist can only select a domain that she can specify. But it seems
that the only way to specify a domain containing absolutely all donkeys requires
quantifying over absolutely everything. To specify such a domain, one must be able
10

to say something like: ‘Absolutely everything is such that if it is a donkey, then it is
in D’.
Whether this argument is convincing depends on the relation between using a
restriction and specifying a restriction. The restrictivist might argue that she can use
a restricted domain containing absolutely all donkeys without having to specify this
domain.

1.3

Non-restrictivist arguments against absolutism

Two arguments have been given against absolutism on the grounds that language,
or reality, or both, lack the requisite determination for there to be a fact of the
matter as to whether quantification is unrestricted. First, there is the argument from
semantic indeterminacy. The semantic indeterminist uses the Skolem-Löwenheim
theorem to argue that first-order theories are blind to the distinction between infinite
domains of different sizes.7 He goes on to infer that there is no intelligible distinction
to be made between first-order quantification over an all inclusive infinite domain
(one that includes absolutely everything there is) and first-order quantification over
a less than all inclusive infinite domain (one that leaves some things out).8
Second, there is the argument from conceptual relativism. The conceptual relativist
holds that (a) the number of objects can only be determined within a conceptual
framework, which fixes a determinate meaning for object and/or exists and (b) there
is no unique conceptual framework that truly represents reality.9 It follows that while
there is a fact of the matter as to whether a quantifier ranges over everything relative
to a conceptual framework, there cannot be a fact of the matter as to whether a
7

The theorem shows that if a first-order theory, T, is satisfied by an infinite model, then T is
satisfied by infinite models of all sizes (no matter how large or how small).
8

Putnam (1980) presents semantic indeterminism as a lesson of the Skolem-Löwenheim theorem.
See also Quine (1969, 58–62).
9

See Carnap (1950), Putnam (1977, 489–493), Putnam (1981, 22–48) and Putnam (1987).
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quantifier ranges over everything simpliciter. An example of Putnam’s (1987, 18–
19) illustrates these points. Imagine a world containing three mereological atoms.
How many objects are there in this world? Relative to a conceptual framework that
counts arbitrary mereological sums, the answer is seven (or eight, if we include a
null-object). Relative to a conceptual framework that counts only atoms, the answer
is three. But (we are invited to infer) neither of these frameworks can claim to be
the true framework that captures the correct definition of object.
There is a third, more exotic non-restrictivist view, opposed to absolutism. According to this view, there are some peculiar things, about which it is impossible to
speak, and therefore, over which, it is impossible to quantify. I call this mysticism.10
Suppose that a is a mystical object about which it is impossible to speak (never mind
the fact that we just named it!). Since, according to mysticism, it is impossible to
quantify over a, it is impossible to quantify over absolutely everything.
Some of Georg Cantor’s views on the infinite may suggest mysticism. In “Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds” (1883) and his famous “Letter to Dedekind”
(1899), Cantor makes a distinction between transfinite sets—totalities containing
infinitely many members which can be well-ordered and therefore counted—and absolutely infinite or inconsistent totalities, which cannot be counted and therefore do
not form sets. The latter include totalities such as “the absolutely infinite totality
of [ordinal] numbers” ((Cantor, 1883) translated in Hallett (1984, 42)) and “the totality of everything thinkable” (Cantor, 1899). Cantor (1899) goes on to describe an
absolutely infinite totality as one, “such that the assumption that all its elements
are together leads to a contradiction, so that it is impossible to conceive of [it] as a
unity.” If (a) we understand “totalities” in this passage as akin to singular objects
and supplement Cantor’s description with the premises (b) that it’s only possible to
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Shapiro (2003, 467) mentions this view as a foil to restrictivism. He does not give it a name.
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conceive of a totality as a singular object (“unity”) and (c) that it’s only possible to
speak about what can be conceived, then if there are any absolutely infinite totalities,
it follows that it’s impossible to speak of them (because they cannot be conceived).
Since there are some things (absolutely infinite totalities) about which it is impossible
to speak, mysticism is true.
Assumptions (a) and (b), however, are dubious. This leaves room for both the
absolutist and restrictivist to understand Cantor’s remarks in ways that are friendly
to their own views and which do not suggest mysticism.
The restrictivist can take Cantor’s remarks as support for her view by rejecting
(a): totalities are not singular objects. She might then claim that in denying that an
absolutely infinite totality can be conceived of as a unity, Cantor is not claiming that
we cannot conceive of some sort of singular object. Instead, he is claiming that we
cannot quantify over all the elements of very large pluralities. We cannot conceive of
these pluralities as unities because they encompass too many things to talk about all
at once.11
The absolutist can make room for Cantor’s remarks by denying (b): it’s possible
to conceive of totalities in two ways, as singular objects and as mere pluralities. One
might conceive of a totality as a singular object, by conceiving of the set or the
mereological sum that is made up of the members of the totality. But one might
also conceive of a totality as a mere plurality by conceiving of all the things “in”
the plurality without conceiving of any associated singular object that these things
make up. To illustrate, consider the totality of natural numbers. I might conceive of
this in the first way as a singular object, e.g., as the set that contains every natural
number (and nothing else). But I might also conceive of this in the second way as
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Though, see Parsons (1977) for an alternative modal interpretation of Cantor, according to
which, while each of the elements of an absolutely infinite totality exists, it is impossible for all of
them to exist together.
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a mere plurality, simply by conceiving of all the natural numbers. On this view,
Cantor’s claim that it is impossible to conceive of absolutely infinite totalities as
unities expresses the thought that such totalities cannot be conceived in the first way.
It doesn’t follow that they cannot be conceived of at all. It may still be possible to
conceive of all the “members” of an absolutely infinite totality as a plurality. Hence,
(c) no longer implies that we cannot speak of absolutely infinite totalities at all;
only that we cannot speak of them as singular objects. If we have a properly plural
conception of infinite totalities, then it is perfectly consistent with (c) that we can
also speak of them as pluralities, using plural terms and plural quantification.

1.4
1.4.1

Restrictivism
Defining restrictivism

The theses of semantic indeterminism, conceptual relativism and mysticism are
all highly implausible. Semantic indeterminism is implausible because it amounts to
the denial that there can be any “intended” interpretation of a sentence (or theory)
involving quantification over an infinite domain.12 Conceptual relativism is implausible because it denies that there is any privileged division of reality into fundamental
parts. And even if this is granted, it is contentious whether it follows from the fact
that there is no privileged division of reality into fundamental parts that we cannot
make sense of quantification over absolutely everything. Mysticism is the most implausible of all: one wonders what sort of odd qualities an object must have to make
it repel any attempts at quantification.
I will not argue these points here. I will simply assume that if quantification is
restricted, it is not because any of these theses are true. So what is it that might
12

Adding that the speaker intended one interpretation rather than another amounts to adding
“more theory” and is consequently subject to the same wide range of “unintended” interpretations
as the original sentence.

14

explain the impossibility of unrestricted quantification? I think that the best answer
appeals to a fundamental mismatch between the size of reality and the expressive
strength of language and logic. In other words, restrictivism is true iff and because
there are too many things for language or logic to capture all at once. I will say more
about this when I discuss the challenge of expressing restrictivism; officially, I define
restrictivism as the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is impossible,
or incoherent, but not because semantic indeterminism, or conceptual relativism, or
mysticism is true.
Restrictivism Absolutely unrestricted quantification is impossible, or incoherent,
but not because semantic indeterminism, or conceptual relativism, or mysticism
is true.
In what follows, I will generally omit these qualifications and speak of restrictivism
simply as the view that absolutely unrestricted quantification is impossible.
1.4.2

A quick argument for restrictivism?

Quantification is typically defined as taking place over a domain, which is typically
identified with the set (or class, or collection) containing all and only the objects
over which the quantifiers range. The domain fixes the interpretation of quantified
statements. For example, by identifying the domain of quantification with the set of
natural numbers, we determine that the quantifiers range over all and only the natural
numbers. Consequently, any statement of the form ‘everything φs’ is interpreted
as “every natural number φs.” These semantic facts suggest the following quick
argument for restrictivism:
P1. A quantifier ranges over all and only the objects in the domain of quantification.
P2. Domains of quantification are sets (or classes or collections).
P3. There is no universal set (or class).
15

C. Therefore restrictivism is true.
P2 and P3 jointly entail that there is no universal domain; whence, by P1, it follows
that there is no absolutely unrestricted quantification.
Bertrand Russell (1908, 63) endorses something like this argument when he equates
a collection’s having “no total” with the impossibility of quantification over all its
members.
When I say that a collection has no total, I mean that statements about
all its members are nonsense.
If we interpret ‘collection’ as ‘set’ and identify a collection’s having no total with
its nonexistence, Russell’s claim is that the nonexistence of a set is equivalent to
the impossibility of (meaningful) quantification over all its members. If this claim
were true, it would validate the inference from the nonexistence of a universal set—
P3—to the truth of restrictivism—C. But what grounds the claim? Without the
auxiliary premises P1 and P2, it’s hard to see any clear logical connection between
the nonexistence of a set and the impossibility of quantifying over its members. This
suggests an implicit acceptance of P1 and P2.
Michael Dummett (1991) seems to endorse a similar argument. He takes the
lesson of the set-theoretic paradoxes to be that unrestricted quantification over certain
totalities, such as the totality of all sets (all cardinals, all ordinals, etc.), is impossible.
However, these paradoxes do not directly target the possibility of quantification over
these totalities, but rather the existence of particular sets (the universal set, the set
of all cardinals, the set of all ordinals, etc.). Thus, Dummett seems to be inferring
that there can be no quantification over all sets (all cardinals, all ordinals) because
there can be no set of all sets (all cardinals, all ordinals). Again, this suggests an
implicit acceptance of P1 and P2.
P1 and P2 jointly express a principle that Richard Cartwright (1994) has dubbed
the All-In-One principle. Cartwright offers several statements of the principle.
16

To quantify over certain objects is to presuppose that those objects constitute a “collection,” or a “completed collection”—some one thing of which
those objects are the members (1994, 7).
The values of the variables [of a first-order language] must be in, or belong
to, some one thing (1994, 7).
Any objects that can be taken to be the values of the variables of a firstorder language constitute a domain (1994, 17).
An arguably equivalent principle is the ‘domain principle’, which Michael Hallett
(1984, 7) attributes to Cantor. Cantor’s formulation of the principle: “Each potential infinite . . . presupposes an actual infinite,” hardly sounds related to Cartwright’s
statements of the All-in-One principle above; however, Cantor’s argument for the
principle: that any infinitely variable quantity presupposes the existence of a “domain,” which he describes as “a definite, actually infinite series of values,” comes
closer (cited in Hallett (1984, 25)). Graham Priest (2002, 125–126) argues for an
even tighter resemblance when he writes that in modern semantics, Cantor’s argument for the domain principle amounts to the claim that:
For a sentence containing a variable to have a determinate meaning, the
range of the quantifiers governing the variable . . . must be a determinate
totality, a definite set.
And in later writing, Priest (2013, 1269) describes the domain principle, “in the
context of modern logic,” as saying that a quantified statement, “has no determinate
truth value unless there is a determinate collection over which the variable ranges.”
Under this reading, Cantor’s domain principle is hardly discernible from Cartwright’s
All-in-One principle.
In fact, referring to this as the All-in-One principle may be misleading: Cartwright
suggests that in reality there are number of distinct, but closely related principles,
each asserting the dependence of quantification on the existence of a particular kind
of set-like entity.
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According to one, the values of the variables of a first-order language must
constitute a set; another requires only a class, perhaps ultimate [=proper];
still another, designed to accommodate talk of all classes, requires only a
hyper-class; and so on.
Call the collection of principles named in this passage AOP. Specific principles will
be individuated by subscripts. The first principle is AOPSet , the second is AOPClass ,
the third is AOPHyper-Class , and so on.
AOPSet The values of the variables of a first-order language constitute a set.
AOPClass The values of the variables of a first-order language constitute a set or a
proper class.
AOPHyper-Class The values of the variables of a first-order language constitute a
set, or a proper class or a hyper-class.
Next, consider a corresponding list of theories, ranked in order of increasing ontological complexity. The first is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF), which countenances
only sets. The second is Von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory (NBG), which countenances both sets and proper classes. The third is hyper-class theory, which adds
hyper-classes to NBG. (Hyper-classes are to proper classes as proper classes are to
sets: while proper classes can be members of hyper-classes, hyper-classes are too large
to be members of anything.) The list can be continued in this way indefinitely. Each
theory from the list corresponds to an AOP principle. ZF corresponds to AOPSet ;
NBG corresponds to AOPClass ; Hyper-class theory corresponds to AOPHyper-Class
and so on.
We can now adapt the general argument for restrictivism stated above as a number
of separate arguments, each applicable to one of these theories. These arguments share
a single form: the first premise (which combines P1 and P2 above) is a statement
that the appropriate AOP principle is true; the second premise denies the existence
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of a universal entity of the appropriate kind (a universal set, class or hyperclass). To
illustrate, consider the adaptation of the argument to ZF, which goes as follows:
P1. AOPSet is true.
P2. There is no universal set
C. Therefore, it is impossible to quantify over all sets in ZF
Is this argument sound? I will argue that P2 is plausible but P1 is not.
There are at least three arguments that support P2. First, the existence of a
universal set in ZF would contradict the axiom of foundation, since it would be selfmembered. Second, the existence of a universal set in ZF would allow us to derive the
existence of Russell’s set from the subset axiom.13 Third, the existence of a universal
set would contradict Cantor’s theorem, since all its subsets would be members. Texts
on ZF set theory commonly use one (or more) of these arguments as proofs that the
universal set does not exist.14 Mutatis mutandis for NBG and hyper-class theory.
If one is determined to keep the universal set (and to reject P2), one must replace
standard set theory with a nonstandard alternative, such as Quine’s New Foundations
(1937). To meet the first and second arguments, this replacement theory must be
one in which the axioms of foundation and subset do not hold. To meet the third
argument, this theory must also place restrictions on the powerset operation, limiting
the number of subsets each set has. However, these restrictions may defeat their
intended purpose: for if we restrict the powerset operation, it is doubtful whether
any set can be a true universal set.
Turning to P1, I think it should be granted that the various AOP principles
stand or fall together. Hence, P1 is true only if AOP is true, i.e., only if first-order
13
Proof : The Subset axiom is: (∀z)(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φx). Replace ‘φ’ with ‘x ∈
/ x’ and
instantiate ‘z ’ to the universal set, u, to get: (∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ u ∧ x ∈
/ x). Since everything is
a member of u, this is equivalent to (∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈
/ x).
14

See, for example, Enderton (1977, 22).
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quantification, in general, presupposes the existence of a domain, taken to be a set,
or class, or collection of some sort of all the objects “in” the domain. There are two
arguments that might be adduced to support this. And I will argue that neither of
them is very convincing.
The first appeals to how we speak about quantification. As I observed at the
beginning of this section, we often describe quantification as taking place over a
domain. Suppose, for example, that we are discussing quantification in the context
of a first-order number theory. We might explain ourselves by uttering the following
statement:
(8) Only natural numbers are in the domain of quantification.
Syntactically, ‘the domain of quantification’ occurs in (8) as a singular referring expression; semantically, its value is a particular object. If, as seems plausible, singular
talk about a domain is acceptable whenever first-order quantification is employed,
then the way we speak suggests that there is a collection of F s whenever there is
first-order quantification over F s, just as AOP requires.
This Quinean argument is based on the ontological commitments of our assertions.
The best known strategy for avoiding such commitments is to offer a paraphrase. One
might execute this strategy by replacing the occurrence of the singular expression ‘the
domain of quantification’ in (8) with a plural expression, such as ‘the things over which
∀ ranges’. This replacement allows for a plural paraphrase of (8), such as:
(8P) Only natural numbers are among the things over which ∀ ranges.15
The restrictivist may counter that even if it is possible to eliminate domain talk by
systematically replacing statements such as (8) with statements such as (8P), doing
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The predicate ‘among’ is treated as a logical connective in plural logics. The adequacy of this
sort of plural paraphrase of singular talk has been defended in detail by George Boolos (1998, ch. 4).

20

so requires abandoning certain pre-theoretic commitments to AOP. Thus, while it
may be possible to reject AOP by adopting a paraphrase, doing so is revisionist.
I am not persuaded. Whether revisionism in the present case is objectionable
depends on the degree to which we really took ourselves to be committed to the
singular talk we use. Perhaps when the AOP-theorist speaks of domains, he takes
this quite seriously. But his commitment comes from his prior attachment to AOP;
not simply by his use of domain talk.
Suppose I have never thought about AOP but that I often engage in singular talk
about domains of quantification. A colleague explains AOP to me and points out
that my previous way of speaking carries commitment to AOP. I do not find AOP
plausible, so I shift over to a plural paraphrase. To what extent does the adoption of
this plural paraphrase signal a change in my original meaning? Not much, I claim.
The reason is simply this: I never really meant to be taking a stand on AOP by
my use of singular vocabulary. I was simply indifferent with respect to several ways
in which what I said might be true. When I later come to consider AOP, I cease
to be indifferent. Now I must settle on a more precise interpretation of my original
comments; one that does not require the existence of singular domains. But in doing
so, I have not changed my commitments. I have simply ceased to be indifferent about
a matter on which I previously took no position.16
The second argument for AOP appeals to the formal representation of quantification in model theory. In model theory, quantification is handled by a set-theoretic
semantics. According to the semantics, the range of quantification is a set. Therefore,
quantification is committed to sets.
16

See Eklund (2005, 565), who argues for indifferentism, according to which speakers are often,
“indifferent with respect to certain aspects of the proposition literally expressed by the sentence
assertively uttered”.
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My response to this argument is that while it establishes that our formal representation of quantification is committed to sets, it does not establish that quantification
itself (which is being formally represented) is so committed. The use of sets to represent domains of quantification provides no more evidence for the claim that first-order
quantification is committed to sets, than does the use of variable assignment functions
as semantic values of first-order variables for the claim that first-order quantification
is committed to variable assignment functions, or the use of sets of n-tuples as semantic values for n-place predicates for the claim that predication is committed to sets
of n-tuples. It simply does not follow from the fact that sets are used to represent
domains of quantification that domains of quantification really are sets or that quantification is committed to sets or that the notion of quantification is only coherent
relative to a set. In general, we must distinguish the commitments of a theory that
represents quantification from the commitments of quantification itself.17 Agustin
Rayo (2007, 431) makes a similar point regarding individual sentences:
One should generally distinguish between the ontological commitments
carried by a sentence and the semantic machinery employed by a semantic
theory assigning truth-conditions to that sentence.
I conclude that the arguments for AOP are unconvincing. As a result, the arguments
considered in this section fail to establish restrictivism.

1.4.3

Indefinite extensibility

The thesis of restrictivism is reminiscent of Michael Dummett’s thesis that certain
concepts are indefinitely extensible. Dummett (1963, 1981, 1991) describes a concept
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In stressing the distinction between semantics and ontology, I don’t mean to imply that semantic
theory, in general, has no relation to what exists; only that no particular semantic theory is definitive
in this regard. We are committed to both the truth and the meaningfulness of what we say. If the
sentences we assert are meaningful only if their sub-sentential expressions have sets as their semantic
values, then we are committed to sets. But conditions of meaningfulness are difficult to establish.
And we should not be too hasty, even if we currently have no set-free ways of making sense of
language, to infer a commitment to sets.
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C as indefinitely extensible if given a “definite totality” of objects instantiating C (i.e.,
a definite totality of Cs) and the ability to quantify over all elements in this totality, it
is possible to introduce new Cs which must lie outside the given totality. To illustrate,
consider Dummett’s (1981, 532–533) argument that ‘object’ is indefinitely extensible.
The notion of ‘object’ ... has to be regarded as an indefinitely extensible
one. If we have succeeded in forming some definite conception of a totality
of objects, then we are able to introduce into the language quantification
over this totality. But, by means of such quantification, together with certain term-forming operators which yield expressions for abstract objects,
we are able to form new terms for objects which do not lie within the
original totality.
If the fact that some concept C is indefinitely extensible entails that it is impossible
to quantify over all Cs, then the existence of indefinitely extensible concepts is a
truth-maker for restrictivism.
I believe that this entailment holds, though it is not immediately evident that
Dummett thinks so. The problem is that it would seem that the impossibility of
quantification over all Cs would be of the sort that would make quantification over
all Cs simply unintelligible. But Dummett flatly denies this. Speaking of the ordinals,
i.e., the objects falling under the indefinitely extensible concept ordinal number, he
writes: “It does not follow that quantification over the intuitive totality of all ordinals
is unintelligible” (1991, 316–317). I argue that Dummett’s views are best understood
as a sort of piece-meal absolutism (and consequently do count as restrictivist). The
particular version of piece-meal absolutism he endorses allows for unrestricted quantification over every instance of an indefinitely extensible concept, but only in special
cases where such quantification does not require quantification over all instances “at
once.” It is these special cases that Dummett has in mind when he denies that
unrestricted quantification over all ordinals is unintelligible.
Dummett’s views on quantification are based on the distinction between nonindefinitely extensible and indefinitely extensible concepts (described above) and a

23

corresponding distinction between definite and indefinite totalities. A definite totality is akin to a domain of quantification that encompasses all the instances of
an ordinary, non-indefinitely extensible concept; an indefinite totality is akin to a
domain of quantification that encompasses all the instances of an indefinitely extensible concept. Dummett claims that whereas all syntactically well-formed statements
purporting to quantify over a definite totality have determinate truth-values, and
therefore always succeed in quantifying over the entire definite totality; syntactically
well-formed statements that purport to quantify over an indefinite totality have determinate truth-values and therefore succeed in quantifying over the entire totality,
only if their interpretations under suitable assignments of definite sub-totalities have
a single, determinate truth-value. In this way, we can make sense of unrestricted
quantification over an indefinite totality in terms of quantification over its arbitrary
sub-totalities because these can be considered in isolation, without looking at all instances of the indefinitely extensible concept “at once.” Thus, Dummett seems to
endorse piece-meal absolutism.
He offers ‘every ordinal has a successor’ as an example of a statement that is
“true of all ordinals whatever,” because it is “true in any definite totality of ordinals”
(1991, 316). But other statements cannot be so construed. The statement ‘there is
an ordinal number of all the ordinals’ seems to be an example. For (a) this demands
that we consider all ordinals together in a single totality, but “no definite totality
comprises everything intuitively recognizable as an ordinal number.”
There are two ways in which indefinite extensibility goes beyond the core restrictivist thesis. First, it is committed to concepts and totalities and to the related
notions of ‘definite concept’ and ‘definite totality’. Second, indefinite extensibility is
intricately tied to the possibility of introducing new terms. This suggests an essential
tie to a sort of proof-theoretic modality: a concept is indefinitely extensible if given
quantification over any elements instantiating the concept it is possible to prove the
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existence of an object instantiating the concept that is not among these. It is not
entirely clear how seriously to treat this sort of modal talk. One might argue that it
is primarily heuristic. If this is right, then Dummett’s claim that we can introduce
new Cs that are not among any given Cs may simply be a colorful way of saying that
given any totality of Cs there is another, more inclusive, totality of Cs. This “reductionist” view of Dummett’s modal talk fits nicely with some of the things he says
about indefinitely extensible concepts. He writes, for example, that indefinitely extensible concepts have an “increasing sequence of extensions,” (Dummett, 1991, 317)
each more inclusive than those preceding. This may be taken to suggest a restrictivist picture, according to which for any interpretation of the quantified expression
“all Cs”, there is another, more inclusive interpretation. On the other hand, the fact
that he calls the sequence “increasing,” seems to lend support to a non-reductionist,
dynamic picture, according new extensions are always being added by some sort of
process.
Philosophers after Dummett have taken the notion of indefinite extensibility to
capture other special primitive modalities. For example, Linnebo (2010, 2013) argues
that the indefinite extensibility of ‘set’ captures the special mathematical modality
involved in the claim that a set is merely potential relative to its members. Alternatively, Uzquiano (2015) argues that the indefinite extensibility of ‘set’ captures a
special linguistic modality involved in the claim that given any interpretation of the
predicate ‘set’, it is possible to provide a more inclusive interpretation.18 Finally,
it’s possible to understand indefinite extensibility in an ontological way, according
to which reality itself is “incomplete” or “unfinished.” Joshua Spencer (2012) seems
to be advocating such a view when he argues that “there are no things that are all
things.” His argument is a reductio, couched entirely in terms of ontology, not lan18

See also Williamson (1998) and Studd (2013).

25

guage. From the assumption that there are some things that are all the things, a
contradiction follows. Hence (90):
Although the claim that there are some things that any things whatsoever are amongst seems intuitively plausible, I believe this thesis must be
rejected.
Steven Yablo (2006, 177–178) seems to have a similar view in mind when he writes
that what gives rise to the set-theoretic paradoxes is not the principle of naive comprehension (according to which every property defines the set of all things that have
that property) but the principle that for every property P there exist all the things
that have that property.
In particular, it is not the case that there are some things comprising all
and only the self-identical things.19
Restrictivism is distinct from all these views. Of course, it has a modal element:
according to restrictivism, unrestricted quantification is impossible. But it does not
require that concepts such as ‘object’ and ‘set’ exhibit any special proof-theoretic
or mathematical modalities. Nor does it require that the corresponding predicates
exhibit any special linguistic modalities of reinterpretation or that ontology is incomplete or unfinished. These views may entail restrictivism. If it is always possible to
prove the existence of objects outside any given domain of quantification, or if it is
always possible to extend our language so as to quantify over more things, then it
is also impossible to quantify over absolutely everything and so restrictivism is true.
There is a sense in which restrictivism may also follow from the thesis that ontology
is incomplete or unfinished. For, if there are no things that are all the things, then it
would seem to be impossible to quantify over all the things. You can’t quantify over
what isn’t there! On the other hand, it would seem that on this view, the inability
to quantify over all things is not due to any failing of language or logic; rather, it
19

Spencer and Yablo express their views in terms of plural quantification, which I discuss in
chapters 4 and 6.
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is a reflection of the incompleteness of ontology. In this sense, the ontological view
is not properly restrictivist. The heart of restrictivism is a picture of the world on
which ontology outstrips the resources of language and logic. The restrictivist is not
an ontological sceptic. In this sense, he does not deny there are some things that are
all the things. What he denies that it is possible to quantify over all the things that
there are.

1.4.4

Generality relativism and limitivism

In the recent literature, a variety of labels have been used for theses about the
possibility/impossibility of unrestricted quantification. In a particularly influential
paper, Timothy Williamson (2003) uses the labels ‘generality absolutism’ and ‘generality relativism’ for the views that it is possible/impossible to quantify over absolutely everything. In another influential paper, Kit Fine (2006b, 21) calls the same
views ‘universalism’ and ‘limitivism’. As far as I can tell, Williamson’s ‘generality
absolutism’ and Fine’s ‘universalism’ have the same meaning as my ‘absolutism’.
However, both Williamson’s ‘generality relativism’ and Fine’s ‘limitivism’ differ in
meaning from my ‘restrictivism’. Williamson and Fine treat the views expressed by
their labels as logical contradictories of generality absolutism. This makes semantic indeterminism, conceptual relativism and mysticism come out as relativist views
(for Williamson) and limitivist views (for Fine). None of these counts as restrictivist
according to my understanding of restrictivism.
In addition, the particular limitivist view that Fine adopts involves a modal element, common to discussions of indefinite extensibility, that is absent from my conception of restrictivism. The modal limitivist holds that any use of quantification
can be shown to be non-absolute. In fact, Fine distinguishes two limitivist positions, which he calls ‘restrictionism’ and ‘expansionism’. The restrictionist holds that
quantification is non-absolute since it can always be extended by lifting restrictions

27

on the interpretation of the quantifier (Fine, 2006b, 35), whereas the expansionist
holds that quantification is non-absolute since it can always be extended by postulating new objects (Fine, 2006b, 37–41). The difference between Fine’s restrictionism
and my restrictivism is perhaps not fundamental. One might plausibly reduce the
modality of restrictionism to the existence of infinitely many possible interpretations
of the quantifier, each restricted relative to others. On this view, the modal claim
that a restriction on the quantifier can be lifted is understood as the quantificational
claim that there is a possible interpretation of the quantifier which is less restrictive.
However, Fine’s preferred view is expansionism, for which the modality is a primitive
mathematical one.20 In this respect, Fine’s expansionism is quite different from my
understanding of restrictivism.

20

I discuss modal views in more detail in ch. 6.
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CHAPTER 2
THREE SET-THEORETIC PARADOXES

In this chapter, I discuss the three set-theoretic paradoxes. 2.1 is dedicated to
basic terminology and definitions. I introduce the necessary set-theoretic vocabulary
and define a number of basic operations, relations and functions on sets. In 2.2–2.4,
I articulate the additional conceptual background, existential assumptions and auxiliary proofs needed to derive each of the traditional set-theoretic paradoxes of Cantor,
Burali-Forti and Russell. I then distinguish several forms that these arguments may
take. In 2.5, I ask whether they are better viewed as genuine paradoxes or as reductio proofs and I discuss answers to this question given by Cantor, Burali-Forti and
Russell.
It will be helpful to keep the ultimate goal in mind: an argument from the paradoxes to restrictivism. This ‘argument from paradox’ takes the paradoxes as evidence
that it is impossible to quantify over all sets. Since the impossibility of quantifying
over all sets implies the impossibility of quantifying over absolutely everything, the
conclusion is that restrictivism is true.1 To formulate the argument, I define ‘set
absolutism’ and ‘set restrictivism’ as:
1

Michael Glanzberg (2006) understands the paradoxes in this way:

So far, we have observed that, given any quantifier domain, it is possible
to build an object which does not fall under that domain, via directions
provided by familiar paradoxes. . . . Call this the argument from paradox.
What does this argument really show? Though the issue is contentious,
my starting point . . . is that the argument shows no quantifier can range
over ‘absolutely everything’.
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Set Absolutism Quantification over absolutely all sets is possible, or coherent.
Set Restrictivism Quantification over absolutely all sets is impossible, or incoherent.
The argument can then be presented as follows:

The argument from paradox
P1. Set absolutism leads to paradox.
C1. Therefore, set restrictivism is true.
P2. Set restrictivism entails restrictivism.
C2. Therefore, restrictivism is true.
In rejecting all non-absolutist views other than restrictivism, I am assuming that set
restrictivism is the only viable alternative to set absolutism. Given this assumption,
C1 follows from P1. P2 is true as it follows from the definitions of ‘set restrictivism’
and ‘restrictivism’. The action lies with P1. I will provide an (indirect) argument
for P1 in chapter 6, in which I attempt to show that the best absolutist strategy
for making set absolutism consistent fails. But first, we need to get a handle on the
paradoxes themselves. This requires some basic set-theoretic terminology, which I
introduce below. (Readers familiar with set theory may want to skip to the next
section.)

2.1

Basic terminology and definitions

Letters from the end of the alphabet (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, ‘X’, ‘Y ’ and ‘Z’), possibly with
numerical subscripts, are used as variables for sets. Letters from the beginning of the
alphabet (‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’), possibly with numerical subscripts, are used

30

as names for sets. As a visual aid, lower-case letters will be used for sets that are
elements or subsets of sets denoted by capital letters. The capital letter ‘R’, possibly
with numerical subscripts, is used as a variable for relations and the letters ‘f ’, ‘g’,
‘h’, possibly with numerical subscripts, are used as variables for functions. I use
the same letters, with non-numerical subscripts, as names for functions. Whenever
possible, I will choose subscripts that suggest the particular function that is named.
Thus, ‘fs ’ is used to name a particular successor function, ‘g= ’ to name a particular
identity function, and ‘gc ’ to name a particular choice function.
I make use of the following basic relations and operations on sets:
X is a subset of Y , X ⊆ Y , if x ∈ X implies x ∈ Y :
X ⊆ Y =df (∀x)(x ∈ X → x ∈ Y )
The notation ‘X ⊂ Y ’ (X is a proper subset of Y ) is used for X ⊆ Y ∧ X 6= Y .
The powerset of X, PX, is the set of all subsets of X:
PX =df {x — x ⊆ X}
The union of X,
S

S

X, is the set of all members of members of X:

X =df {x — (∃y)(y ∈ X ∧ x ∈ y})

The notation ‘X1 ∪ X2 ∪ · · · ∪ Xn ’ is used for

S

{X1 , X2 , . . . Xn }.

The relative complement of X with respect to Y , X − Y , is the set of all x ∈ X
such that x ∈
/ Y:
X − Y =df {x — x ∈ X ∧ x ∈
/ Y }.
The expression ‘R(x, y)’ is used whenever x bears the relation R to y. The domain
of R, dom(R), is the set of all x such that (∃y)(R(x, y)). The range of R, ran(R),
is the set of all y such that (∃x)(R(x, y)). R is a relation on X if dom(R) ⊆ X and
ran(R) ⊆ X. R is a relation from X to Y if dom(R) ⊆ X and ran(R) ⊆ Y .
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A relation, R, from X to Y is a function, written ‘f : X → Y ’ if (i) R(x, y1 ) and
R(x, y2 ) implies y1 = y2 and (ii) dom(R) = X. A condition, φ, is functional on X
if for all x ∈ X: φ(x, y1 ) and φ(x, y2 ) implies y1 = y2 . Intuitively, a function is a
mapping from every object in dom(f ) to a unique object in ran(f ). The expression
‘f (x) = y’ is used whenever f maps x to y. For any Z ⊂ dom(f ), the result of
replacing dom(f ) with Z is a new function, f Z : Z → Y , called the restriction of
f to Z. A relation, R, from X to Y is a partial function if condition (i) holds but
dom(R) ⊂ X. We say that R is not defined for any x ∈ X − dom(R). An example
of a partial function is the relation of identity f= from the set {1, 2} to the set {1}.
This relation is not defined for 2, since 2 ∈ {1, 2} − dom(f= ).
A function f : X → Y is a surjection iff ran(f ) = Y . A function f : X → Y
is an injection iff for all x1 , x2 ∈ X, f (x1 ) = f (x2 ) implies x1 = x2 . Any injection,
f : X → Y , has an inverse, f −1 : Y → X, where f −1 (f (x)) = x. A function
f : X → Y is a bijection iff f is both a surjection and an injection.2
Sets are either pure or impure. To define these terms, it is convenient to use the
familiar metaphor of set formation, according to which sets are formed by collecting
their elements. The pure sets are those sets that include the empty set and all the
sets that can be formed out of the empty set. Thus, the empty set is a pure set; the
collection of the empty set (its singleton) is a pure set; all collections of these sets
are pure sets, and so on. The impure sets are all those sets that can be formed out
of objects that include non-sets. Thus, the collection of Socrates (his singleton) is an
impure set; any collection that includes Socrates or his singleton is an impure set;
any collection that includes these collections is an impure set, and so on.
2

Another name for injection is ‘one–one function’. Another name for bijection is ‘one–to–one
correspondence’.
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2.2

Cantor’s paradox

Cantor’s paradox is a consequence of Cantor’s theorem, according to which the
cardinality of any set is less than the cardinality of its powerset.
Cantor’s theorem For any set, X, Card(X) < Card(PX).
It is assumed that every set has a cardinality and that every set has a powerset.
The cardinality of a set, Card(X), is a measure of its size and is defined by:
D1. Card(X) = Card(Y ) =df there is a bijection between X and Y .
D2. Card(X) ≤ Card(Y ) =df there is an injection from X to Y.
The relation ‘<’ is defined on cardinalities in terms of ‘=’ and ‘≤’:
D3. Card(X) < Card(Y ) =df Card(X) ≤ Card(Y ) and Card(X) 6= Card(Y ).
In 2.2.1, I run through a proof of Cantor’s theorem. In 2.2.2, I show how to apply
Cantor’s theorem to several existence assumptions to derive the paradox in a number
of different ways.
2.2.1

Proof of Cantor’s theorem

To prove Cantor’s theorem, it suffices to show that for an arbitrary set A, (i) there
is an injection from A to PA, and, (ii) there is no bijection between A and PA.
(i) Define fs : A → PA by fs (x) = {x}. Since distinct objects have distinct
singletons, fs is an injection.
(ii) To prove (ii), it suffices to show that no function f : A → PA is a surjection.
The key insight behind Cantor’s proof was the discovery of a procedure (diagonalization), by means of which we can use any f : A → PA to define a set w such that:
w ∈ PA but w ∈
/ ran(f ).3 This shows that f is not a surjection.
3

The procedure is called diagonalization because w can be represented geometrically as lying
along the diagonal of a matrix for f . For a clear explanation, see Klement (2010, 16–18).
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Let fa be an arbitrary function from A to PA and let ‘x’ range over A. Define w
as the set of all x such that x ∈
/ fa (x):
(1.1) (∀x)(x ∈ w ↔ x ∈
/ fa (x)).4
Since w ⊆ A, w ∈ PA. Assume for reductio that w ∈ ran(fa ). It follows that there
is some x—call this xw —such that fa (xw ) = w. As an instance of (1.1), we get
(1.2) xw ∈ w ↔ xw ∈
/ fa (xw ).
Since fa (xw ) = w, (1.2) is equivalent to the contradictory
(1.3) xw ∈ w ↔ xw ∈
/ w.
Discharging our reductio assumption, w ∈
/ ran(fa ). So fa is not a surjection. Since
fa was an arbitrary function, no function from A to PA is a surjection.
We now apply D1–D3 to reach the conclusion. Since fs : A → PA is an injection,
it follows by D2 that Card(A) ≤ Card(PA). Since no function from A to PA
is a surjection, it follows by D1 that Card(A) 6= Card(PA). Therefore, by D3,
Card(A) < Card(PA).
2.2.2

Derivations of Cantor’s paradox

Applying Cantor’s theorem to any of the following existence assumptions generates
a contradiction.
A1. There exists a set of all things, U .
A2. There exists a set of all sets, V .
A3. There exists a set of all pure sets, VP .
A4. There exists a set of all cardinal numbers, K.
4

To illustrate, suppose fa (x1 ) = {x1 } and fa (x2 ) = {x1 , x3 }. Then x1 ∈
/ w since x1 ∈ fa (x1 ),
but x2 ∈ w since x2 ∈
/ fa (x2 ).
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Speaking somewhat loosely, we might refer to the family of contradictions so generated
as ‘Cantor’s paradox’. But there are two reasons to be cautious.
First, this way of speaking departs somewhat from ordinary usage: it’s common
for authors to refer to a particular member of this family as ‘Cantor’s paradox’.
To take a somewhat random sampling, Russell (1903, 101); (1906, 138) identifies
Cantor’s paradox with the derivation of the contradiction that results from A1. In
their Encyclopedia Britannica entry on set theory, Robert Stoll and Herbert Enderton
(2016) identify Cantor’s paradox with the derivation of the contradiction that results
from A2. Graham Priest (2002, 128) identifies Cantor’s paradox with the derivation
of the contradiction that results from A3. And Stewart Shapiro and Crispin Wright
(2006, 257) identify Cantor’s paradox with the derivation of the contradiction that
results from A4.
Of course, the mere fact that these authors speak in these ways hardly shows that
they are engaged in a real dispute about the true identity of Cantor’s paradox. A
more plausible explanation for these diverse identifications is simply that in order to
present the paradox, one of A1–A4 must be selected, though any will do, and, as a
result, these authors have made their particular selections either entirely arbitrarily
or purely out of pedagogical preference.
But derivations of Cantor’s paradox differ in more ways than their starting assumptions. They also differ in the identity of the contradictions they generate and
in the intermediary steps leading up to these contradictions. Taken together, these
differences warrant a division into several argument types. I distinguish three, each
of which generates contradictions from some of A1–A4, and each of which has been
identified with Cantor’s paradox. I refer to these as ‘Cantor I’, ‘Cantor II’ and ‘Cantor III’. Cantor I generates contradictions from each of A1–A3. Cantor II generates
contradictions from each of A1 and A2. Cantor III generates a contradiction from
A4.
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I will not attempt to justify my division of Cantor’s paradox into three argument
types by presenting and defending particular identity criteria for argument types.
Instead, I base my division on differences in the particular contradiction (or contradictions) derived or in the steps used to derive this contradiction that strike me as
“significant enough.” Often, arguments from different types differ in both ways. Thus,
it is a consequence of Cantor I, but not of Cantor II, that Card(VP ) = Card(PVP )
(which contradicts Cantor’s theorem). In addition, these paradoxes derive their contradictions in different ways. Cantor I proceeds by showing that the cardinal number
of particular sets is the same as the cardinal number of their powersets; whereas
Cantor II proceeds by showing something stronger: that the cardinal number of particular sets is the largest possible cardinal number. However, I do not count every
difference between arguments as constituting a difference in argument type. Thus, I
distinguish two variants (or versions) of Cantor I. The decision of when to call two
arguments variants of the same type and when to call them two distinct types is
somewhat arbitrary; it’s always possible to look at things with a finer microscope and
see differences in type where before one had only noticed variants of the same kind.

2.2.2.1

Cantor I

Cantor I consists of a proof that the sets U , V and VP have the same size as their
powersets. This contradicts Cantor’s theorem. Overview: Let ‘X’ stand for any of
the sets U , V , or VP . The argument proceeds in three steps:
(i) The singleton function, fs : X → PX is an injection.
(ii) The identity function g= : PX → X is an injection.
(iii) It follows from (i) and (ii) that there is a bijection between X and PX. By D1,
Card(X) = Card(PX). This contradicts Cantor’s theorem, which, together
with D3, implies Card(X) 6= Card(PX).
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(i) has already been established (see 2.2.1). It remains to prove (ii) and (iii).
(ii) may seem obvious, for, it is trivial that any identity function f : X → Y
is an injection. (Given that f (x) = x, it follows immediately that if x1 6= x2 , then
f (x1 ) 6= f (x2 ).) However this is not enough to establish (ii). We also need to show
that g= is defined for all x ∈ PX. This requires showing that PX ⊆ X. We do
this by considering each possible value of ‘X’. PU ⊆ U since every subset of U is a
thing and therefore a member of U . PV ⊆ V since every subset of V is a set and
therefore a member of V . Finally, PVP ⊆ VP since every subset of VP is a pure set
and therefore a member of VP . Notice, however, that these cases are exceptional and
do not hold for smaller sets.
(iii) requires the Schröder-Bernstein theorem (SBT), which was independently
discovered by Ernst Shröder and Felix Bernstein in 1898:
SBT. If there is an injection, f : X → Y , and an injection, g : Y → X, then there is
a bijection between X and Y .
In terms of cardinalities, SBT tells us that if Card(X) ≤ Card(Y ) and Card(Y ) ≤
Card(X), then Card(X) = Card(Y ). In other words, the <-relation on cardinalities
behaves as we’d naturally expect.
The preceding discussion suggests formulating Cantor’s paradox I as follows. By
Cantor’s theorem,
(2.1) Card(X) < Card(PX).
Consequently, by D3,
(2.2) Card(X) 6= Card(PX).
However, by SBT, there is a bijection between X and PX. So, by D1,
(2.3) Card(X) = Card(PX).
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Contradiction.
A more common, though less rigorous, presentation of Cantor’s paradox I consists
of a proof that the sets U , V and VP are at least as large as their powersets, which
contradicts Cantor’s theorem. Overview: Let ‘X’ stand for any of the sets U , V
or VP . As before, the fact that PX ⊆ X establishes that g= : PX → X is an
injection. However, instead of using this (together with the injective function fs :
X → PX) to show that there is a bijection between X and PX, this presentation of
the argument infers directly that Card(X) 6< Card(PX). This contradicts Cantor’s
theorem, according to which Card(X) < Card(PX).
Shaughan Lavine (1994, 61–62) presents the paradox in this way (for X = U ):
The class of classes can be no larger than the class of individuals, since
it is contained in the class of individuals. But the class of classes is the
class of all subclasses of the class of individuals, and so Cantor’s diagonal
argument shows it to be larger than the class of individuals.
Lavine’s presentation might be formulated as follows. Since PX ⊆ X, g= : PX → X
is an injection. Therefore, by D1,
(3.1) Card(X) ≥ Card(PX).
But (3.1) implies
(3.2) Card(X) 6< Card(PX),
which contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which
(3.3) Card(X) < Card(PX).
Given the intuitive meaning of <, the step from (3.1) to (3.2) seems to be straightforward and even analytic. But notice that this step doesn’t follow from the definitions
D1–D3, which define < on cardinalities. In fact, it requires SBT in a proof such as
the following:
Proof: Given (3.1), suppose ¬(3.2) for reductio. Applying SBT to (3.1)
and ¬(3.2), it follows that Card(X) = Card(P(X)). This is impossible,
since by ¬(3.2) and D3, Card(X) 6= Card(P(X)). Therefore, Card(X) 6<
Card(PX).
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2.2.2.2

Cantor II

Cantor II begins by showing that X has the greatest cardinal number when X is
U or V . This contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which PX has a greater
cardinal number. Russell (1906, 138) presents the paradox in this form for X = U .
The cardinal contradiction is simply this: Cantor has a proof that there
is no greatest cardinal, and yet there are properties (such as ‘x = x’)
which belong to all entities. Hence the cardinal number of entities having such a property must be the greatest of cardinal numbers. Hence a
contradiction.5
Russell’s version of the argument may be formulated as follows. Suppose X = U
and let κ be any cardinal number. It follows that there is some set, A, such that
(4.1) κ = Card(A).
Since A ⊆ U , the identify function, g= : A → U , is an injection. By D2, κ ≤ Card(U ).
Generalizing,
(4.2) (∀κ)(κ ≤ Card(U )).
Therefore,
(4.3) Card(PU ) ≤ Card(U ).
By SBT,
(4.4) Card(PU ) 6> Card(U ).
This contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which,
(4.5) Card(PU ) > Card(U ).
If X is V , the proof that X has the greatest cardinal number is different. Suppose
first that X = V . As before, given an arbitrary cardinal number κ, it follows that
5

See also Russell (1903, 362) and Fraenkel et al. (1973, 7).
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there is some set, A, such that κ = Card(A). However, we cannot assume A ⊆ V ,
since A may contain non-sets as members. To get around this problem, define B as
the set of all and only singletons of members of A. Since no two objects have the
same singleton, the singleton function, fs : A → B, is an injection. Since no two
singletons are singletons of the same object, f ’s inverse, f −1 : B → A, is an injection.
By SBT, there is a bijection between A and B. Hence, by D1, κ = Card(B). Since
every member of B is a set, B ⊆ V . By D2, κ ≤ Card(V ). The argument then
proceeds as above.
Cantor II doesn’t go through when X = VP because we cannot satisfactorily
prove that VP has the greatest cardinal number. To do this, we’d need to rule out
the possibility that the set of individuals, U − V , has a greater cardinal number. The
most direct way of proving this is to come up with an injective function from U − V
to VP . In the standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with individuals (urelemente)—
ZFCU—injective functions can be defined from arbitrary sets of individuals to pure
sets.
Proof sketch: Let x be an arbitrary set of individuals in ZFCU. There is
a well-ordering of x, by the well-ordering theorem. This can be used to
define a bijection between x and an ordinal, y, which is a pure set. (In
ZFCU, the ordinals are defined as pure sets.)
However, this proof goes through only because, in ZF set theories, there can be no
set with at least as many members as there are pure sets. In any ZF set theory, a
collection with as many members as there are pure sets is not a set, but a proper
class. And we cannot derive a contradiction from the premise that the proper class
of all pure sets has the greatest cardinal number, since proper classes do not have
“power classes”. Of course, the rationale for this restriction in ZFCU is, in large part,
to block the derivation of Cantor’s paradox.
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2.2.2.3

Cantor III

Cantor III derives the contradiction from A4 by using K to construct a distinct
set, which is then shown to have the greatest cardinal number. This version of the
paradox is based on Shapiro and Wright’s (2006, 257) presentation of the argument
that cardinal number is an indefinitely extensible concept.
0

Let C be a collection of cardinal numbers. Let C be the union of the
result of replacing each κ ∈ C with a set of a size κ. The collection of
0
subsets of C is larger than any cardinal in C. So cardinal number is
indefinitely extensible.
If we begin with the assumption that there is a set of all cardinal numbers, i.e., there
is some C = K, this argument generates a contradiction.
Let gc be a choice function mapping every κ to an arbitrary set of cardinality κ.
It follows that
(5.1) (∀x)(x ∈ ran(gc ) ↔ (∃κ)(x = gc (κ))).
0

C is then defined as
(5.2) (∀x)(x ∈
S

S

S

ran(gc ) which is defined by:

ran(gc ) ↔ (∃κ)(x ∈ gc (κ))).

ran(gc ) has the greatest cardinal. For let κ1 be any cardinal number and take

gc (κ1 ). From (5.2), it follows that
(5.3) gc (κ1 ) ⊆

S

ran(gc ).

Since Card(gc (κ1 )) = κ1 , it follows by D2 that
(5.4) Card(

S

ran(gc )) ≥ κ1 .

Generalizing,
S
(5.5) (∀κ)(Card( ran(gc )) ≥ κ), which (by SBT) implies
S
(5.6) (∀κ)(Card( ran(gc )) 6< κ).
This contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which
(5.7) Card(

S

ran(gc )) < Card(P

S

ran(gc )).
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2.3

Burali-Forti’s paradox

Burali-Forti’s paradox (1897) is the result of applying certain general facts about
ordinal numbers, well-ordering relations and well-ordered sets, to the set of all ordinal
numbers. In this section, I introduce the conceptual machinery needed to define the
ordinals as order types of well-ordering relations. I will then use this definition, in
conjunction with two theorems about ordinals, to derive the paradox.
Let R be a relation defined on the set A. R is a well-ordering of A iff the following
conditions are met:
• R is transitive.
• R satisfies trichotomy, i.e., for any x, y ∈ A exactly one of the three alternatives:
(i) xRy,

(ii) x = y,

(iii) yRx,

holds.
• Every non-empty subset of A has a least element under R.
A set, X, is well-ordered iff there is a relation R that is a well-ordering of X.
Since one of the simplest and most familiar well-ordering relations is the relation <,
defined on the natural numbers, it is standard to use the symbol ‘<¡’ for well-ordering
relations in general. I write ‘<A ’ to denote the well-ordering relation < on the set A
and ‘(A, <A )’ to denote the set A when it is well-ordered by <A . For any element
x ∈ (A, <A ): (i) x is maximal if for every z ∈ (A, <A ), z ≤A x; (ii) x is greatest if
x is maximal and nothing else is; (iii) x is minimal if for every z ∈ (A, <A ), z ≥A x
and (iv) x is least if x is minimal and nothing else is.
There are three immediate consequences of these definitions that are worthy of
note. The first is that every well-ordered set contains a least element. The second
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is that any non-maximal element of a well-ordered set has a unique successor.6 The
third is that well-ordered sets may contain non-minimal elements having no immediate
predecessors. These are “limit points.” (In the ordered set of natural numbers {1 <
3 < 5, . . . , 2 < 4 < 6, . . .}, in which the odd numbers (from least to greatest) precede
the even numbers (from least to greatest), 2 is a limit point.)
In standard set theories, the sequence of ordinal numbers is identified with a
particular sequence of well-ordered sets. According to one standard identification,
0 is defined as the empty set, ∅, and the successor of each natural number, s(n),
is defined as the union of n with its singleton: s(n) = n ∪ {n}.7 According to
another standard identification, the successor of each natural number is defined as its
singleton: s(n) = {n}. Identifications such as these are mathematically advantageous,
however, philosophically they appear arbitrary. This arbitrariness cannot be avoided
by selecting the identification that is the most useful: there are many such sequences
that are useful and none of these stands out as the sequence that is most useful
(Benacerraf, 1965). One way to avoid making an arbitrary identity is to hold that
ordinal numbers are sui generis.8 While I am sympathetic to this approach, I will
officially go no further than to define the ordinal numbers as measures (order-types) of
the “length” of well-ordered sets. This leaves it open what particular entities play this
role; consequently, whether the ordinals are sui generis or whether they are identical
to some other entities.9
6

Proof: Suppose x is a non-maximal element of the well-ordered set (A, <A ). By the definition of
‘maximal’, there is some y ∈ (A, <A ) such that y >A x. Define B ⊆ A as the set of all z ∈ (A, <A )
such that z >A x. Since <A is a well-ordering, B has a least element. This is the successor of x.
7

This is the so-called von Neumann sequence: ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, . . . , named after John von Neumann.
8

This point is made by Resnik (1980, 231) and criticized by Balaguer (1998, 78–80). Another
way to avoid making an arbitrary identity is to adopt structuralism. This seems to be Benacerraf’s
preference (Benacerraf, 1965, 290–294).
9

Though, any argument for the latter must address the arbitrariness worry.
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Every well-ordered set, (X, <X ), has an ordinal number, written ‘Ord(X, <X )’.
Ord(X, <X ) is a measure of X’s length under the well-ordering relation <X . Ordinals
stand to set length as cardinal numbers stand to set size. To illustrate, consider the
(unordered) set:
{Aristotle, Plato, Socrates}.
If we order this by the relation, Born Earlier Than, which we may symbolize as <BET ,
we get the well-ordered set:
{Socrates <BET Plato <BET Aristotle}.
To calculate the length of this set, we take its elements in order. The first element is Socrates. The second element is Plato. The third and last element is
Aristotle. Thus, its length is the ordinal number 3. Note that the ordinal number of {Socrates <BET Plato <BET Aristotle} is the same as the cardinal number of
{Aristotle, Plato, Socrates}. In general, for finite sets, length and size coincide. This
does not hold for infinite sets.
Two ordinals are identical when the corresponding well-ordered sets are related
by an order-preserving bijection, called an isomorphism.
D4. f : (A, <A ) → (B, <B ) is an isomorphism between (A, <A ) and (B, <B ) =df (i)
f is a bijection and (ii) f is order-preserving, i.e., x <A y implies f (x) <B f (y).
Using ‘∼
=’ for ‘is isomorphic to’, ordinal identity is defined by:
D5. Ord(A, <A ) = Ord(B, <B ) =df (A, <A ) ∼
= (B, <B ).
To define < on the ordinals, I use the notion of an initial segment.
D6. If x ∈ (A, <A ), then {z ∈ A — z <A x} is an initial segment of (A, <A ), written
‘seg(x)’.
I then define < on the ordinals by:
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D7. Ord(A, <A ) < Ord(B, <B ) =df there is a y ∈ B such that (A, <A ) ∼
= seg(y).10
Following standard convention, I use lowercase Greek letters as variables for ordinals. In addition, for any ordinal, α, I let α (in boldface) denote seg(α):
D8. α =df seg(α) = {β | β < α}.
Two important theorems that can be proved from D4–D8 are:
BF1. Any set of ordinals is well-ordered by <.
BF2. Every ordinal, α = Ord(α).
I provide my own proofs in the appendix to this chapter. One reason for doing this
is that standard proofs of BF1 and BF2 presuppose an (arbitrary) identification of
ordinal numbers with particular well-ordered sets, which I find objectionable. Another
reason is to minimize the sort of intellectual dissatisfaction that may result from
simply being told that a certain proposition can be (or has been) proved. This is of
particular importance when the proposition enters into the derivation of a paradox.
In the present case, dissatisfaction can arise in two ways. First, insofar as one is
unfamiliar with the proofs, one may come to doubt the validity of the inferences from
D4–D8 to BF1 and BF2. As a result, one may be led to interpret the derivation of
the resulting contradiction as a simple reductio of either (or both) of these theorems
instead of as constituting a genuine paradox. Second, one might tend towards an
opposite extreme and think of BF1 and BF2 as parts of the definition of ‘ordinal
number’. This may cause one to blame the Burali-Forti contradiction on an incoherent
concept. For example, if in addition to playing the role of measuring well-ordered sets,
the ordinals are defined as being themselves well-ordered and each ordinal is defined
as the ordinal of the set of all lesser ordinals—which is, in essence, what is done
10

To distinguish the ordinal relation < from the cardinal relation <, we might write the former
<O and the latter <K . In what follows, context should be enough to clear up any ambiguity.
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in standard ZF set theory (Jech, 2003, 19)—then it is hardly surprising to discover
that the assumption that there is a set of all ordinals leads to a contradiction. Give
this assumption, it is a direct implication of the definition of ‘ordinal number’ that
a single ordinal exists, which is the measure of two non-isomorphic sets. This result
is more surprising if ordinals are simply defined as order types of well-ordered sets.
One begins with the assumption that there is a set of all ordinals. One then proves
that this set is well-ordered (BF1) and therefore has an ordinal number and one then
proves that this same ordinal number is the ordinal number of all lesser ordinals
(BF2). Whereas the former definition seems to build the Burali-Forti contradiction
into the very notion of an ordinal number, the latter definition does not.

2.3.1

Derivations of Burali-Forti’s paradox

Applying BF1–BF2 to the existence assumption:
A5. There exists a set of all the ordinal numbers,
generates a contradiction. As I noted above in the discussion of Cantor’s paradox,
there are several distinct argument types, each of which generates a contradiction
from A5, and each of each has been identified with Burali-Forti’s paradox. All these,
however, share a common core. This core consists of employing BF1–BF2 to prove
(a) that the set of all ordinal numbers is well-ordered by < and therefore has an
ordinal number, Ω = Ord(O, <), and (b) that Ω = Ord(Ω). BF1–BF2 play a role in
derivations of Burali-Forti’s paradox similar to that which Cantor’s theorem plays in
derivations of Cantor’s paradox. Just as Cantor’s theorem implies that the cardinal
number of any set, Card(X), is less than some cardinal number, viz., the cardinal
number of X’s powerset, BF1–BF2 imply that the ordinal number of any well-ordered
set, Ord(X, <X ), is less than some ordinal number, viz., the ordinal of the set formed
by adding Ord(X, <X ) to the set of all smaller ordinals.
(a) and (b) can be proved as follows:
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(a) Given A5, there is a set of all ordinals, O. By BF1, this set is
well-ordered by <. By D5, it has an ordinal number, Ω = Ord(O, <).
(b) Instantiating BF2 to Ω gives us Ω = Ord(Ω).
At this point, the derivations diverge. To avoid confusion, I label these ‘Burali Forti
I’, ‘Burali-Forti II’ and ‘Burali-Forti III’. Below, I consider each of these in turn.

2.3.1.1

Burali-Forti I

Burial-Forti I uses (a) and (b) to derive the proposition Ω < Ω, which is inconsistent with BF1. Cantor (1899, 115) presents the paradox in this way.
Since [(O, <)] is a well-ordered set, there would correspond to it a number [Ω] greater than all numbers of the system [(O, <)]; but the number
[Ω] also occurs in the system [(O, <)], because this system contains all
numbers; [Ω] would thus be greater than [Ω], which is a contradiction.11
Cantor’s argument can be reconstructed as follows:
(i) It begins by establishing (a): “Since [(O, <)] is a well-ordered set, there would
correspond to it a number [Ω].”
(ii) The argument then asserts that Ω is greater than any ordinal: “[Ω is] greater
than all numbers of the system [(O, <)].” Proof: By (a) and (b), Ord(Ω) =
Ord(O, <). It follows that Ω = (O, <). Since Ω is greater than all members of
Ω, Ω is greater than all members of (O, <).
(iii) Finally, the argument uses the fact that Ω is an ordinal to reach the conclusion
that Ω < Ω: “But the number [Ω] also occurs in the system [(O, <)], because
this system contains all numbers; [Ω] would thus be greater than [Ω], which is
a contradiction.” Proof: Ω is greater than all ordinals (by (ii)). But Ω is an
ordinal. Therefore, Ω < Ω.
11

Cantor assumes that 0 is not an ordinal. Thus, instead of (O, <), he uses the class containing 0
as its least element followed by all the ordinals (beginning with 1). As nothing of importance hinges
on this difference, I have replaced Cantor’s class with (O, <) throughout.
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Cantor calls Ω < Ω, “a contradiction.” While this statement doesn’t have the
logical form of a contradiction, it can be proved to be impossible. Applying D7,
‘Ω < Ω’ means that (O, <) is isomorphic to one of its initial segments. This is easily
proved to be impossible, given the definitions for ‘isomorphism’ and ‘initial segment’
(D4 and D7).12 Alternatively, we can derive an explicit contradiction by applying
BF1, as follows:
(iv) Proof: By BF1, every ordinal satisfies trichotomy. Since Ω is an
ordinal number, Ω satisfies trichotomy. Therefore, Ω 6< Ω.
Putting this all together, Burali-Forti I might be formulated as follows:
By (a) and (b),
(6.1) Ω is greater than any α ∈ (O, <).
But Ω is an ordinal. Therefore,
(6.2) Ω < Ω.
This contradicts BF1, according to which
(6.3) Ω 6< Ω.
A slight variant of this argument begins in the same way, by arguing that Ω is
greater than any α ∈ (O, <), but then proceeds to derive the contradiction Ω ∈ (O, <)
∧Ω∈
/ (O, <). This is how Russell (1906, 141) describes the paradox:
Burali-Forti’s contradiction may be stated, after some modification, as
follows. If u is any segment of the series of ordinals in order of magnitude,
the ordinal number of u is greater than any member of u, and is, in
fact, the immediate successor of u . . . But now consider the whole series
of ordinal numbers. This is well ordered, and therefore should have an
ordinal number. This must be an ordinal number, and yet must be greater
than any ordinal number. Hence it both is, and is not, an ordinal number,
which is a contradiction.
12

See the appendix, Lemma 2.
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Russell’s description suggests the following variant of (6.1)–(6.3):
By (a) and (b),
(7.1) Ω is greater than any α ∈ (O, <).
So,
(7.2) Ω ∈
/ (O, <).
But Ω is an ordinal and (O, <) is the set of all ordinals. So,
(7.3) Ω ∈ (O, <).
Contradiction.

2.3.1.2

Burali-Forti II

Burali-Forti II derives a contradiction by using Ω to define a new ordinal, Ω + 1,
which is shown to be both greater than and less than Ω. This is, in fact, how BuraliForti originally formulated the paradox.13 A recent presentation of this argument is
given by Geoffrey Hellman (2011, 631):
Often the Burali-Forti paradox is referred to as the paradox of ‘the largest
ordinal’, which goes as follows: Let [O] be the class of all (von Neuman,
say) ordinals. Then, since Ω represents the order-type of the well-ordering
< on ordinals ... Ω itself qualifies as an ordinal. But then it has a successor,
Ω + 1, which is an ordinal and so must occur as a member of [O], by
definition of the latter as the class of all ordinals. But then we have that
Ω + 1 < Ω < Ω + 1, a contradiction.
Burali-Forti II has been criticized on the grounds that once Ω is defined as the
ordinal of all ordinals there cannot be any ordinals left to add to it to generate a new
ordinal. The mathematicians W. H. Young and G. C. Young (quoted by Irving Copi
in (Copi, 1958, 284)) voice this criticism, when they write:

13

See Copi (1958, 281) for a presentation of Burali-Forti’s version.
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When you have taken in your mind a set of type Ω, you have taken
everything, nothing remains to give a new element, and the whole of the
reasoning is mere confusion.
The problem with this line of reasoning is not the claim that “nothing remains to give
a new element.” It is rather the inference from this to the denial that Ω + 1 exists.
For we can prove that if (O, <) exists, then it must contain an element, Ω + 1, which
is both less than and greater than Ω. Nevertheless, we can avoid the appearance of
conjuring up an ordinal that cannot possibly exist (given our assumption that there
is a set of all ordinals) by focusing on the set Ω. We know that when you have taken
this set, you have not taken everything. Ω remains to give a new element. Therefore,
the result of adding Ω to Ω is a new set, Ω ∪ {Ω}, consisting of all the members of Ω
with Ω stuck on at the end. Burali-Forti II can be formulated as follows:
Since Ω ∈
/ Ω,
(8.1) Ord(Ω) < Ord(Ω ∪ {Ω}).
By (b), Ord(Ω) = Ω. Consequently, Ord(Ω ∪ {Ω}) = Ω + 1. Substituting into (8.1),
(8.2) Ω < Ω + 1.
Ω + 1 is an ordinal. So, Ω + 1 ∈ (O, <). For the reasons given above (in step (ii) of
Burali-Forti I), Ω is greater than any member of (O, <). Therefore,
(8.3) Ω + 1 < Ω.
By (8.2) and (8.3),
(8.4) Ω + 1 < Ω < Ω + 1
By BF1, < is transitive, so
(8.5) Ω + 1 < Ω + 1.
Also, by BF1, < satisfies trichotomy, so
(8.6) Ω + 1 6< Ω + 1.
Contradiction.
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2.3.1.3

Burali-Forti III

In both Burali-Forti I and II, the argument that Ω is greater than any α ∈ (O, <)
works through the premise that Ω = (O, <). The inconsistency of this identity with
D8, according to which Ω is the sequence of all ordinals less than Ω, raises the
worry that the derivation of a contradiction which follows is invalid: perhaps it is
merely the result of an incoherent assumption. However, this is not the case. What
this observation shows is that Ω, if it existed, would have to be the ordinal of two
sequences of different lengths: Ω, i.e., the sequence of all ordinals less than Ω, and
(O, <), i.e., the sequence of all ordinals (including Ω). Nevertheless, the sense that
these proofs go awry at this step may be assuaged by deriving the contradiction in
the following alternate way, which I label ‘Burali-Forti III’.
By (a) and (b),
(9.1) Ord(Ω) = Ω = Ord(O, <).
By D6, Ω is an initial segment of (O, <). Consequently, by D7,
(9.2) Ord(Ω) < Ord(O, <).
It follows from (9.1) and (9.2) that
(9.3) Ω < Ω.
This contradicts BF1, according to which
(9.4) Ω 6< Ω.

2.4

Russell’s Paradox

Russell’s paradox (1901) consists in deriving a contradictory conclusion from the
existence assumption:
A6. There exists a set of all the non-self-membered sets.
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2.4.1

Derivation of Russell’s Paradox

The derivation of Russell’s paradox is straightforward and requires no additional
conceptual background, special existential assumptions, or auxiliary proofs. According to A6, there exists the set, R, of all non-self-membered sets:
(10.1) R = {x — x ∈
/ x}
Suppose R ∈ R. It follows that R is a non-self-membered set. So
(10.2) R ∈
/ R.
From (10.1) and (10.2) it follows that:
(10.3) R ∈ R.
Contradiction.

2.5

Genuine paradoxes or mere reductios?

Like a paradox, a reductio proof consists in the derivation of a contradiction from
a set of premises. The difference is that a reductio has a single target, a suspect
assumption, which is presumed guilty until proven innocent. Of course, in nearly all
cases, the suspect assumption is not the only premise upon which the derivation of
the contradiction depends. There are almost always other premises. But these are
not under suspicion. The reasons why may vary. Perhaps they have been previously
proved. Perhaps they are taken to be self-evident. Or, perhaps they are simply
widely accepted. Whatever the reason, when a contradiction results, it is clear that
the target premise is the one to be rejected.
A paradox, on the other hand, has no single target. Multiple premises are presumed innocent, usually because each has been previously accepted as highly plausible
in its own right. Since there is no obvious scapegoat, the discovery that these premises
are inconsistent places one in a delicate situation. To avoid the contradiction, some
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premise must be rejected, but with no good reason for picking one premise rather
than another, any choice is arbitrary. To escape this arbitrariness, one might be led
to question the argument’s validity, or even consider revising the underlying logic or
language.14
Are the so-called paradoxes of set theory genuine paradoxes? Or mere reductios?
To decide this question, I introduce the notion of a natural conception of set. By a
natural conception, I mean (very roughly) an independently plausible view about the
nature of sets that is explanatory in the sense that it motivates the basic principles
of set theory, and in particular, grounds the conditions under which sets are said to
exist. Conditions for naturalness are discussed by Michael Potter (1993, 178–179)
and George Boolos (1998, 14–18, 89–90). Of particular interest are Russell’s (1959,
79–80) autobiographical remarks on three requisites that had guided his search for a
“wholly satisfying” solution to the paradoxes. The first two conditions do not have
much to do with naturalness. These are “that the contradictions should disappear”
and that “the solution should leave intact as much of mathematics as possible.” The
third, however, gets to the very heart of this notion. Russell writes:
The third, which is difficult to state precisely, was that the solution should,
on reflection, appeal to what may be called ‘logical common sense’—i.e.,
that it should seem, in the end, just what one ought to have expected all
along.
What Russell has in mind is further illustrated when he considers those philosophers
who being contented with “logical dexterity” have not regarded this criterion “as
essential”.
Professor Quine, for example, has produced systems which I admire greatly
on account of their skill, but which I cannot feel to be satisfactory because
they seem to be created ad hoc and not to be such as even the cleverest
logician would have thought of if he had not known of the contradictions.
14

See Moore and Garciadiego (1981, 321) for similar remarks on the difference between contradiction and paradox.
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The key idea is the requirement that a satisfactory solution to the paradoxes must be
independently motivated. It must provide an account of sets that blocks the paradoxes,
without being motivated by the need to block the paradoxes. This is what prevents
the account from being ad hoc and one that not even the cleverest logician would
have thought of if he had not known of the contradictions.
I claim that a conception of set is the more natural the more closely it conforms
to the following conditions:
• Condition 1: It answers questions about the existence of particular sets by
providing a uniform and believable account of the existence conditions for all
sets.
• Condition 2: It is capable of being readily understood without prior training in
set theory. The conception ought to motivate the formal theory, not the other
way round.
• Condition 3: It does not contain ad hoc devices or restrictions designed principally to avoid paradox.
• Condition 4: Our confidence in the consistency of the formal theory that a
conception of set motivates does not rest solely on the fact that no contradiction
has been proved in the theory, but also on an intuitive grasp of the corresponding
concept of set.
The question of whether a contradiction in set theory constitutes a genuine paradox is then answered relative to a conception of set. In the preceding three sections,
I’ve shown a number of ways in which contradictions follow from the assumptions
A1–A5 that particular “contradiction-inducing” sets exist. I contend that these contradictions constitute genuine paradoxes relative to a natural conception of set, C,
only if C is committed to set theoretic principles which:
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(a) entail the existence of the contradiction-inducing sets, and,
(b) motivate the set-theoretic principles needed to derive the contradictions.
When confronted with a genuine paradox in set theory, it may be unclear how
to go about restoring consistency. One way is to reject the underlying conception of
set; however, given its naturalness, we should be loathe to do this. But if we wish to
keep the conception, we cannot very easily reject the contradiction-inducing sets, or
throw out some of the set-theoretic principles so as to block the derivations, for if the
paradox is genuine, the conception of set is committed to both.
Of course, one might avoid the contradictions by abandoning sets altogether. But,
given their widespread acceptance in mathematics and logic and their remarkable utility, very few would consider such a draconian solution. Alternatively, one might adopt
a pragmatic approach, which seeks to preserve a theory of sets without any underlying conception of set. I find this to be highly unsatisfying. Without a conception of
set, we are in no position to understand what it is that set theory studies, or what
makes it true. In particular, we are unable to explain, in any satisfying way, why
there exist only those sets that our theory says exist; hence, we cannot explain why
the contradiction-inducing sets do not exist. These shortcomings of the pragmatic
strategy are nicely illustrated by Hermann Weyl’s (1949, 231) remark:
The attitude is frankly pragmatic; one cures the visible symptoms [of the
paradoxes] but neither diagnoses nor attacks the underlying disease.
Weyl’s remark underscores the sense of dissatisfaction that results from an inability
to provide an explanation: the pragmatist knows she must restrict set theory in some
way for the sake of consistency; but insofar as consistency is her sole motivation, we
are left dissatisfied, for we have no explanation. A similar sentiment is expressed
by Dummett (1991, 316), when he writes that blocking the paradoxes by simply
prohibiting those entities judged to be immediately responsible for the contradictions,
“is to wield the big stick, not to offer an explanation.”
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Of course, if our only choice is between a consistent set theory with no explanation
and an inconsistent set theory or no set theory at all, then pragmatism may be the
best option. For some time after the discovery of the paradoxes, it was the general
consensus amongst philosophers that we faced such an unattractive choice: it seemed
that there was only one natural conception of set—the logical conception of set—
and that this was committed to principles satisfying (a) and (b).15 (I discuss this
conception in some detail in chapter 4.) However, most philosophers today believe
they have found an alternative conception of set which delivers both consistency and
explanation. This is the iterative conception, which, they claim, is natural without
succumbing to (a) and (b). On their view, while the contradictions constitute genuine
paradoxes relative to the original, logical conception of set, they do not constitute
genuine paradoxes relative to the iterative conception of set. As Gödel (1947, 518) famously observed, relative to the iterative conception of set, the contradictions “cause
no trouble at all.” Of course, standard texts in contemporary set theory include
derivations of contradictions from A1–A5; but insofar as contemporary set theory
can be motivated by the iterative conception of set, these derivations can be understood as harmless reductio proofs. For the iterative conception does not entail the
existence of these contradiction-inducing sets. My own view is that the iterative conception fails to satisfy the conditions on naturalness; in particular, it fails to explain
why the contradiction-inducing sets don’t exist, but I will take this up in chapter 6.

2.5.1

Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell

What did Cantor, Burali-Forti and Russell think of the contradictions they had
discovered? Did they view these as genuine paradoxes? The very short answer is that
Russell did, while Cantor and Burali-Forti did not.
15

See Potter (1993) for some citations from philosophers attesting to this view.
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Burali-Forti published his contradiction in 1897 as part of a reductio proof against
BF1; more specifically, as part of a proof that the ordinals were not connected under
<, i.e., there are pairs of distinct ordinals, α and β, such that neither α < β nor
β < α.16 However, this was inconsistent with Cantor’s (1897) proof that every proper
subset of the ordinals is well-ordered, and later, with Ernest Zermelo’s (1904) proof
that every set could be well-ordered.
Cantor also thought of his contradiction as a reductio proof, but he placed the
blame on the existence assumptions A1–A4. As I noted in chapter 1, he distinguished
absolutely infinite totalities from smaller transfinite (and finite) totalities and he argued that only the latter formed sets. Totalities such as the totality of everything
(A1), the totalities of all pure and impure sets (A2–A3) and the totality of all cardinal
numbers (A4) were “absolutely infinite” and therefore too big to form sets. Cantor
thought of Burali-Forti’s contradiction in the same way: as a reductio proof that
the totality of all ordinals (A5) was absolutely infinite and therefore did not form
a set. Von Neumann (1925) later encapsulated Cantor’s distinction in terms of the
set/proper class distinction. Von Neumann’s sets correspond to Cantor’s transfinite
and finite totalities; his proper classes correspond to Cantor’s absolutely infinite totalities. Unlike sets, proper classes cannot be members of other classes. This restriction
on membership blocks the paradoxes.17 The plausibility of Cantor’s position depends
on the plausibility of the limitation of size doctrine, which I will discuss later.
Russell took a different line. Following Peano and Frege, he thought of sets as the
logical extensions of properties, or, as he put it, propositional functions. Given the
16

See Copi (1958). Russell (1903) briefly considers the related view that O was not well-ordered
even though all its proper subsets were.
17

Cantor’s paradox is blocked since proper classes do not have powerclasses (any proper class
would be a member of its powerclass, which is impossible). Burali-Forti’s paradox is blocked since
proper classes do not have ordinals (any proper class would be a member of its ordinal, which is
impossible). Russell’s paradox is blocked since there is no class of all non-self-membered proper
classes (if there was, it would contain proper classes as members, which is impossible).
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existence of the properties thing, set, pure set, cardinal number and ordinal number,
the logical conception is committed to the existence of their extensions, i.e., the sets
U , V , VP , K and O. Russell’s commitment to these sets and his awareness of Cantor’s
paradox led him to question the veracity of Cantor’s theorem. This, in turn, led him
to the discovery of his own contradiction, which he regarded as a genuine paradox.18
Recall that part (ii) of Cantor’s theorem consists of a reductio argument that no
function from A to PA is a surjection. Russell argued that this reasoning fails for
certain large sets, such as U , V and VP . In a 1901 draft of “Principles of Mathematics”, he showed how to define surjective functions from these sets onto their powersets.
Consider the case in which A = U .19 Russell’s proposal was to define the function
fr : U → PU as follows:
For all x ∈ U , fr (x) = {x} if x is not a set and fr (x) = x otherwise.
Since every subset of U is a member of U , and is consequently mapped to itself by
fr , ran(fr ) = PU . So fr is a surjection. Now consider the set, wr = {x ∈ U —
x∈
/ fr (x)}, defined by Cantor’s method of diagonalization on U with respect to fr .
Clearly, wr ⊆ U . So, wr ∈ ran(fr ). But this is impossible if the proof of Cantor’s
theorem is sound, for, as we’ve seen (2.2.1), this proof purports to show that no
f : X → PX can be a surjection on the grounds that diagonalization on X with
respect to f always defines a set w ∈
/ ran(f ).
In the same draft, Russell goes on to observe that wr = R, the set of all non-selfmembered sets. In other words, the result of applying diagonalization to Russell’s
function fr is the Russell set, R. To see this, it will help to recall Cantor’s recipe for
diagonalization. Given any function, f : X → PX, the diagonal set w is defined by:
18

Russell reports the role Cantor’s argument played in the discovery of his paradox in several
places. Among these are: Russell (1903, 101, 362), Russell (1919, 136) and Russell (1959, 75–76).
19

In the draft, Russell confines himself to the case in which A = V , but the same reasoning applied
in this case is easily extended to U and VP . See Coffa (1979) for discussion.
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(11.1) (∀x)(x ∈ w ↔ x ∈
/ f (x)), where ‘x’ ranges over X.
To define the diagonal set wr , replace f with fr in (11.1). Given the definition of fr ,
if x is not a set, then x ∈ fr (x), and so x ∈
/ wr . On the other hand, if x is a set, then
x ∈ fr (x) ↔ x ∈ x, and so x ∈ wr ↔ x ∈
/ x. Consequently, wr ’s members are all and
only the non-self-membered sets. So wr = R. If we let ‘xs ’ be the restriction of ‘x’ to
sets, then we can represent this by:
(11.2) (∀xs )(xs ∈ wr ↔ xs ∈
/ xs )
Putting ‘R’ in for ‘wr ’ and instantiating ‘xs ’ to R delivers the contradictory
(11.3) R ∈ R ↔ R ∈
/ R.
Recognizing this contradiction, Russell goes on to remark that
The procedure [using fr to define the diagonal set R on U ] is, in this case,
impossible; for if we apply it to R itself, we find that R is a [member
of] fr (R), and therefore not a [member of] R; but from the definition, R
should be a [member of] R.20
Russell’s point seems to be that diagonalization must fail with respect to fr . For if
it succeeded, it would introduce the set R and this leads to the contradictory (11.3).
Note the contrast between this case and the ordinary cases of Cantor’s theorem. In
the ordinary cases, we use diagonalization on a set X with respect to f to define the
set w and then infer by reductio that w ∈
/ ran(f ); or equivalently, that xw ∈
/ dom(f ).
This option is not available when we use diagonalization on U with respect to fr
to define the set R. In this case, we cannot infer by reductio that R ∈
/ ran(fr );
or equivalently, that R ∈
/ dom(fr ). Since dom(fr ) = U and U contains absolutely
everything, R ∈ dom(fr ) if R exists at all.
Surely, Russell is correct that diagonalization is impossible here. But what explains the impossibility? Is it a problem with diagonalization, or with something else?
20

As noted in the previous footnote, Russell defines R on V , not U .
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Later that same year, Russell seems to have changed his mind, however, and decided
that the fault was not with diagonalization. In a 1901 letter, he writes
I thought that I could refute Cantor; now I see that he is irrefutable.21
But at this point he was unable to offer an alternative. His discovery of ‘the contradiction’—
as he called it—left him bewildered.
Today, we would likely reply that Russell’s mistake was his endorsement of a
conception of set that was committed to individual sets such as U , V and VP . The
solution, we might add, is to replace this conception with an alternative conception
of set, which does not have these entailments. But when Russell first discovered
the paradox, there was no alternative conception available. It seemed that the only
conception of set was also inconsistent. This explains Russell’s sense of paradox. In
Russell (1903, xv–xvi) he expressed his state of mind as follows:
In the case of [sets], I must confess, I have failed to perceive any concept
fulfilling the conditions requisite for the notion of [set]. And the contradiction . . . proves that something is amiss, but what this is I have hitherto
failed to discover.22
At the risk of oversimplification, we might say that he remained in this predicament
until 1908, by which time he had worked out a type-theoretic solution (originally
proposed in Russell (1903)). During the period from 1901–1908, however, it seems
likely that Russell viewed the contradictions of set theory as constituting genuine
paradoxes.
2.5.2

Paradoxes of Logic and Paradoxes of Set Theory

We’ve seen two ways of deriving Russell’s paradox. According to the first, the
contradiction follows directly from A6. According to the second, it follows from
A1 and diagonalization. The direct version involves a single ideological assumption
21

Translated in Coffa (1979, 37).

22

I have replaced ‘class’ with ‘set’ throughout.

60

(in addition to some elementary logic): set-membership. In his presentation of set
theory, Michael Potter (2004, 25) notes that the derivation of the contradiction from
the assumption that the Russell set exists (A6) requires none of the axioms of set
theory.
The first thing to notice about this result is that we have proved it before
stating any axioms for our theory.
The fact that the contradiction can be derived so directly, without appeal to additional
mathematical or set theoretic machinery, bears on the degree to which it strikes us
as purely logical. Of course, to show that the contradiction is a logical paradox, and
not merely a reductio, the assumption that R exists must itself be logically wellmotivated. This is a question I will take up when I discuss the logical conception of
set in chapter 4.
Like Russell’s paradox, Cantor’s paradox and Burali-Forti’s paradox require the
existence of particular sets (U , V , or VP in the case of Cantor’s paradox; O, in the
case of Burali-Forti’s paradox). But these paradoxes require more. Each makes use
of additional ideology, existential assumptions and auxiliary theorems that do not
appear to be part of logic.
All derivations of Cantor’s paradox depend on Cantor’s theorem, which involves
the functional notions of surjection, injection and bijection; as well as the set-theoretic
notions of cardinality (defined by D1–D3) and powerset 23 These latter two notions go
hand in hand with the existential assumptions that every set has a cardinal number
and that every set has a powerset. All derivations of Cantor’s paradox also depend
on SBT (p. 30), which, in spite of its apparent obviousness, is quite difficult to prove.
Cantor’s paradox III requires additional principles for set formation corresponding to
the familiar ZFC axioms of Union, Replacement and Choice.
23

See pp. 31–33.
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All derivations of Burali-Forti’s paradox involve the notions of well-ordering, isomorphism (defined by D4) and ordinal number (defined by D5–D7).24 These notions
go hand in hand with the existential assumption that every well-ordered set has an
ordinal number. All derivations of Burali-Forti’s paradox also involve the auxiliary
theorems BF1 and BF2. As I show below in the appendix, the proofs of these theorems require additional lemmas.
I conclude that even if we accept a logical conception of sets, according to which
set-membership is a logical notion and set existence is secured by logic alone, the
paradoxes of Cantor and Burali-Forti are paradoxes of set theory, not logic.

2.6

Appendix

The following proofs are based largely on Jech (2003, 18-19) and Potter (2004,
180-181).

Lemma 1. If f is an isomorphism on the well-ordered set (A, <A ), then
(∀x ∈ A)(f (x) ≥A x)
Proof: Let f be an isomorphism on the well-ordered set (A, <A ) and suppose for
reductio that there exists x ∈ A such that f (x) <A x. Let x0 be the least such x and
let f (x0 ) = y. Since y < x0 , f (y) ≥ y. Therefore, f (y) ≥ f (x0 ), which is impossible,
since f is order-preserving.

Lemma 2. No well-ordered set is isomorphic to one of its initial segments
Proof: Suppose for reductio that f is an isomorphism on (A, <A ) and that there is
some x ∈ A such that ran(f ) = seg(x). It follows that f (x) <A x, which contradicts
Lemma 1.
24

See pp. 42–44.
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Lemma 3. For any ordinal α, (α, <) is a well-ordered set
Proof: Since α is an ordinal, there is a well-ordered set, (A, <A ), such that α =
Ord(A, <A ). For each x ∈ A, let f (x) = Ord(seg(x)). I will show that (α, <) is a
well-ordered set by showing two things:
1. ran(f ) = α.
2. f : (A, <A ) → (ran(f ), <) is an isomorphism.
1a. First, I show that y ∈ ran(f ) implies y ∈ α. Suppose y ∈ ran(f ). Then,
for some x ∈ A, y = f (x) = Ord(seg(x)). Since y is the ordinal of an initial
segment of (A, <A ) and α = Ord(A, <A ), it follows by D7 that y < α. Hence,
by D8, y ∈ α.
1b. Next, I show that y ∈ α implies y ∈ ran(f ). Suppose y ∈ α. By D8, y is an
ordinal and y < α. Hence, there is a well-ordered set, (B, <B ), such that y =
Ord(B, <B ) and Ord(B, <B ) < Ord(A, <A ). By D7, there exists some x ∈ A
such that (B, <B ) ∼
= seg(x)). Let this be a. Then f (a) = Ord(seg(a)) = y. So,
y ∈ ran(f ).
1c. It follows from 1a and 1b that ran(f ) = α.
2a. First, I show that f is a bijection. f is a surjection by definition. To show that
f is an injection, I need to show that for any x1 6= x2 ∈ A, f (x1 ) 6= f (x2 ). Since
(A, <A ) is well-ordered, either x1 <A x2 or x2 <A x1 . By D5, if x1 <A x2 , then
seg(x1 ) is an initial segment of seg(x2 ). Similarly, if x2 <A x1 , then seg(x2 ) is
an initial segment of seg(x1 ). In either case, seg(x1 ) ∼
6= seg(x2 ) by Lemma 2. By
D4, Ord(seg(x1 )) 6= Ord(seg(x2 )). Therefore, f (x1 ) 6= f (x2 ).
2b. To show that f is order-preserving, I need to show that for any x1 <A x2 ,
f (x1 ) < f (x2 ). Suppose x1 <A x2 . It follows that seg(x1 ) is an initial segment
of seg(x2 ). Hence, by D6, f (x1 ) < f (x2 ).
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2c. It follows from 2a and 2b that f : (A, <A ) → (ran(f ), <) is an isomorphism.
By 1c and 2c, (A, <A ) ∼
= (α, <). Hence, (α, <) is a well-ordered set.
BF1. Any nonempty set of ordinals is well-ordered by ¡
Proof: Let D be a nonempty set of ordinals. We need to show three things:
1. ¡ is transitive on D.
2. ¡ satisfies trichotomy on D.
3. Any nonempty subset X ⊆ D has a least element.
1a. Suppose α, β, γ ∈ D and α < β < γ. We need to show α < γ. Since α, β and
γ are ordinals, there are well-ordered sets, (A, <A ), (B, <B ) and (C, <C ) such
that α = Ord(A, <A ), β = Ord(B, <B ) and γ = Ord(C, <C ).
1b. Since α < β, it follows by D7 that there is some y ∈ B such that A ∼
= seg(y).
Similarly, since β < γ, it follows by D7 that there is some z ∈ C such that
B∼
= seg(z).
1c. Let f be an isomorphism between B and seg(z). The restriction of f to seg(y)
is an isomorphism between seg(y) and an initial segment of seg(z). Since A ∼
=
seg(y), there is an isomorphism between A and an initial segment of seg(z).
Since seg(z) is an initial segment of C, there is an isomorphism between A and
an initial segment of C. Therefore, by D7, α < γ.
2a. Suppose α, β ∈ D. We need to show exactly one of the three alternatives:
(i) α < β,

(ii) α = β,

(iii) β < α,

holds.
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2b. Since α and β are ordinals, there are well-ordered sets, (A, <A ) and (B, <B ) such
that α = Ord(A, <A ) and β = Ord(B, <B ). Therefore, (i)–(iii) are equivalent,
respectively, to:
(i∗ ) Ord(A, <A ) < Ord(B, <B ),
(ii∗ ) Ord(A, <A ) = Ord(B, <B ),
(iii∗ ) Ord(B, <B ) < Ord(A, <A ).
Applying D5 and D7, it follows that (i∗ )–(iii∗ ) are equivalent, respectively, to:
(i∗∗ ) (∃y ∈ B)((A, <A ) ∼
= seg(y)),
(ii∗∗ ) (A, <A ) ∼
= (B, <B ),
(iii∗∗ ) (∃x ∈ A)((B, <B ) ∼
= seg(x)).
Therefore, (i)–(iii) are equivalent, respectively, to (i∗∗ )–(iii∗∗ ).
2c. Let f : Af → Bf be defined as the set of all ordered pairs (x, y) ∈ A × B
such that seg(x) ∼
= seg(y). It follows that Af = {x ∈ A — (∃y ∈ B)(seg(x) ∼
=
seg(y))} and Bf = {y ∈ B — (∃x ∈ A)(seg(x) ∼
= seg(y))}. I will show that f is
an isomorphism.
First, I show that f is a bijection. For reductio, suppose f is not a bijection.
Then either f is not a surjection or f is not an injection. However, f must be
a surjection, since Bf = ran(f ). Suppose, therefore, that f is not an injection.
It follows that there exist elements x1 , x2 ∈ dom(f ) such that x1 6= x2 and
f (x1 ) = f (x2 ). By definition of f , this means that there are two distinct initial
segments of A each isomorphic to the same initial segment of B. Consequently,
these initial segments of A are isomorphic to one another. This contradicts
Lemma 2.
Second, I show that f is order-preserving. Suppose x1 , x2 ∈ dom(f ) and x2 <A
x1 . I need to show that f (x2 ) < f (x1 ).
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By definition of f , there is an isomorphism, h, between seg(x1 ) and seg(f (x1 )).
Since x2 ∈ dom(h) and ran(h) = seg(f (x1 )), h(x2 ) <B f (x1 ). Furthermore, the
restriction of h to seg(x2 ), hseg(x2 ) , defines an isomorphism between seg(x2 )
and seg(h(x2 )). Consequently, by definition of f , f (x2 ) = h(x2 ). Therefore,
f (x2 ) <B f (x1 ). This establishes that f is order-preserving.
2d. If dom(f ) = A and ran(f ) = B, then case (ii∗∗ ) holds.
2e. If ran(f ) 6= B, then ran(f ) is an initial segment of B, dom(f ) = A and consequently, case (i∗∗ ) holds.
First, I show that ran(f ) is an initial segment of B. By the definition of f ,
ran(f ) ⊆ B. By assumption, ran(f ) 6= B. Consequently, ran(f ) ⊂ B, and
B − ran(f ) 6= ∅. Since B is well-ordered, B − ran(f ) has a least element, y0 . By
the definition of f , if y1 <B y2 and y2 ∈ ran(f ), then y1 ∈ ran(f ). Therefore,
ran(f ) = seg(y0 ).
Next, I show that dom(f ) = A. Assume for reductio that dom(f ) 6= A. By the
definition of f , dom(f ) ⊆ A. Consequently, dom(f ) ⊂ A, and A − dom(f ) 6= ∅.
Since A is well-ordered, A − dom(f ) has a least element, x0 , and dom(f ) =
seg(x0 ). Since f is an isomorphism between dom(f ) and ran(f ), seg(x0 ) ∼
=
seg(y0 ). But then, by definition of f , x0 ∈ dom(f ). Since x0 ∈ dom(f ) ∧ x0 ∈
/
dom(f ), dom(f ) = A.
To show that case (i∗∗ ) holds, note that f is an isomorphism between dom(f )
and ran(f ). Since dom(f ) = (A, <A ) and ran(f ) = seg(y0 ), (A, <A ) ∼
= seg(y0 ).
Therefore, (∃y ∈ B)((A, <A ) ∼
= seg(y)). So case (i∗∗ ) holds.
2f. If dom(f ) 6= A, then dom(f ) is an initial segment of A, ran(f ) = B and
consequently, case (iii∗∗ ) holds. The argument parallels 2e. First, use the assumption that dom(f ) 6= A together with the fact that dom(f ) ⊆ A to prove
that A − dom(f ) has a least element, x0 , and that dom(f ) = seg(x0 ). Next, use
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a reductio proof to show that ran(f ) = B. Since f is an isomorphism between
dom(f ) and ran(f ), (B, <B ) ∼
= seg(xo ). Therefore, (∃x ∈ A)((B, <B ) ∼
= seg(x)).
So case (iii∗∗ ) holds.
2g. It’s evident that at least one of the possibilities:
(iv) dom(f ) = A and ran(f ) = B,

(v) ran(f ) 6= B,

(vi) dom(f ) 6= A,

obtains. Hence at least one of (i∗∗ )–(iii∗∗ ) holds. It remains to show that at most
one of (i∗∗ )–(iii∗∗ ) holds. I will show first that (ii∗∗ ) is incompatible with either
(i∗∗ ) or (iii∗∗ ). Then I will argue that (i∗ ) and (iii∗∗ ) are mutually exclusive.
(ii∗∗ ) is incompatible with (i∗∗ ), for if both (ii∗∗ ) and (i∗∗ ) hold, then (B, <B ) is
isomorphic to one of its initial segments, contrary to Lemma 2. Similarly, (ii∗∗ )
is incompatible with (iii∗∗ ), for if both (ii∗∗ ) and (iii∗∗ ) hold, then (A, <A ) is
isomorphic to one of its initial segments.
To show that (i∗∗ ) and (iii∗∗ ) are mutually exclusive, suppose for reductio that
both (i∗∗ ) and (iii∗∗ ) hold. By (i∗∗ ), there is an isomorphism, f , between (A, <A
) and seg(y). By (iii∗∗ ), there is an isomorphism, h, between (B, <B ) and
seg(x). The restriction of h to seg(y), hseg(y) , is an isomorphism between
seg(y) and seg(x1 ), where x1 <A x. Therefore, the composition of hseg(y) and
f , hseg(y) ◦f , is an isomorphism between (A, <A ) and seg(x1 ), which contradicts
Lemma 2.
2h. Since (by 2g) exactly one of the possibilities (iv)–(vi) obtains, it follows (by 2d–
2f) that exactly one of the cases (i∗∗ )–(iii∗∗ ) holds. Since these are equivalent,
respectively, to (i)–(iii), exactly one of the alternatives (i)–(iii) holds.
3a. Let A be an arbitrary subset of D. Take an arbitrary α ∈ A. If α is not least,
then α ∩ A 6= ∅. By Lemma 3, α is well-ordered. Since α ∩ A ⊆ α, α ∩ A has
a least element. This must also be the least element of A.
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BF2. For any ordinal α, Ord(α, <) = α
Proof: Since α is an ordinal, there is a well-ordered set, (A, <A ), such that α =
Ord(A, <A ). Define f on A as in Lemma 3. Since (A, < A) ∼
= (α, <), Ord(α, <) =
Ord(A, <A ) = α.
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSELL’S SCHEMA

In this chapter, I discuss Russell’s 1906 diagnosis of the paradoxes as instances
of a single logical form, which has subsequently been called ‘Russell’s schema’. Russell’s schema suggests two ways of blocking the paradoxes. The first, which I call
No Set, seeks to block the paradoxes by denying that the contradiction-inducing sets
exist. The second, which I call No Function, seeks to block the paradoxes by denying that certain functions needed to derive the contradictions can be defined on the
contradiction-inducing sets. After presenting Russell’s schema in 3.1, I discuss Russell’s notion of a self-reproductive class (which he introduced in the same paper as his
schema). I show how to extend this notion to properties and I argue that the No Set
reply amounts to the claim that only non self-reproductive properties define sets. In
3.2, I show how each of the three set theoretic paradoxes can be put into the form of
Russell’s schema. In 3.3, I discuss Russell’s 1908 vicious circle principle and I show
that it can be used to motivate both No Set and No Function. In 3.4, I argue that
No Set provides a more uniform solution to the paradoxes and is therefore preferable
to No Function.

3.1

Russell’s schema

Russell (1906, 142) wrote that all three contradictions could be described as instances of the following “generalization”:
Given a property φ and a function f , such that, if φ belongs to all the
members of u, f (u) always exists, has the property φ, and is not a member
of u; then the supposition that there is a class w of all terms having the
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property φ and that f (w) exists leads to the conclusion that f (w) both
has and has not the property φ.
These remarks describe each paradox as the product of two assumptions (specified in
the consequent, after the semicolon) given certain background conditions (specified in
the antecedent, preceding the semicolon). The first assumption concerns the existence
of a contradiction-inducing set (or class), w, defined as the set “of all terms having
the property φ.” In other words, w = {x — φ(x)}. The second assumption concerns
the existence of a function, f , defined on w. The background conditions specify two
conditions governing the behavior of f on arbitrary subsets u ⊆ w: (i) f (u) “is not
a member of u,” and (ii) f (u) “has the property φ.” Since w is the set of all φs, we
can express (ii) as ‘f (u) ∈ w’. Substituting ‘w’ for ‘u’ in (i) and (ii) then delivers the
contradictory f (w) ∈
/ w ∧ f (w) ∈ w.
Graham Priest (1994, 27–28), (2002, 129) refers to this generalized account of the
paradoxes as ‘Russell’s schema’, which he expresses as follows:
Russell’s Schema. The paradoxes result from the following two assumptions:
A1. There exists the set, w, of all terms having the property φ.
A2. There exists a function, f , defined on every set, u, of φs such that:
(i) f (u) ∈
/u
(ii) f (u) ∈ w.
In fact, Priest (1994), (2002, 133–136) goes further, arguing that Russell’s schema is
an instance of a more complex schema, “the inclosure schema,” which applies to both
set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, e.g., the Liar paradox, Konig’s paradox, Berry’s
paradox, and Richard’s paradox. While I will not discuss this more complex schema,
I will adopt some of Priest’s “inclosure schema” terminology. Following Priest, I will
refer to A2(i) as ‘Transcendence’ because A2(i) says that f (u) falls outside of, or
transcends u and I will refer to A2(ii) as ‘Closure’ because A2(ii) says that w is closed
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under f (u). The combination of A1 and A2 leads to a contradiction when w is put
in for u. Under this substitution, Transcendence, f (w) ∈
/ w, contradicts Closure,
f (w) ∈ w.
Russell’s schema suggests two replies to the set theoretic paradoxes:
No Set: Deny A1, that is, deny that there is a set, w, of all terms having the property
φ.
No Function: Deny A2, that is, deny that there is a function, f , defined on every
set, u, of φs, satisfying Transcendence and Closure.
One of the strengths of Russell’s schema is its generality. Once we have settled on
one reply (either No Set or No Function), the schema tells us under what general
conditions a set (or function) fails to exist. These conditions are sufficiently general
to block not just the three paradoxes I’ve been focusing on, but any set-theoretic
paradox of the requisite form. According to No Set, the conditions under which a set,
w, of all terms having the property φ, fails to exist are: whenever there is (or would
be) a function, f, defined on every set of φs (including w), satisfying Transcendence
and Closure. According to No Function, the conditions under which a function, f ,
defined on every set of φs, satisfying Transcendence and Closure, fails to exist are:
whenever there is a set, w, of all terms having the property φ.

3.1.1

Self-reproductive properties

No Set tells us that some properties are without a set of all their instances and,
in this sense, fail to define a set. No Set also tells us the conditions under which
a property, φ, fails to define a set: whenever there is (or would be) a function, f ,
defined on every set of φs (including the set of all φs), satisfying Transcendence and
Closure. This observation, however, does not tell us what sort of relation f bears to
φ. When f is present, is its existence entailed by the intrinsic nature of φ? If so,
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then we might be able to attribute the paradoxes to a special kind of ‘contradictioninducing property’. On the other hand, if f ’s existence depends on something else,
then it would seem that whether a property leads to a contradiction will depend on
things external to the property itself.
Russell (1906, 144) attributes the contradictions to “self-reproductive processes
or [sets].”1
The above considerations point to the conclusion that the contradictions
result from the fact that, according to current logical assumptions, there
are what we may call self-reproductive processes and [sets]. That is, there
are some properties such that, given any [set] of terms all having such
a property, we can always define a new term also having the property
in question. Hence we can never collect all the terms having the said
property into a whole; because, whenever we hope we have them all, the
collection which we have immediately proceeds to generate a new term
also having the said property.
There is some unclarity in this passage regarding the proper subject of the predicate
‘self-reproductive’. Russell refers to processes and sets; but I think he is better
understood as attributing the label directly to properties. We might then say that
a property, φ, is self-reproductive, if given any arbitrary set of φs, S, it’s possible to
define a new φ ∈
/ S.2
The definition of this φ may be viewed as a process that “expands” the set S. This
process satisfies Transcendence (because it involves defining some φ ∈
/ S) and Closure
(because this φ would belong to the set of all φs, if such a set existed). In light of this
observation, we might read Russell as advocating a No Set solution to the paradoxes,
according to which the set of all φs does not exist whenever φ is self-reproductive. I
call this ‘the doctrine of self-reproductive properties’ (SRP).

1

I replace ‘class’ with ‘set’ throughout.

2

Note that there can be no direct correspondence between self-reproductive properties and selfreproductive sets; for if φ is a self-reproductive property, there is no corresponding set of all φs.
However, we apply the label ‘self-reproductive’ to arbitrary sets of φs according to the rule that a
set of φs, S1 , is self-reproductive if given any set of φs, S2 , it’s possible to define a new φ ∈
/ S2 .
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SRP If φ is self-reproductive, then there is no set of all φs.
Indeed, I claim that Russell’s schema is properly understood as a representation of
the logical profile of self-reproductive properties—they give rise to expansive definitions or processes—and that Russell (1906) is properly interpreted as attributing the
paradoxes to the (false) assumption that all properties define sets. Finally, I claim
that the feature of being self-reproductive is plausibly viewed as an intrinsic feature of
properties and as the feature in virtue of which a property is contradiction-inducing.

3.2

Putting the paradoxes into the form of Russell’s schema

In this section, I show how each of the three set-theoretic paradoxes can be translated into the form of Russell’s schema. The translation is easiest for Russell’s paradox, which I present first. I will then present translations of the other two paradoxes.

3.2.1

Russell’s schema: Russell’s paradox

Let ‘x’ range over sets. Define φ as the property being a non-self-membered set
and define w as the set of all φs.
D1. φ(x) =df x ∈
/ x;
w =df {x — φ(x)}
By D1, w = {x — x ∈
/ x} = R. Let u be any subset of R and let f (u) = u. We
need to show that f (u) satisfies Transcendence (i.e., f (u) ∈
/ u), and Closure (i.e.,
f (u) ∈ R). The argument goes as follows:
From the assumption f (u) ∈ u, it follows that f (u) ∈
/ u. This establishes Transcendence:
(1.1) f (u) ∈
/ u.
Because u is a set, f (u) is a non-self-membered set. So, f (u) satisfies Closure:

73

(1.2) f (u) ∈ R.
Putting R in for u in (1.1) and (1.2) delivers the contradictory
(1.3) f (R) ∈
/ R ∧ f (R) ∈ R.

3.2.2

Russell’s schema: Cantor’s paradox

I present two translations for Cantor’s paradox.
The first derives a contradiction from the assumption that any of the sets U , V
or VP exists. In this respect, it resembles Cantor I (chap. 2, pp. 36–38); however, it
differs from Cantor’s paradox I both in the identity of the particular contradiction
that is subsequently derived and in the derivation itself. Recall that for X = U, V
or VP , Cantor’s paradox I shows that there is a bijection between X and Card(X),
and consequently that Card(X) = Card(PX).3 This contradicts Cantor’s theorem.
To get things into the form of Russell’s schema, we want a contradiction of the form
f (w) ∈
/ w ∧ f (w) ∈ w. We can put Cantor’s paradox into this form by defining w
as the diagonal set on X with respect to an arbitrary bijection, g, between X and
PX. Define f as the inverse of g so that g(xw ) = w and f (w) = xw . The reductio
argument from Cantor’s theorem can then be applied to g to derive the contradictory
proposition that f (w) both is and is not a member of w.
The second translation applies to arguments such as Cantor I (chap. 2, p. 41),
which are based on the existence of K.
Alternatively, that there is an injection from PX to X and consequently that Card(X) 6<
CardPX. See chap. 2, p. 38.
3
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3.2.2.1

First translation

Let ‘x’ range over X, which is interpreted as either U , V or VP . Let g : X → P(X)
be an arbitrary bijection from X onto P(X).4 Define f : P(X) → X as the inverse
of g.
D2. f =df g −1
It follows by D2 that f (g(x)) = x. Define φ as the property x has when x ∈
/ g(x) and
define w as the set of all φs.
D3. φ(x) =df x ∈
/ g(x);
w =df {x — φ(x)}
The argument goes as follows.
Let u be any subset of w. Since w ⊆ X, u ⊆ X. So u ∈ P(X). Since g is a
bijection, there is some x, xu , such that, g(xu ) = u. By D2, it follows that f (u) = xu .
For conditional proof, suppose f (u) ∈ u. Since u ⊆ w, f (u) ∈ w. By D3, w = {x
—x∈
/ g(x)}. Therefore, f (u) ∈
/ g(f (u)). But g(f (u)) = g(xu ) = u. Discharging the
assumption, f (u) ∈ u implies f (u) ∈
/ u. This establishes Transcendence:
(2.1) f (u) ∈
/ u.
Since u = g(f (u)) and f (u) = xu , (2.1) is equivalent to: xu ∈
/ g(xu ). It follows that
xu ∈ w. This establishes Closure:
(2.2) f (u) ∈ w.
Putting in w for u in (2.1) and (2.2) delivers the contradictory:
(2.3) f (w) ∈
/ w ∧ f (w) ∈ w.

4

Recall that by application of SBT it is possible to prove that there must be a bijection g(x).
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3.2.2.2

Second translation

Let ‘x’ range over K and let ‘u’ range over PK. Define φ as the property being
a cardinal number and define w as the set of all φs:
D4. φ(x) =df x is a cardinal;
w =df {x — φ(x)}
By D4, w = {x — x is a cardinal} = K. The translation follows Cantor’s paradox
III quite closely.
Let gc be a choice function on K mapping every κ ∈ K to an arbitrary set of
cardinality κ. Given any u ⊆ K, let gc (u) denote the set formed by replacing every
κ ∈ u with gc (κ). Define f : PK → K as the function that maps every u to the
cardinality of the powerset of the union of gc (u).5
D5. f (u) =df Card(P

S

gc (u))

The argument goes as follows.
Take an arbitrary u. For every κ ∈ u, the union of the κ-sized sets selected by
S
gc , gc (u), has at least κ-many members. Hence, its cardinal number is at least
S
as great as the greatest κ ∈ u. In other words, for every κ ∈ u, Card( gc (u)) ≥
S
S
κ. By Cantor’s theorem, Card(P gc (u)) > Card( gc (u)). Therefore, for every
S
S
κ ∈ u, Card(P gc (u) > κ. But Card(P gc (u)) = f (u), by D5. This establishes
Transcendence:
(3.1) f (u) ∈
/ u.
Since f (u) is a cardinal, f (u) satisfies Closure:

5

You can think of f as a step-by-step plan for constructing a cardinal number, f (u), out of u.
The first step is to replace every κ ∈ u with a κ-sized set. This is what gc (u) does.
S The second step
is to form a new set out of all the members
of
these
κ-sized
sets.
This
is
what
gc (u) does. The
S
S
third step is to form the
powerset
of
g
(u).
This
is
what
P
g
(u)
does.
The
final
step is to take
c
c
S
S
the cardinality of P gc (u). This is what Card(P gc (u)) does.
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(3.2) f (u) ∈ K.
Putting K in for u in (3.1) and (3.2) delivers the contradictory:
(3.3) f (K) ∈
/ K ∧ f (K) ∈ K.
3.2.3

Russell’s schema: Burali-Forti’s paradox

The translation for Burali-Forti’s paradox most closely resembles the structure of
Burali-Forti I (chap. 2, pp. 47–49), and in particular, Russell’s variant. Let ‘x’ range
over O and let ‘u’ range over PO. Define φ as the property being an ordinal number
and define w as the set of all φs:
D6. φ(x) =df x is an ordinal;
w =df {x — φ(x)}
By D6, w = {x — x is an ordinal} = O.
Let g be the function on PO that maps every u to the initial segment of ordinals
defined by u. (By ‘the initial segment of ordinals defined by u’, I mean the set of all
ordinals less than or equal to every x ∈ u.) Define f : PO → O as the function that
maps every u to the ordinal number of g(u).
D7. f (u) =df Ord(g(u))
The argument goes as follows.
By BF2, f (u) is greater than any x ∈ u. This establishes Transcendence:
(4.1) f (u) ∈
/ u.
Since f (u) is an ordinal, f (u) satisfies Closure:
(4.2) f (u) ∈ O.
Putting O in for u in (4.1) and (4.2) delivers the contradictory:
(4.3) f (O) ∈
/ O ∧ f (O) ∈ O.
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3.3

The vicious circle principle

Two years after introducing his schema, Russell (1908, 63) argued that A1 and
A2 violate a general principle of logic, which he expressed as follows:
Whatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection;
or conversely: If, provided a certain collection had a total, it would have
members only definable in terms of that total, then the said collection has
no total.
Just what Russell means by involvement in a collection is not perfectly clear. Under
one plausible interpretation, something is involved in a collection iff it is defined by
quantification over that collection. This is supported by Russell’s “converse” statement of the principle, which makes explicit reference to definition. If this interpretation is correct, then Russell’s proposal is to ban all impredicative definitions. (An
impredicative definition of a term is a definition that involves quantification over any
collection to which the term belongs.) Such a ban, which may be motivated by the
thought that impredicative definitions are viciously circular, is commonly known as
the vicious circle principle.
Let C be any collection, τ any term, and Def(τ ) a definition of τ . (I make no
distinction here between collections and sets.) The vicious circle principle (VCP) may
then be formulated as:
VCP Def(τ ) is viciously circular (and therefore, illegitimate) iff (i) Def(τ ) involves
quantification over C and (ii) τ belongs to C.
VCP motivates a No Set response to Russell’s paradox and the first translation of
Cantor’s paradox. Def(R) violates VCP since (i) it involves quantification over the
collection of all non-self-membered sets and (ii) R belongs to this collection. Def(U )
violates VCP since (i) it involves quantification over the collection of all things and
(ii) U belongs to this collection. Similar remarks apply to Def(V ) and Def(VP ).
Whether VCP motivates a No Set response to the second translation of Cantor’s paradox and to Burali-Forti’s paradox depends on the identities of cardinal and
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ordinal numbers. Both Def(K) and Def(O) satisfy condition (i): Def(K) involves
quantification over the collection of all cardinals and Def(O) involves quantification
over the collection of all ordinals. If cardinals and ordinals are identified with sets of
cardinals and sets of ordinals, so that K is a cardinal number and O is an ordinal
number, Def(K) and Def(O) will also satisfy condition (ii): K will belong to the
collection of all cardinal numbers and O will belong to the collection of all ordinal
numbers. Hence, Def(K) and Def(O) will violate VCP. On the other hand, if cardinals and ordinals are identified with different sets or if they are sui generis, so that
K is not a cardinal number and O is not an ordinal number, then K and O will not
satisfy condition (ii). Consequently, Def(K) and Def(O) will not violate VCP.
VCP provides more unilateral support for a No Function response. In 3.2, I
defined four functions—one for Russell’s paradox, two for Cantor’s paradox and one
for Burali-Forti’s paradox—and I have shown that each satisfies Transcendence and
Closure if it is defined for every u ⊆ w. Here is a list of all four functions, which I
now label f1 –f4 :
(f1 ) Russell’s paradox: f1 (u) = u, where u ⊆ R
(f2 ) Cantor’s paradox: f2 (u) = xu , where u ⊂ w ⊆ X, X = U, V, or VP , g(xu ) = u
and g is an arbitrary bijection from X to PX
(f3 ) Cantor’s paradox: f3 (u) = Card(P

S

gc (u)), where u ⊆ K, gc is a choice

function mapping every κ ∈ K to an arbitrary set of cardinality κ and gc (u) is
the set formed by replacing every κ ∈ u with gc (κ).
(f4 ) Burali-Forti’s paradox: f4 (u) = Ord(g(u)), where u ⊆ O and g maps u to the
initial segment of ordinals defined by u.
Since the contradiction results when u = w, it follows that someone who adopts
No Function must deny that f1 –f4 are defined when u = w, i.e., she must deny that
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f (w) exists. We’ve seen that w = R in the case of Russell’s paradox, that w = {x ∈ X
—x∈
/ g(x)}) in the case of the first translation of Cantor’s paradox, that w = K in
the case of the second translation of Cantor’s paradox and that w = O in the case of
Burali-Forti’s paradox. Consequently, someone who adopts No Function must deny
that each of the following exists:
• f1 (R),
• f2 (w), where w = {x ∈ X — x ∈
/ g(x)}) and X = U, V, or VP ,
• f3 (K),
• f4 (O).
Russell’s vicious circle principle supports the claim that none of these values exists,
since each of f1 –f4 violates the principle under the arguments R, w, K and O.
In the case of Russell’s paradox, Def(f (R)) violates VCP since f (R) = R and
Def(R) violates VCP. The definitions used in the other paradoxes—Def(f (w)), Def(f (K))
and Def(f (O))—can be shown to satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) and consequently to
violate VCP as well. Each of these three definitions satisfies condition (i), for f (w),
f (K) and f (O) are defined as functions of the sets w, K and O and consequently
are defined in terms of quantification over w, K and O. To show that each of these
definitions satisfies condition (ii), it suffices to show that f (w), f (K) and f (O) belong to w, K and O. We already did this, in the translations above, when we proved
that each of these functions satisfies Closure ((2.2), (3.2) and (4.2)). Since Def(f (w)),
Def(f (K)) and Def(f (O)) satisfy conditions (i) and (ii), these definitions violate VCP.
Consequently, VCP motivates a No Function response to all three of the set-theoretic
paradoxes.
The plausibility this lends to No Function depends on the prior plausibility of
VCP. Unfortunately for VCP, mathematics and logic are rife with impredicativity.
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In blocking all impredicative definitions, VCP imposes restrictions that are so strict,
they would block many otherwise benign definitions and cripple much of mathematics.
For this reason, it seems that VCP misdiagnoses the problem. Note that Russell’s
schema is less restrictive. Any function satisfying Closure is impredicative: in each
case, f (w) is defined by quantifying over w and, by Closure, f (w) ∈ w. But this is
allowed by Russell’s schema, so long as f does not also satisfy Transcendence. Unless
it is combined with Transcendence, this sort of circularity is benign, according to
Russell’s schema.

3.4

Logical relations between No Function and No Set

In this section, I consider some of the logical relations between No Function and
No Set. Say that No Function is ‘logically equivalent’ to No Set if the question of
whether f (w) exists determines the question of whether w exists and that No Function
is ‘logically independent’ from No Set if the question of whether f (w) exists does not
determine the question of whether w exists. I argue that No Function is equivalent
to No Set with respect to f1 and f2 and that No Function is independent from No
Set with respect to f3 and f4 .
3.4.1

f1 and f2 : No Function is equivalent to No Set

In the case of Russell’s paradox, f1 (R) = R. Hence, the No Function response—
that f1 (R) does not exist—is indistinguishable from the No Set response—that R
does not exist.6
The case of the first translation of Cantor’s paradox is similar, though the point
is not as immediate. According to the No Function response, f2 (w) does not exist.
Given the assumption that the bijection g : X → PX exists, it seems that the only
way that f2 (w) could fail to exist would be if w was not a permissible argument for
6

As Russell himself observes: 1906, 143.
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f2 . This would be the case only if w 6⊆ X. But it is evident from the definition of
w (see D3, p. 75) that w ⊂ X. Thus, we are led back to question whether there is
a bijective function g : X → PX. I showed earlier (chapter 2, pp. 33, 36–37) that
we can define injections from X into PX and from PX into X; hence, by SBT, we
know that there is a bijection, g, if X and PX exist. The only remaining option,
then, is to deny that X (and consequently PX) exists. ‘X’ stands for U , V or VP .
So, it seems that the only option is to deny that these sets exist. The No Function
response is therefore equivalent to the No Set response.

3.4.2

f3 and f4 : No Function is independent from No Set

Things change when we come to the second translation of Cantor’s paradox and to
Burali-Forti’s paradox. In both of these cases, it’s possible to consistently hold that
the contradiction-inducing sets K and O exist and then to block the contradiction
“at the next step,” by denying that the functions f3 and f4 are well-defined for the
arguments K and O.
Consider, first, the second translation of Cantor’s paradox. Recall that f3 maps u
S
to the cardinal number of P gc (u), where u ⊆ K and gc is a choice function on PK
that replaces every κ ∈ u with a set of cardinality κ. f3 may fail to be well-defined
when u = K for two reasons:
R1. One of the principles for set formation used to construct P

S

gc (K) from K

fails.
R2. P

S

gc (K) has no cardinal number because it is too big.

Let’s briefly consider the plausibility and implications of each.
The set formation principles relevant to R1 are: Choice and Replacement (used
S
to construct gc (K) out of K); Union (used to construct gc (K) out of gc (K)); and
S
S
Powerset (used to construct P gc (K) out of g(K)). While any of these might be
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rejected, an attractive response along this line would have to provide some account
for why the selected principle fails.
If R2 obtains (and R1 does not), there is good reason to infer that not only
S
P gc (K), but also K has no cardinal number. For if R2 is true, then this is either
S
because gc (K) has no cardinal number (because it is too big also) or because the
S
powerset operation has taken us from a set with a cardinal number ( gc (K)) to a
S
S
set that is too big to have a cardinal number (P g(K)). Similarly, if gc (K) has
no cardinal number, then this is either because gc (K) has no cardinal number or
because the union operation has taken us from a set with a cardinal number (g(K))
S
to a set that is too big to have a cardinal number ( gc (K). Finally, if gc (K) has no
cardinal number, then it must also be the case that K has no cardinal number, for
the operation of replacing each κ ∈ K with a κ-sized set produces a set no bigger
than K. Now, it seems arbitrary for the powerset operation or the union operation
to take us from sets with cardinal numbers to sets that are too big to have cardinal
numbers. So, the possibility that R2 is the reason why f3 fails to be well-defined for
u = K reduces to the possibility that K has no cardinal number.
Next, consider Burali-Forti’s paradox. Recall that f4 maps u to the ordinal number
of g(u), where g(u) is the initial segment of ordinals defined by u. Like f3 , there are
two reasons why f4 may fail to be well-defined when u = O:
R3. O fails to define an initial segment of ordinals.
R4. O does not have an ordinal number.
Note however, that R3 implies that O does not exist; for the initial segment of ordinals
defined by O (i.e., the set of all ordinals less than or equal to any x ∈ O), if it exists,
is O. So, if R3 is true, then O does not exist. This means that No Function is
equivalent to No Set, for No Set blocks Burali-Forti’s paradox by denying that O
exists. On the other hand, R4 is compatible with the existence of O. So, if R4 is true,
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then No Function and No Set are independent. R4 invites the question: why does O
not have an ordinal number? Cantor’s (1897) proof that O is well-ordered rules out
one possible answer, viz., that the ordinals are not well-ordered. Perhaps the only
alternative is that sets such as O lack ordinal numbers because they are “too long.”7
R4 has some interesting historical precedent in the work of one of Russell’s students, Phillip Jourdain. Jourdain thought that No Function afforded the best defense
of Russell’s 1903 set theory, which was committed to the contradiction-inducing set
O. He claimed that this was no mark against Russell’s theory, since it was not the
existence of O that was to blame for Burali-Forti’s contradiction, but rather the assumption that the functions Ord(x) and Card(x) were defined on O. For this reason,
Jourdain argued, O should be called ‘absolutely infinite’, not ‘inconsistent’.
The series of all ordinal numbers may, it seems to me, properly be called
an “absolutely” infinite series. For, if a well-ordered series has a type, it
is, in a certain sense, completed; while the above series [O] cannot, as is
shown by Burali-Forti’s contradiction, have a type.
This seems to be the most promising way of regarding Burali-Forti’s
contradiction, and the words “absolutely infinite” seem preferable to the
equivalent word “inconsistent,” which I, in common with Cantor, have
used hitherto; because an “inconsistent” aggregate is not itself contradictory (it exists in the mathematical sense of the word), but a cardinal
number or type of it does not exist.8
Unfortunately, Jourdain’s suggestion was of little help: Russell’s theory was also
committed to Card(K) and Ord(O).9 Of course, these commitments are the result
of Russell’s identification of the cardinal and ordinal numbers with particular sets.
They might be avoided by another theory, in which cardinals and ordinals are sui
generis.
7

Recall that length is a matter of well-ordering relations. See chapter 2 for discussion.

8

Jourdain (1905, 54)

9

These are identified (respectively) with the set of all sets equinumerous to K and the set of all
sets isomorphic to O and the existence of these sets is entailed by Russell’s comprehension principle.
See Hallett (1984, 179–180).
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3.4.3

A uniform solution

It is natural, once one comes to think of the paradoxes as sharing a common form,
to look for a uniform solution to all three. No Set is uniform. No Function is not.
No Function is a mix of two diagnoses. It blocks Russell’s paradox and the first
translation of Cantor’s paradox in one way: by denying the existence of the sets R,
U , V and VP ; it blocks the second translation of Cantor’s paradox and Burali-Forti’s
paradox in another way: by denying the existence of f3 (K) and f4 (O) but not the
existence of the sets K and O. For this reason, No Set is preferable to No Function.
However, a satisfactory solution requires more than a diagnosis, it requires also an
explanation of why the diagnosis is true. In the present case, if we are to embrace
the No Set diagnosis, it remains to explain why the contradiction-inducing sets do
not exist. I will return to the question of explanation in chapters 4 and 6.
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CHAPTER 4
THE LOGICAL CONCEPTION OF SET

In this chapter, I consider the logical conception of set, according to which a set is
the extension of a concept (or property). This conception is called “logical” because
at the time it was developed in the 19th century, it was widely held that logic was the
study of concept extensions, which were viewed as logical objects. Thus, syllogistic
logic, which comprised much of logic in the 19th century, was commonly explicated
in terms of relations of inclusion and exclusion between concept extensions. For
example, the Barbara syllogism—“all As are Bs, all Bs are Cs; therefore all As are
Cs”—was explicated as the claim that the extension of the concept C includes the
extension of the concept A (“all As are Cs”) if the extension of the concept C includes
the extension of the concept B (“all Bs are Cs”) and the extension of the concept
B includes the extension of the concept A (“all As are Bs”). The logical conception
of set is also sometimes called “naive” in light of the relative ease by which it can
be shown to engender contradictions. Arguably, its most influential proponent was
Gottlob Frege, who argued that arithmetic could be reduced to a formal theory of
sets as extensions of concepts (Frege, 1884, 1893, 1903).
Frege’s views will play a significant role in this chapter, which is organized as
follows. In 4.1 and 4.2, I present a broadly Fregean account of concepts and their
extensions. In 4.3, I discuss the relation of priority between concepts and concept
extensions and I contrast this with the relation of priority between the members of
a collection and the collections they form. (The iterative conception of set, which
I discuss in chapter 6, is based on the identification of sets with collections.) In
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4.4, I formulate a set theory based on the logical conception of set and I show this
theory to be inconsistent by deriving Russell’s paradox. In 4.5 and 4.6, I present
and evaluate two “fixes” that purport to restore consistency without abandoning the
logical conception of set. These are the limitation of size doctrine and first-order set
restrictivism.

4.1

Concepts

The Fregean account of concepts is based, in large part, on the notion of a mathematical function. In mathematics, expressions such as ‘y = x2 ’ stand for functions
that take numbers as argument (in the ‘x’-place) and yield numbers as value (in the
‘y’-place).1 Frege (1891) argues that ordinary predicate expressions are similar to
these mathematical expressions: they too stand for functions, but instead of taking
numbers to numbers, these functions take all objects (including numbers) to truthvalues. Such functions are commonly called “truth-functions.” Frege’s notion of a
concept is the notion of a truth-function defined on absolutely all objects that is
denoted by a (possible) predicate expression. To illustrate, consider the predicate
expression ‘is a horse’. According to the Fregean account, this stands for a particular truth-function from absolutely all objects to truth-values, viz., the concept
horse. Pursuing the analogy with mathematics, if we add an “argument variable”,
we can express this concept by means of the more mathematical-looking expressions:
‘x is a horse’ or ‘horse(x)’. If we add a “value variable”, we can express this concept
as we did the quadratic function above, by means of an equation: ‘y = horse(x)’. This
equation represents the concept as the truth-function that takes objects as argument
(in the ‘x’-place) and yields a truth-value (in the ‘y’-place): this truth-value is True
whenever x is a horse; otherwise it is False.
1

Frege (1891, 133) suggests replacing ‘x’ with a blank space: ‘y = ( )2 ’ to make it clear that ‘x’
indicates the function’s argument position and not any particular object.
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The identification of Fregean concepts with truth-functions provides an extensional account of meaning for predicate expressions. (An account of ‘meaning’ is
extensional if it assigns the same meaning to predicate expressions that are satisfied by all the same objects, i.e., if it assigns the same meaning to coextensional
predicate expressions.) Such an account is suitable to mathematics, in which intensional distinctions—distinctions in meaning between coextensional expressions—are
generally ignored. In most mathematical contexts, for example, any differences between expressions that denote the same thing, such as the same number or the same
function, are ignored. The reason is that in these contexts, one is concerned with
the identity of the number or function in question, not with how it is represented.
Because ‘4’ denotes the same number as ‘22 ’, it makes no (mathematical) difference
whether ‘4’ or ‘22 ’ is substituted for ‘x’ in a given formula. Similarly, because ‘y = x2 ’
and ‘y − x2 = 0’ denote the same function, it makes no difference which expression we
use. In other contexts, intensional distinctions are important and cannot be ignored.
For example, in the interests of developing a satisfactory analysis of natural language,
one must distinguish between the meaning of coextensional expressions such as ‘has
a kidney’ and ‘has a heart’. Of course, truth-functions are inadequate for such a
project. If concepts are to serve as meanings in this context, they would have to
be more finely individuated, like properties “in the abundant sense” (Lewis, 1983,
10–19). In what follows, I reserve the term ‘concept’ for the coarser-grained notion
of a truth-function.
In the philosophy of language today, it is common to mark the distinction between truth-functional meaning and non-truth-functional meaning as the distinction
between ‘extensional meaning’ and ‘intensional meaning’. Frege (1892c) recognized
such a distinction, but he expressed it in different terms. He distinguished the reference (Bedeutung) of an expression—which for predicates was always a concept
and thus truth-functional—from its sense (Sinn)—which was not truth-functional.
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Whereas we would say that the predicate expressions ‘has a kidney’ and ‘has a heart’
have different intensional meanings but the same extensional meaning, Frege would
say that they have different senses but the same reference, i.e., they refer to the same
concept. It is likely that this difference is only terminological, not substantive. There
is a second difference, however, between Frege’s views of concepts and contemporary
conceptions of meaning that is quite substantive. Frege held that concepts could only
be referred to indirectly, by predicate expressions occurring predicatively. This led to
the baffling conclusion that while the occurrence of ‘is a horse’ in the sentence ‘Ed
is a horse’ refers to the concept horse; the singular expression ‘the concept horse’
does not (Frege, 1892b, 184–185). The tenability of Frege’s position and his reasons
for adopting it have been discussed in a number of places.2 I will not follow Frege
here. I assume that it is possible to name concepts by singular expressions such as
‘the concept horse’. In this respect, my account of concepts is unFregean.
Two additional notes about concepts are in order. First, to contemporary ears,
talk of concepts is likely to suggest something mental or linguistic. Fregean concepts
are neither mental nor linguistic; their existence depends neither on our thoughts,
nor on the expressive resources of any actual language. In these respects, they are
fully objective. It may be more common to use the term ‘property’ or simply ‘truthfunction’ to convey the sort of objectivity that is intended. The second note concerns
a distinction between determinate and indeterminate concepts. Say that a concept,
F , is determinate iff for any object, x (or objects the xx) it is determinate whether or
not x (or the xx) fall(s) under F . Similarly, say that a concept, F , is indeterminate
iff there is at least one object, x (or objects the xx) such that it is indeterminate
whether or not x (or the xx) fall(s) under F . If the predicate expressions ‘cloud(x)’
and ‘pile(xx)’ refer unambiguously to the concepts cloud and pile, then it would seem

2

See Dummett (1981), Parsons (1986) and Hale and Wright (2001, Essay 3).
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to follow that these concepts are indeterminate. For it is often indeterminate whether
some portion of sky is a cloud or whether some grains of sand constitute a pile. Since
concepts are objective, it follows that belief in indeterminate concepts is committed
to ontological vagueness.
Frege held that mathematics and logic were precise sciences and consequently
that they required determinate concepts. There are a number of passages in which
he makes this point. For example, in (1884, 41), he argues that subjective definitions
of the number one in terms of the indeterminate (or “hazy”) concept being thought of
as one (or indivisible) are unacceptable since they fail to uniquely determine whether
the number of some thing (or things) is (or are) one. This sort of indeterminacy
is unacceptable in arithmetic, “which bases its claim to fame precisely on being as
definite and accurate as possible.” In (1903, 259) he argues that logic also demands
determinate concepts.
A definition of a concept (of a possible predicate) must be complete; it
must unambiguously determine, as regards any object, whether or not it
falls under the concept (whether or not the predicate is truly ascribable
to it). Thus there must not be any object as regards which the definition
leaves in doubt whether it falls under the concept . . . We may express this
metaphorically as follows: the concept must have a sharp boundary.
Indeed, he goes on to claim that the law of excluded middle is to be understood as
the demand that, in logic, every concept must be determinate.
It is unclear whether Frege meant to deny the existence of indeterminate concepts entirely or only to deny their admissibility to the fields of precise sciences such
as logic and mathematics.3 Whatever Frege’s intention might have been, the undesirability of ontological vagueness may be reason enough to deny the existence of
indeterminate concepts. Someone who does so can provide a linguistic account of indeterminacy, according to which the indeterminacy we see in cloud-talk and pile-talk
3

See van Heijenoort (1986) for a defense of the former interpretation; see Ruffino (2003) for a
defense of the latter interpretation.
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is the result of indeterminacy in the predicates ‘cloud(x)’ and ‘pile(xx)’.4 Say that
a predicate is determinate if it unambiguously denotes a single concept; otherwise, it
is indeterminate. Equipped with these notions, we can attribute the indeterminacy
of the predicate ‘cloud(x)’ to the fact that it simultaneously expresses multiple, but
individually determinate cloud concepts, each differing from the others with respect
to the precise division of the sky into individual clouds. Similarly, we can attribute
the indeterminacy of the predicate ‘pile(xx)’ to the fact it simultaneously expresses
multiple, but individually determinate pile concepts, each differing from the others
with respect to the minimum number of grains necessary to make a pile. In what
follows, I will assume that all concepts are determinate.

4.2

Extensions

Like his account of concepts, Frege’s account of their extensions is based on an
analogy to mathematics. Frege (1891, 134) notes that any numeric function can be
geometrically represented in the familiar way as a set of points, “that presents itself
to intuition (in ordinary cases) as a curve.” To illustrate, he asks us to consider a
particular quadratic function: y = x2 −4x. This function is represented geometrically
as an upwards parabolic curve, with a vertex at (2, −4) that intersects the x-axis at
(0, 0) and (4, 0). Frege (1891, 135) calls this curve “the graph” (Wertverlauf) of
the function. His idea is to provide an account of extensions by generalizing on
the notion of a geometric graph. This generalization is a sort of corollary to the
previous generalization of the notion of a numeric function, according to which not
only mathematical expressions (such as ‘y = x2 ’) but also non-mathematical predicate
expressions (such as ‘x is a horse’) refer to functions. The corollary is that not only
mathematical functions (such as the quadratic function expressed by ‘y = x2 ’), but

4

See Lewis (1993) for an account of indeterminacy along these lines. See Ruffino (2003, 272–275)
for an argument that this account fits nicely with some of Frege’s own remarks on indeterminacy.
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also non-mathematical functions, in particular, truth-functions (such as the truthfunction expressed by ‘x is a horse’), determine graphs. Since concepts are truthfunctions, every concept has a graph. The graph of a concept is its extension.
We can designate as an extension the [graph] of a function whose value
for every argument is a truth-value (Frege, 1891, 139).
But just what is a graph, in this generalized sense? In the mathematical case,
graphs of simple numeric functions can be visualized or imagined as curves; however,
it’s likely that many (if not most) numeric functions exceed human powers of visualization and imagination. For this reason, it seems that an adequate account of even
purely geometric graphs should not be tied to such human cognitive capacities. A
more promising account of geometric graphs is one that is based on the role they play
of representing functions. A geometric graph represents a function by representing
two things. First, each point along the graph represents a unique pair of numbers,
hn, f (n)i, which is determined by the function. The first member of this pair, n, is
an argument for the function; the second member, f (n), is the value of the function
for this argument. Second, any two points along the graph, representing the pairs
hn1 , f (n1 )i, hn2 , f (n2 )i, are ordered by the relation < defined on the arguments n1 ,
n2 . This ordering is needed to fix the graph’s shape. Putting these two observations
together, we might say that a geometric graph is an entity, consisting of a series of
argument-value pairs, ordered under the relation < defined on the arguments, which
represents a function. Alternate translations of ‘Wertverlauf’, as ‘course-of-values’ or
‘value-range’ may suggest this view more vividly than ‘graph’.
Extending this account to graphs in general, it would follow that the graph of
a concept, i.e., an extension, is also an entity, consisting of a series of argumentvalue pairs, ordered under a relation R defined on the arguments. The arguments
are objects; the values are truth-values determined by the corresponding concept.
Since concepts are determinate, this series is ‘total’, meaning that absolutely every
object is included as the argument of one pair. According to the present account,
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then, the extension of the concept horse consists in the total ordered series of the
argument-value pairs hx, horse(x)i, where horse(x) is the value True if x is a horse
and the value False otherwise.
However, the analogy between geometric graphs and concept graphs is imperfect.
For amongst objects in general there is no analogue of the mathematical relation <
to provide a natural ordering. Consequently, any ordering of objects in general—
which is necessary to generate an ordered series of argument-value pairs—would be
arbitrary. Such arbitrariness is unacceptable, since it would make the identity of
concept extensions arbitrary as well. To illustrate, the identity of the extension of
the concept horse would vary, depending on the relative ordering of horses and nonhorses. The extension that would result from placing every pair containing a horse (as
its first member) before every pair containing a non-horse (as its first member) would
differ from the extension that would result from placing every pair containing a nonhorse (as its first member) before every pair containing a horse (as its first member)
and also from the extension that would result from alternating pairs that contained
horses (as their first member) with pairs that did not. Since there is no non-arbitrary
ordering of objects in general, there is no unique, total series of argument-value pairs
that can (non-arbitrarily) be identified with the extension of the concept horse. This
result is completely general. There is no unique, total series of argument-value pairs
that can (non-arbitrarily) be identified with the extension of any concept. It follows
that if extensions are graphs at all, they are unordered graphs, i.e., entities consisting
of argument-value pairs that are unordered relative to one another. I will refer to such
graphs as ‘mappings’. A mapping represents a function, but it does not represent it
as having any determinate “shape”. You might think of a mapping as the result of
abstracting away the shape from a geometric graph. I submit that the Fregean notion
of a concept extension is the notion of a total mapping.
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4.2.1

Involvement and membership

Since extensions are total mappings, they “involve” every object in the sense that
every object is included in the mapping. This notion of involvement in an extension
should be distinguished from the notion of membership in an extension. Let ‘Ext(F )’
denote the extension of the concept F . While every object is involved in Ext(F ), only
those objects that fall under F are members of Ext(F ).
Involvement in an extension is defined by:
D1. x is involved in Ext(F ) =df x is an argument for F.
Since Ext(horse) is a total mapping, absolutely every object is involved in Ext(horse),
for absolutely every object is an argument of the function ‘horse(x)’.
The notion of membership in an extension is defined by:
D2. x is a member of Ext(F ) =df F x.
While absolutely every object is involved in Ext(horse), only horses are members of
Ext(horse). (In what follows, I use the usual membership sign, ‘∈’ for membership
in an extension.)

4.2.2

Identity

The identity conditions for extensions are suggested by another analogy between
mathematical and non-mathematical language. Frege (1891, 135) notes that numeric
expressions which return the same values for the same arguments—what we might call
“coextensional numeric expressions”—have the same graph.5 By analogy, it seems to
follow that coextensional predicate expressions must have the same extension. However, there is no need to resort to analogy at this point: the definitions of concepts
as truth-functions and extensions as mappings are enough to fix identity conditions
5

Frege’s example involves two algebraic equations for the same parabolic curve.

94

for extensions. On the one hand, if two concepts are identical, then their extensions
are identical (since otherwise, there would be identical concepts whose mappings differed with respect to least one argument-value pair, which is impossible, given the
assumption that concepts are determinate truth-functions). On the other hand, if
two extensions are identical, then their concepts are identical (since otherwise, there
would be distinct concepts that determined all the same argument-value pairs, which
is impossible given the assumption that concepts are determinate truth-functions).
Putting these results together, two concept extensions are identical iff the corresponding concepts are identical.
The most direct way of expressing this is as follows:
(1) (∀F )(∀G)[Ext(F ) = Ext(G) ↔ F = G]
However, we can express virtually the same thought without speaking of identity
between concepts so directly. Say that two concepts F and G are coextensional if
they have the same values for the same arguments, i.e., if (∀x)(F x ↔ Gx). Given
the extensional identity conditions for concepts, we know that F = G iff they are
coextensional. Hence, we might substitute the relation of coextensionality between
concepts for the relation of identity between concepts in (1) and thereby express the
identity conditions for extensions as:
(2) (∀F )(∀G)[Ext(F ) = Ext(G) ↔ (∀x)(F x ↔ Gx)].
In fact, this is just what Frege did. The reason why and the relation between
(1) and (2) is worthy of note. Recall Frege’s view that concepts can only be referred
to by predicate expressions occurring predicatively. A consequence is that concept
terms cannot flank the identity sign. Hence, Frege could not express the identity
conditions for extensions directly, by means of (1); instead he used the relation of
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coextensionality between concepts as a sort of stand-in for first-order identity and
expressed the identity conditions between concept extensions by means of (2).6

4.3

The priority of concepts to extensions

The Fregean view of extensions as mappings determined by concepts suggests that
concepts are prior to their extensions. The sort of priority that is at play here may be
of any of three types (Burge, 1984, 285). First, concepts may be semantically prior
to extensions if the definitions of extensions involve reference to or quantification
over concepts (and the converse does not hold: i.e., the definitions of concepts do
not involve reference to or quantification over extensions). Second, concepts may be
epistemically prior to extensions if extensions are properly conceived as belonging
to concepts, as being the extensions of concepts (and the converse does not hold:
i.e., concepts are not properly conceived as belonging to extensions). Third, concepts
may be ontologically prior to extensions if the identity and existence of extensions
is grounded in the identity and existence of concepts (and the converse does not
hold: i.e., the identity and existence of concepts is not grounded in the identity and
existence of concepts).7
Semantic priority is supported by the following asymmetry of reference. On the
one hand, expressions that refer to individual concepts, e.g., ‘the concept horse’, or
simply ‘horse’, do not involve any obvious reference to extensions. However, the
converse does not seem to hold. Expressions that refer to individual extensions, e.g.,
‘the extension of the concept horse’, or ‘Ext(horse)’, do involve obvious reference

6

Frege (1892a, 175–176) writes that it is coextensionality that “we have in mind” when we say
things such as “the concept F is identical to the concept G.”
7

Klement (2012, 154–155) argues for the stronger view that extensions are concepts, conceived
of as objects. A similar view may have been held earlier by Wright (1983, 19): “Extensions now
emerge simply as concepts objectified.” See also Cocchiarella (1987).
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to concepts, for they contain expressions such as ‘the concept horse and ‘horse’ as
constituent subexpressions.
An argument for epistemic priority is suggested by Frege’s views on the relation
between statements of identity between extensions and statements of coextensionaliry
between concepts, corresponding to the left and right-hand sides of (2) above.8 Frege
held that the two sides of (2) were semantically, but not epistemically equivalent.
Statements of identity between extensions were semantically equivalent to statements
of coextensionality between concepts, since each had the same truth condition9 ; however, the latter were epistemically prior, since extensions were only known in terms
of the relation of coextensionality on concepts (Frege, 1884, 73–79). Consequently,
(2) functions as an epistemic principle for expanding our conceptual repertoire. Principles that play this role are commonly called abstraction principles. They work by
employing an equivalence relation between previously understood entities to define
identity statements involving a new type of singular term and thereby to introduce a
new kind of object. In the case of (2), the previously understood entities are concepts,
the equivalence relation between them is coextensionality, and the identity statements
that are defined are statements of the form ‘Ext(F ) = Ext(G)’. The new singular
terms are ‘Ext(F )’ and ‘Ext(G)’, which refer to a new kind of object: extensions.
The ontological priority of concepts to extensions may be suggested by the observation that an extension, being a total mapping, is nothing over above its associated
concept and the objects to which this concept applies or does not apply. However, this
observation is unhelpful, for to the extent that it supports the thesis that concepts
are prior to their extensions, it also supports the thesis that all objects are prior to
extensions. This latter thesis has the absurd consequence that extensions are prior to
8

For a development and defense of Frege’s views, see Wright (1983, ch. 1), Hale (1988) and Hale
and Wright (2001, Introduction, Essays 5, 6).
9

See Hale and Wright (2001, Essay 4) for discussion of several candidate notions of same truthcondition in this context.
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themselves. It is interesting to note that when Frege speaks of the priority relation
between concepts and their extensions in ontological terms he speaks of the extension
of a concept as depending solely on the concept and not on objects.
The extension of a concept is constituted in being, not by the individuals,
but by the concept itself (Frege, 1895, 224–225).
The extension of a concept simply has its being in the concept, not in the
objects which belong to it (Frege, 1906, 183).
Since, for Frege, the concept does not depend on objects, his view avoids the absurd
consequence that extensions are prior to themselves.
Whether we think that concepts are ontologically prior to extensions may depend
on how we understand the statements (1) and (2) which express the relation between
the two. It’s possible to view these statements merely semantically, or epistemically,
as defining identity for extensions in terms of the semantically, or epistemically prior
relation of identity (or coextensionality) between concepts. But we might go further
and claim that this relation of identity (or coextensionality) between concepts is what
grounds the relation of identity between extensions. Under this interpretation, (1)
and (2) express an ontological priority of concepts to their extensions.
Insofar as concepts are prior to extensions in some, or all, of these senses, the
logical conception provides a “top–down” view of sets according to which concepts—
which one may picture as being situated above the domain of objects in a Platonic
heaven—come first, and their extensions—which one may picture as the shadows cast
by the concepts above—come second. Contemporary philosophers of set theory are
accustomed to work the other way round: to take the members of a set as basic and
to then tell a story about how the sets are formed out of their elements by the process
of forming collections. Various images are used to illustrate the process of collection
formation: one forms a collection by coralling its elements, or lassoing them (Kripke),
or thinking of them as one (Cantor), or enclosing them in a sack (Dedekind). This
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conception (which I discuss in detail in ch. 6) is “bottom-up”, insofar as the elements
of collections are prior to any collections they form.
To avoid confusion, a brief note on my use of ‘collection’ is in order. Unless
otherwise noted, I use this term in a rather technical sense to refer to those objects that
answer to the bottom-up conception of set. Collections are singular, non-mereological
entities whose identities are determined by the identity of their members, but which
are something over and above their members in the sense of being formed out of them.
Although technical, this use is not unfamiliar. For example, Charles Parsons (1997,
174) uses the term in this way when he writes:
By a collection I mean an object that consists of its elements; it is typically thought of as in some way “formed” from them . . . Thought of as
a collection, a set is formed from objects that are already “available” or
“given”.
This use of ‘collection’ is much narrower than the ordinary meaning, which allows
for uses of ‘collection’ that refer to entities that are not taken to be something over
and above their members, for example, uses of ‘collection’ to refer to mere pluralities,
such as “the collection of planks from Theseus’s original ship.” Ordinary speech
also allows for uses of ‘collection’ that refer to entities that are something over and
above their members but which are not formed out of their members, for example,
uses of ‘collection’ to refer to extensions. Thus, George Boolos (1998, 14), in his
exposition of the logical, top-down conception of set as an extension, in a paper in
which distinguishes this conception from the iterative, bottom-up conception of set,
uses ‘collection’ as a synonym for extensions. Neither of these uses of ‘collection’ are
permitted under my restriction.

4.3.1

Extensions as pluralities

I have said that extensions are (total) mappings. This leaves many questions
about the nature of extensions unanswered. In particular, we would like to know

99

more about the sort of relation that an extension (mapping) bears to the argumentvalue pairs that constitute it. Since the current project is to provide a conception of set, we cannot elucidate this relation in set-theoretic terms, i.e., we cannot
identify extensions with sets of argument-value pairs.10 We cannot, for example,
conceive of the extension of the concept horse as the set of argument-value pairs
{hBucephalus, Truei, hSocrates, Falsei, . . .}. But how else can we conceive of it?
Nor can we say that extensions are collections of argument-value pairs. If extensions are collections, then the relation of membership in an extension must be a
determinate of the determinable relation of membership in a collection; but it seems
that this cannot be the case, for the latter relation is irreflexive and so the notion of
a self-membered collection is incoherent; but the notion of a self-membered extension
is not. According to D2,
Ext(F ) is a self-member =df F (Ext(F )).
In other words, to say that an extension is a self-member is simply to say that it falls
under the concept of which it is the extension. There is nothing particularly puzzling
about this. There are even positive examples of extensions meeting this description.
Consider, for example, the extension of the concept self-identical. Certainly, Ext(selfidentical )—if it exists at all—is self-identical. It follows by D2 that Ext(self-identical )
is a self-member. Similarly with Ext(non-philosopher ), which is a non-philosopher
and Ext(abstract), which is abstract. So it seems that the relation of membership
in an extension is not irreflexive. Since the relations of membership in an extension
and membership in a collection differ in this way, the former cannot be a determinate
of the latter and so we cannot identify extensions with collections. One might try
identifying extensions with some other sort of singular entity. In addition to being
something other than a collection, this entity must satisfy the following desiderata:
10

Michael Beaney (1997, 135) writes that Frege’s notion of an extension is that of “a set of pairings
of arguments with values.”
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(i) it must be one object that unifies (in some way) its many argument-value pairs; (ii)
its identity must be uniquely determined by these argument-value pairs, and not by
any other things (as is the case with mereological compositions, which are identical to
the sum of their parts under any decomposition); (iii) finally, it must be understood
independently of set theory. I am doubtful whether there is any type of non-collection
satisfying (i)–(iii).
In an intriguing discussion, Max Black (1971, 622–624) considers an analysis of
‘set’ as the extension of a concept, defined as the property of being one of the objects
that falls under it. Black ends up rejecting this proposal on account of two objections.
The first is that it presupposes “our prior possession of the concept of a set” (624) and
is therefore unacceptable as an analysis of ‘set’. The second is that the plural phrase
‘being one of the objects that falls under F ’ “reduces to vacuity” in cases where F
is uninstantiated. Black’s first objection stems from the fact that he regards sets as
mere vehicles of plural reference so that the conception of set is exhausted by the rules
governing “set talk” (635). This claim, I think, should be resisted. Black’s second
objection is based on the more plausible claim that empty plural referring expressions
are meaningless. It follows that we cannot make sense of the property of being one of
the objects that falls under an uninstantiated concept. This problem does not arise if
extensions are mappings, however, for the property of being one of the argument-value
pairs determined by F is never uninstantiated (assuming there is at least one object).
The plural phrase ‘being one of the argument-value pairs determined by F ’ refers
to just as many pairs for uninstantiated concepts—one pair for every object—as it
does for universal concepts. For these reasons, I think that Black’s proposed analysis
survives his objections. However, there is a simpler alternative: instead of identifying
Ext(F ) with the property of being one of the argument-value pairs determined by F ,
identify Ext(F ) with the argument-value pairs themselves.
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According to this proposal, extensions are pluralities of argument-value pairs,
so that, for example, the extension of the concept horse is the plurality of pairs:
hBucephalus, Truei, hSocrates, Falsei, etc. Over the past twenty years or so, it has
become quite common to enrich classical first-order logic by adding devices for plural
reference and quantification. The result is a plural logic, which contains plural variables (‘xx’, ‘yy’) bound by the familiar quantifiers ∀ and ∃ and a logical predicate,
≺ (among). Read ‘∃xx ...’ as ‘there are some xx ...’. Read ‘∀xx’ as ‘for any xx ...’.
Read ‘xx ≺ yy’ as ‘the xx are among the yy’.11
In what follows I will employ these devices freely in philosophical regimentations of
plural English claims. Note that while the term ‘plurality’ is a convenient singularizing
term, pluralities are not singular entities. Thus, singular expressions such as ‘the
extension of F ’ and ‘the plurality of F ’s argument-value pairs’ must be understood
as stand-ins for plural terms, such as ‘the argument-value pairs of F ’. Though it may
be tedious, we can in general always dispense with reference to pluralities of objects
by referring plurally to the objects themselves—for example, we can dispense with
reference to a plurality of F s by referring directly to the F s—and we can always
dispense with quantification over pluralities of objects by plurally quantifying over
the objects themselves—for example, we can dispense with quantification over every
plurality of F s in ‘every plurality of F s is finite’ by means of a paraphrase such as
‘any F s are finite’.12
11

Nonlogical plural terms (e.g., ‘the Egyptians’) and predicates (e.g., ‘built a pyramid’) may be
added. Boolos (1984) provides one of the earliest presentations and defenses of plural logic. More
recent formulations can be found in Burgess and Rosen (1997), Rayo (2002), Yi (2005, 2006), McKay
(2006), Oliver and Smiley (2013) and ?. Officially, ≺ takes only singular terms in its first argument
place and plural terms in its second argument place. Read ‘x ≺ yy’ as ‘x is one of (among) the yy’.
(Unofficially, ≺ can take plural terms in its first argument place. Read ‘xx ≺ yy’ as an abbreviation
for ‘(∀z)(z ≺ xx → z ≺ yy)’.)
12

Like a singular quantifier, a plural quantifier ranges over objects taken one-at-a-time. But it
also ranges over objects taken two-at-a-time, and three-at-a-time, and so on. A sentence of the form
‘some things are F ’ is true iff at least some individual or individuals are F . The crucial difference
between singular and plural quantification is that such a sentence might be true even if F is a
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If extensions are pluralities, then identity between extensions must then be understood as an instance of plural identity. Two pluralities, the xx and the yy, are
identical iff every one of the xx is identical to one of the yy and vice versa. Thus, if the
xx are the argument-value pairs of some concept F and the yy are the argument-value
pairs of some concept G, then the xx are identical to the yy iff every pair among the
xx is identical to a pair among the yy and vice versa. However, whenever convenient,
I will use singular expressions and speak of identity between extensions as a singular
relation.
A plural analysis of extensions raises a concern similar to the one just discussed
for the view of extensions as collections. This concern arises from consideration of
the extensions of what we might call plural concepts: well-defined functions from
arbitrary pluralities of objects to truth-values. Other than taking plural arguments,
plural concepts are just like the concepts discussed so far. They are truth-functions
defined on all pluralities of objects that serve as the extensional meanings of plural
predicates in the same way that ordinary concepts do for singular predicates.
A predicate can be plural in a strong or a weak sense. A predicate is weakly plural
if any sentence in which it occurs can be reinterpreted in terms of singular predication.
Thus, the plural predicate ‘are green’ is weakly plural since its applications, e.g., in
the sentence ‘All the leaves are green’, can be reinterpreted in terms of singular
predication as the sentence ‘Each of the leaves is green’, in which ‘is green’ takes only
singular arguments. A strongly plural predicate cannot be reinterpreted in this way.
An example is the predicate ‘are heavy’ in the sentence ‘All the leaves are heavy’.
This sentence cannot be reinterpreted as ‘Each of the leaves is heavy’. If we accept
ordinary concepts and we allow for strongly plural predication, then it seems that we
must also accept plural concepts.

property that no individual has. An intuitive example is the relational property of being married to
each other. No individual instantiates this, although many couples do.
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Let ‘T W O’ stand for the plural concept at least two in number. According to
the plural analysis of extensions, the extension of T W O is the plurality of all the
argument-value pairs determined by T W O. Moreover, since T W O is a total function,
it is defined on every plurality of objects; in particular it is defined on the extension
of T W O. This means that the extension of T W O is the plural argument of one of
its own argument-value pairs. Since according to the plural analysis of extensions,
the extension of T W O is the plurality of all the argument-value pairs determined
by T W O, it follows that this plurality is a member of one of its own argumentvalue pairs. Admittedly, this sounds strange. But I suspect that this strangeness
is due to the assumptions, which are illicit in this context, that the argument-value
pairs of a concept are each “built-up” from some original arguments and values and
that the extension of a concept is “built-up” from its argument-value pairs. If these
assumptions were true, then the arguments of each pair would be prior to the pair,
and each pair would be prior to the extension. And the present example would then
involve the absurd consequence that the extension of T W O is prior to one of its
argument-value pairs and therefore prior to itself. But these assumptions are false.
According to the present view of extensions as concept mappings, each of the pairs in
the extension of T W O as well as the extension of T W O itself are determined “from
above” by applications of the plural concept T W O.

4.4

Inconsistency of naive set theory

The logical conception of set as the extension of a concept is relatively easy to
understand and provides a simple, uniform account of the existence conditions for
sets. As it was formulated in ignorance of the paradoxes, it is free from ad hoc devices
designed to avoid them. Unfortunately, the set theories that most accurately reflect
this conception—naive set theories—are inconsistent. In this section, I formulate a
naive set theory based on the logical conception of set. I then prove its inconsistency
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by deriving Russell’s paradox. In the following sections, I consider two modifications
to this set theory that seek to restore consistency while remaining as close as possible
to the logical conception of set.
Naive set theories can be formulated using either a classical first or second-order
logic. I prefer a second-order logic, as this allows for quantification over concepts,
which makes it possible to express the relation between concepts and sets in the
most straightforward way. I call the theory ‘second-order naive set theory’ (SN) The
language of SN includes the first-order variables: ‘x’, ‘y’ and ‘z’, which range over all
objects (including extensions) and the second-order variables: ‘F ’, ‘G’ and ‘H’, which
range over all concepts. In addition, I include the restricted first-order variable ‘e’,
which ranges exclusively over extensions. I attach subscripts to variables as needed.
The membership relation ∈ is defined by D2.
SN has two axioms. The axiom of full comprehension axiom (FC) specifies the
existence conditions for extensions:
FC (∀F )(∃e)(∀x)(x ∈ e ↔ F x).
The axiom of extensionality (Ext) specifies identity conditions:
Ext (∀F )(∀G)[Ext(F ) = Ext(G) ↔ (∀x)(x ∈ Ext(F ) ↔ x ∈ Ext(G))].13

13

If we wanted, we could replace (FC) and (Ext) with the single axiom:

(1) (∀F )(∀G)[Ext(F ) = Ext(G) ↔ F = G],
from which they can be derived as theorems.
The derivation of FC takes place in two steps. First, we show that (1) implies that every concept
has an extension. Proof: Instantiate the concept variables ‘F ’ and ‘G’ in (1) to an arbitrary concept,
say H, to get: Ext(H) = Ext(H) ↔ H = H. By the law of identity, H = H. Therefore, Ext(H) =
Ext(H). Since the logic is classical, there are no empty terms, so Ext(H) exists. Moreover, H is
arbitrary, so it follows that every concept has an extension, i.e., (∀F )(∃e)(e = Ext(F )). Next, we
apply D2, which specifies the conditions under which something is a member of an extension, to e.
Given e = Ext(F ), D2 tells us that for any object, x, x ∈ e ↔ F x. This gives us FC.
The principle of extensionality (Ext) follows from an application of D2 directly to (1). First,
since concepts are extensional, ‘F = G’ is equivalent to ‘(∀x)(F x ↔ Gx)’. Second, we know by D2
that ‘F x’ (‘Gx’) is equivalent to ‘x ∈ Ext(F )’ (‘x ∈ Ext(G)’). Therefore, ‘F = G’ is equivalent to
‘(∀x)(x ∈ Ext(F ) ↔ x ∈ Ext(G))’. In effect, the derivation of Ext from (1) plus D2 amounts to
replacing the relation of identity between concepts in (1) with the definitionally equivalent relation
of coextensionality between the extensions of these concepts.
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FC and Ext jointly entail that each of the concepts object, extension, pure extension,
cardinal number, ordinal number and non-self-membered extension defines a unique
extension differing from the others with respect to its members.14 Let U , V , VP , K, O
and R stand for the corresponding extensions, so that SN vindicates A1–A6. This is
the first step in deriving the contradictions discussed in chapter two. The second step
is to justify any additional principles used in the derivations. As we saw in chapter
2, Russell’s paradox requires no additional principles and is derived in SN as follows:
Instantiate FC to the concept non-self-membered extension to get:
(4.1) (∃e)(∀x)(x ∈ e ↔ x is an extension ∧ x ∈
/ x).
By (4.1) and Ext, ‘e’ has a unique value, R, whose members are all and only the
non-self-membered extensions. This allows us to eliminate the existential quantifier,
replacing the bound occurrence of ‘e’ with ‘R’:
(4.2) (∀x)(x ∈ R ↔ x is an extension ∧ x ∈
/ x).
(4.2) entails:
(4.3) (∀e)(e ∈ R ↔ e ∈
/ e).
Instantiate ‘e’ to R in (4.3) to get:
(4.4) R ∈ R ↔ R ∈
/ R.
The other paradoxes require additional principles, such as Cantor’s theorem, SBT,
BF1 and BF2 (chapter 2) and consequently might be blocked by denying some of the
assumptions needed to prove these principles. Any response of this sort, however,
would be an instance of the No Function strategy (chapter 3) and, as we’ve seen, this
strategy provides a diagnosis of the paradoxes that is less uniform than that provided
by the No Set strategy. For this reason, a No Set strategy is preferable.
14

Thus, the concept object defines Ext(object), the concept ordinal number defines Ext(ordinal
number ) and Ext(object) 6= Ext(ordinal number ) since not every object is an ordinal number.
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Below, I consider two No Set strategies that strive to preserve as much of the
logical conception of set as possible. The first—limitation of size—replaces FC with
an explicitly restricted comprehension principle, according to which only “small”
concepts have extensions. The second—first-order set restrictivism—reinterprets the
first-order quantifiers in FC as implicitly restricted by context so that while every concept defines an extension in every context, the extensions so defined are always small.
Similar remarks apply to Ext. First-order set restrictivism amounts to replacing FC
and Ext with implicitly restricted principles of comprehension and extensionality.
The difference between these approaches can be illustrated by comparing what each
says about the concepts that engender the contradiction-inducing sets under FC. Limitation of size tells us that these concepts do not have extensions and hence do not
define sets at all. First-order set restrictivism tells us that while these concepts define
extensions in every context; there is no context in which these extensions include all
the objects that intuitively fall under the corresponding concepts.

4.5

Limitation of Size

The limitation of size doctrine has two parts. The first is the imposition of a limit
on the size of sets. The second is the claim that this limit is intrinsic to the existence
conditions for sets in such a way that the mere fact that some objects, the xx, exceed
the limit explains why there is no set of the xx. Both parts can arguably be traced
back to Cantor’s view of the “absolutely infinite” as the size of totalities too great
to be measured or in any way bounded, though it is somewhat controversial whether
Cantor would have endorsed the sort of explanatory claim expressed by the second
part (Cantor, 1899, 114).
If the doctrine is going to be informative, we must have some independent grasp
on the size of the absolutely infinite. It would seem that the absolutely infinite cannot
be measured, or assigned any definite cardinality, since that would imply that it was
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bounded or had a limit. On the other hand, in order to avoid a vicious sort of
circularity, we cannot define the absolutely infinite simply as the size that is too big
for set formation and then apply this standard in our explanation for why some things
don’t form sets. Fortunately, we are able to get a grip on the size of the absolutely
infinite in another way, by discovering independently intelligible totalities which can
be proved to be limitless. We can then use these totalities as relative measures in
the sense that any totality as large as one of them is shown to be absolutely infinite.
Cantor (1899) proceeds in just this way. First, he applies Burali-Forti’s reasoning to
prove by reductio that the totality of all ordinals is absolutely infinite. Second, he
proves that other totalities, such as the totality of all cardinals and the totality of all
thoughts, are absolutely infinite, by showing that they are as big as the totality of
ordinals. There is nothing sacred about the totality of all ordinals. One might select
another totality to start with, such as the totality of all sets (von Neumann, 1925),
apply Cantor’s reasoning to prove by reductio that this totality is absolutely infinite
and then go on to show that other totalities are absolutely infinite, by showing that
they are as big as the totality of all sets. I will discuss worries of circularity facing
these strategies below.
The limitation of size doctrine seeks to fix SN by replacing FC with a restricted
comprehension principle (LOS), according to which only “small” concepts define extensions:
LOS (∀F )[Small(F ) → (∃e)(∀x)(x ∈ e ↔ F x)].
The size of a concept is defined in terms of the size of the absolutely infinite.
D3. A concept is small if it applies to fewer than absolutely many things.
D4. A concept is big if it is not small.
Because LOS, like FC, says that all sets (extensions) are defined by concepts, it
can be seen as an attempt to preserve as much of the logical conception of set as
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possible.15 The paradoxes are blocked as follows. Given some relative metric for the
absolutely infinite, such as the concept ordinal, we show that each of the concepts
object, extension, pure extension, cardinal number, and non-self-membered extension
has at least as many instances as this metric and is therefore big. It follows by LOS
that none of these concepts defines a set. Hence, none of the contradiction-inducing
sets (U , V , VP , K, O or R) exists. In this way, the limitation of size doctrine provides
a uniform, No Set solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.
Below, I consider two objections to limitation of size. The first claims that the
limitation of size doctrine fails to respect the intuitive notion of an extension. The
second claims that it leads to circular explanations.

4.5.1

Failure to respect the intuitive notion of an extension

Intuitively, a concept, F , has an extension if for every object, x, there is a determinate answer to the question of whether x falls under F . Intuitively, therefore,
every determinate concept defines an extension. As we’ve seen, the limitation of size
doctrine denies this. According to LOS, only small concepts have extensions. Big
concepts do not. But why not? Can it be that big concepts fail to have extensions
because they are true of too many things? I think not. If this sort of explanation
appears at all plausible, I claim that this is because it forces an illicit shift from
15
Although modern set theories, like ZF, are not generally thought of as representing the logical
conception of set, some philosophers have argued that the axioms of these theories can also be seen
as attempts to preserve as much of the logical conception of set as possible. Thus, Fraenkel et al.
(1973, 32) write:

The axiom of [full] comprehension turned out to be inconsistent and therefore cannot be used as an axiom of set theory. However, since this axiom is
so close to our intuitive concept of set we shall try to retain a considerable
number of instances of this axiom schema . . . Our guiding principle, for the
system ZF, will be to admit only those instances of the axiom schema of
comprehension which assert the existence of sets which are not too “big”
compared to sets which we already have. We shall call this principle the
limitation of size doctrine.
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the logical conception of set as an extension to the iterative conception of set as
a collection. If we mix these conceptions, and think of extensions as collections of
the objects falling under a concept, then we may find some plausibility in the claim
that when the objects falling under a concept are too many, it is impossible for them
to be collected together (by whatever means) so as to form an extension. But this
plausibility is based on a conflation. Extensions as mappings exist, iff and because
there is a determinate answer to the question of whether each object falls under the
corresponding concept. The number of objects for which the answer to this question
is yes is irrelevant.
But let us suppose that size does determine whether an extension exists and that
this is an acceptable constraint of the logical conception. We might then wonder
why size shouldn’t also determine whether a concept exists. It seems arbitrary to
accept concepts, no matter their size, but then to reject their extensions when the
number of objects that would belong to them is too many. Furthermore, given our
definition of extensions as mappings, there is a perfectly good sense in which even
the extensions of small concepts have an absolutely infinite size; for every extension
involves absolutely every object. Limitation of size only restricts the number of
objects that can be members of an extension, not the number of objects that can be
involved in an extension. What might justify such partiality?
A defender of the limitation of size doctrine might seek to meet this objection
by modifying his view. According to the modified view, every concept has an extension, but there are two kinds of extension: small extensions—the extensions of
small concepts—and big extensions—the extensions of big concepts. The difference
between these two kinds has to do with the conditions under which they are members of other extensions. Small extensions behave in the way we expect extensions to
behave: a small extension is a member of an extension, Ext(F ), just in case it falls
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under the concept F . Big extensions behave differently: they are never members of
anything. This amounts to replacing D2 and LOS with:
D2∗ . x is a member of Ext(F ) =df F x ∧ x is not a big extension
and
LOS∗ (∀F )(∃e)(∀x)[(x is not a big extension ∧ x ∈ e ↔ F x) ∨
(x is a big extension ∧ x ∈
/ e)].
LOS∗ tells us that every concept has an extension. In particular, the concept non-selfmembered extension has an extension. Ext tells us that this extension is unique (i.e.,
the concept non-self-membered extension has only one extension). We can therefore
label it ‘R’. However, the derivation of the contradictory R ∈ R ↔ R ∈
/ R goes
through only if R is small. We refer by reductio that R is big.
To see this in a bit more detail, we might try running through the derivation
(4.1)–(4.4) of Russell’s paradox in SN, with D2∗ and LOS∗ replacing D2 and FC. (To
save space, I use ‘A’ to abbreviate ‘x is an extension ∧x ∈
/ x’.) Begin by instantiating
LOS∗ to the concept non-self-membered extension to get:
(5.1) (∃e)(∀x)[(x is not a big extension ∧ x ∈ e ↔ Ax) ∨
(x is a big extension ∧ x ∈
/ e)].
As before, Ext then allows us to infer:
(5.2) (∀x)[(x is not a big extension ∧ x ∈ R ↔ Ax) ∨
(x is a big extension ∧ x ∈
/ R)].
But here the derivation comes to a halt. For (5.2) entails:
(5.3) (∀e)(e ∈ R ↔ e ∈
/ e)
only if every extension is small. In particular, it follows that:
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(5.4) R ∈ R ↔ R ∈
/R
only if R is small. We infer by reductio that R is big.
D2∗ and LOS∗ preserve the letter of the thesis that every concept has an extension,
but not the spirit. Intuitively, Ext(F ) is a self-member iff F (Ext(F)). Indeed, this is
the result of substituting ‘Ext(F )’ for ‘x’ in D2. But we have replaced D2 and this
is no longer true. To see how unintuitive the consequences are, consider the concept
self-identical. Since Ext(self-identical ) is self-identical, Ext(self-identical ) ∈ Ext(selfidentical ) according to D2. But self-identical is big (since everything is self-identical).
So Ext(self-identical ) ∈
/ Ext(self-identical ) according to LOS∗ . Because this version
of the limitation of size doctrine denies that big extensions like Ext(self-identical )
are members of extensions whose intuitive membership criteria they satisfy, it fails to
preserve the spirit of the thesis that every concept has an extension.
Perhaps it is for this reason that in his attempt to fix naive set theory, Boolos
(1998, ch. 6) chooses to drop the name ‘extension’ entirely, replacing it with ‘subtension’. In Boolos’s adaptation of the limitation of size doctrine, every concept F has
a subtension, ∗ F , where ∗ F = ∗ G iff either F and G are both big or F and G are
coextensional. Membership in a subtension is defined by: x ∈ y =df (∃F )(y = ∗ F ∧
F x). Subtensions of small concepts behave just as we would expect extensions to. If
F is small, then x ∈ ∗ F ↔ F x. Subtensions of big concepts do not behave this way.
If F is big, then x ∈ ∗ F does not imply F x. Let F be the concept self-identical and
let G be the concept of ordinal number. Since F and G are both big, ∗ F = ∗ G. Since
Socrates is self-identical, Socrates ∈ ∗ F . Therefore, Socrates ∈ ∗ G. But Socrates is
not an ordinal. Boolos’s theory preserves neither the letter nor the spirit of the thesis
that every concept has an extension.
In chapter 2 (p. 55), I described a pragmatic solution to the paradoxes as one
“which seeks to preserve a theory of sets without any underlying conception of set.”
I argued that this sort of solution is unsatisfying because it leaves us unable to offer
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explanations such as why there exist only those sets that our theory says exist and why
none of the contradiction-inducing sets exists. The preceding objections show that
the limitation of size doctrine provides only a pragmatic solution to the paradoxes.
It enforces restrictions on logical set theory that are sufficient to restore consistency;
but (as I have argued) these restrictions cannot be justified by the underlying logical
conception of set. Despite his efforts to resuscitate logical set theory by means of
the limitation of size doctrine, I think that Boolos would agree. After lamenting
the inconsistency of naive set theory, which he describes as “simple to state, elegant,
initially quite credible, and natural in that it articulates a view about sets that might
occur to one quite naturally” (1998, 15), he characterizes the limitation of size doctrine
quite differently (90).
Unlike the naive and the iterative conceptions, limitation of size . . . is
not a natural view, for one would come to entertain it only after one’s
preconceptions had been sophisticated by knowledge of the set-theoretic
antinomies, including not just Russell’s paradox, but those of Cantor and
Burali-Forti as well.
(Note how the grounds for unnaturalness here cited call to mind Russell’s third condition on a satisfactory explanation (p. 54).) I conclude that because logical set theory
can only be motivated by the logical conception of set, we can adopt the limitation
of size doctrine as a fix to logical set theory only if we are willing to do so in a purely
pragmatic spirit, with no reference to an underlying conception of set. This solution
by fiat is philosophically unsatisfactory.

4.5.2

Circular explanations

As early as 1883, Cantor had determined that the totalities of cardinal and ordinal numbers were ‘absolutely infinite’ and could not be assigned any definite cardinal
number, finite or transfinite. This position led to a conflict with Frege’s (1884) definition of ‘the cardinal number of F ’ as ‘the extension of the concept equinumerous to

113

F ’.16 Under a replacement of ‘F ’ with ‘the concept ordinal number ’, Frege’s definition
implies that the cardinal number of the concept ordinal number is the extension of
the concept equinumerous to the concept ordinal number. Similarly, Frege’s definition
implies that the cardinal number of the concept cardinal number is the extension of
the concept equinumerous to the concept cardinal number. Thus, Frege’s definition
implies that each of these concepts has a definite cardinal number. This contradicts
Cantor.
In his critical review of Frege (1884), Cantor (1885) argued that Frege had overlooked the fact that some extensions have no definite cardinal number, but are “quantitatively indeterminate”. The relevant passage is the following (Cantor here uses the
terms ‘number’ and ‘power’ for ‘finite cardinal’ and ‘transfinite cardinal’):
[Frege] entirely overlooks the fact that the ‘extension of a concept’ in
general may be quantitatively completely indeterminate. Only in certain
cases is the ‘extension of a concept’ quantitatively determinate: Then it
has of course, if it is finite, a definite number or, in the case it is infinite, a
definite power. For such a quantitative determination of an ‘extension of
a concept’ the concepts ‘number’ and ‘power’ must already be given from
another source, and it is a reversal of direction if one undertakes to found
the latter concepts on that of ‘extension of a concept’.17
The argument is not obvious; however, if we interpret ‘quantitatively indeterminate’
as ‘absolutely infinite’, the following plausible line of reasoning emerges.18
(a) Cantor observes that in order to avoid false implications, such as that the concept cardinal number has a definite cardinal number, Frege’s definition must be
restricted so that it applies only to concepts that have definite cardinal numbers
(or whose extensions do).

16

In this discussion, I treat ‘the cardinal number of F ’ and ‘the cardinal number of Ext(F )’ as
interchangeable.
17

This translation is from Tait (1997).

18

See Tait (1997) and Burgess (2008). For an argument that Cantor did not understand quantitative indeterminacy in this way, see Ebert and Rossberg (2009).
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(b) Although he does not call it such, the necessary restriction is a version of the
limitation of size doctrine, according to which there is no extension of the form
‘Ext(equinumerous to the concept F )’, whenever F is quantitatively indeterminate.
(c) Assuming that no concept is indeterminate in the sense of lacking a sharp
boundary (see 4.1, pp. 89–91), quantitative indeterminacy is entirely a matter
of lacking a definite cardinal number. Therefore, this limitation of size principle
makes use of the very notion of ‘cardinal number’ that Frege is attempting to
define. This is the “reversal of direction” that Cantor speaks of.
I believe that Cantor’s full objection may then be properly understood as a dilemma:
Frege’s definition of ‘cardinal number’ is either inconsistent (if it is not amended by
a limitation of size principle) or viciously circular (if it is).
Cantor’s argument is worrisome only insofar as one is sympathetic to Frege’s
definition of the cardinal numbers as extensions of concepts, although it may be generalized so that it also applies to Russell’s definition of the cardinal numbers as classes
of equivalent classes. However, recently, Øystein Linnebo (2010, 151–154) has articulated an argument that a limitation of size principle leads to circular explanations
no matter how one defines the cardinal numbers. This variant is based on the notion
of a minimal size—a “threshold cardinality”—for set formation: any things whose
cardinality is at or above the threshold cardinality are too many to form a set. This
leaves room for questions about what the threshold cardinality is and why it is what
it is. Linnebo exploits these questions, arguing that attempts to answer them lead to
circular explanations.
A standard answer to the first question is that the threshold cardinality is the
cardinality of the plurality of all the ordinals oo. Linnebo assumes this identity and
proceeds to argue that explanations for why it obtains are circular.
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Consider the question why there are not more ordinals than oo. For
instance, why cannot the plurality oo form a set, which would then be
an additional ordinal, larger than any member of oo? According to the
view under discussion, the explanation is that oo are too many to form a
set, where being too many is defined as being as many as oo. Thus, the
proposed explanation moves in a tiny circle. The threshold cardinality is
what it is because of the cardinality of the plurality of all ordinals, but
the cardinality of this plurality is what it is because of the threshold.19
This circularity arises for any self-reproductive property φ, for the set of all φs,
if it existed, would entail the existence of an additional φ. In some cases, the set
of all φs would be an additional φ; in other cases it would not be an additional
φ, but would allow us to define it.20 Thus, if we identify the threshold cardinality
with the cardinality of the plurality of φs and then say that there is no set of all
φs because of the number of φs being what it is, our explanation will necessarily be
circular. To illustrate, consider the self-reproductive property set and suppose we
identify the threshold cardinality with the cardinality of the plurality of all sets ss
(von Neumann, 1925). Finally, consider the question why cannot the plurality ss
form a set—the universal set—which would be more inclusive than any member of
ss? If we answer that the plurality of ss cannot form a set because of the threshold
cardinality being what it is, our explanation will be circular. For on the one hand,
the threshold cardinality is what it is because of the cardinality of the plurality of
all sets. But since the set of all sets, if it existed, would be an additional set, the
cardinality of this plurality is what it is (at least in part) because of the threshold.
These circles may be broken if Cantor’s notion of the absolutely infinite is coherent.
Equipped with this notion, we are in a position to define the threshold cardinality as
19

In this passage, Linnebo identifies ordinals with sets of ordinals. But this is not necessary for
his argument. It can be proved from the definition of ordinal numbers as measures of well-ordered
sets that any set of ordinals starting from 0 (and containing no gaps) has an ordinal number greater
than any of its members (see the proof of BF2 in the appendix to chapter 2). Consequently, the
number of ordinals depends in part on whether O exists.
20

See my discussion of Russell’s schema, 3.2.
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a size without any bound or limit, in a way that does not involve reference to any
particular pluralities, such as the ordinals or the sets. While it may still be true that
the ordinals or the sets are absolutely infinite and consequently that their size is that
of the threshold cardinality, it will not true that these pluralities fix or determine the
threshold cardinality; at least not in the strong sense of making it what it is. If we
are able to define the threshold cardinality independently of any particular plurality
of objects, we can say that the threshold cardinality is what it is (and not more
or less) because this is the greatest possible size, not because the cardinality of the
ordinals or the cardinality of the sets is what it is (and not more or less). This breaks
the explanatory circles above at the same step: we deny the proposition that the
threshold cardinality is what it is because of the cardinality of the ordinals or the
cardinality of the sets.

4.6

First-order set restrictivism

First-order set restrictivism (FSR) seeks to block the derivations of paradoxes in
SN by placing contextual restrictions on the first-order quantifiers in FC and Ext.
The effect is that big concepts always define small extensions, though the same concept may define different extensions in different contexts. There is a sense in which
these restrictions allow the restrictivist to maintain the full comprehension axiom
(FC). Interpreted within the context in which the restrictions are imposed, the statement ‘Any concept F determines the set of all the F s’ is true. The same statement
will be false if interpreted within an absolutist context in which no quantificational
restrictions are imposed. In the absolutist context, it will be true to say that FSR
replaces FC with a new comprehension principle, in which the first-order quantifiers
are always restricted. Indeed, it is this restriction which blocks the paradoxes. (It
also raises issues for expressibility, which I discuss below.)
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The contextual restrictions on the first-order quantifiers are expressed in FSR as
restrictions on first-order domains of quantification as follows:
• ‘∀D xφ(x)’ abbreviates ‘everything φs’, where ‘everything’ is interpreted as ranging over all objects in the domain D.
Expressions denoting extensions in FSR are indexed to the domain over which the
extension is defined. Thus:
• ‘extensionD ’ abbreviates ‘extension defined over D’. (Similarly, ‘ExtD (F )’ abbreviates ‘Ext(F ) defined over D’, and ‘eD ’ abbreviates ‘e defined over D’.)
Contextual restrictions on the first-order quantifiers are always enforced. While
domains vary between contexts, there is no context in which quantification over absolutely all sets is permitted. In particular, these contextual restrictions are applied
to FC and Ext so as to yield the following interpretations:
FC∗ (∀F )(∃eD )(∀D x)(x ∈ e ↔ F x)
and
Ext∗ (∀F )(∀G)[ExtD (F ) = ExtD (G) ↔ (∀D x)(x ∈ Ext(F ) ↔ x ∈ Ext(G))].
Note that the outermost second-order quantifier is unrestricted. FC∗ tells us that
every concept, F , has an extensionD , whose members are all and only those objects
from D that fall under F . Ext∗ gives identity conditions for extensionsD ; in particular,
Ext∗ tells us that every concept defines a unique extensionD .
As I mentioned above, the same concept defines different extensions relative to
different domains. This may be unsurprising in some cases. We might expect that the
concept horse would have a different extension relative to the domain of yearlings—in
which all and only yearlings are members—than it would relative to the domain of
all horses—in which all and only horses are members. This may be more surprising
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in other cases. It is somewhat surprising to think that the concept horse would have
a different extension relative to the domain of all horses than it would relative to
domain of all animals. After all, these extensions have all the same members! But
given our definition of an extension as a mapping, this result seems to be the right
one: the latter extension includes many argument-value pairs that the former does
not. These extensions cannot really be identical after all.
In order to avoid Russell’s paradox, FSR must not recognize a universal domain,
DU . For if it did, we could derive FC and Ext in FSR as instances of FC∗ and Ext∗
by substituting DU for ‘D’. (As we saw above, FC and Ext lead directly to Russell’s
paradox.) In fact, Russell’s paradox can be derived even without a universal domain.
All that is required is that there is some D that contains ExtD (non-self-membered
extension), i.e., some D that contains the extension of non-self-membered extension
that is defined over it. Fortunately, the FSRist is free to deny that this ever occurs.
To see this in a bit more detail, we might try running through the derivation (4.1)–
(4.4) of Russell’s paradox once more, but this time with FC∗ and Ext∗ replacing FC
and Ext.
Letting ‘D’ stand for an arbitrary domain, the first three steps below—(6.1)–
(6.3)—parallel (4.1)–(4.3) from the original derivation almost exactly. We begin by
instantiating FC∗ to non-self-membered extension to get:
(6.1) (∃eD )(∀D x)(x ∈ eD ↔ x is an extensionD ∧ x ∈
/ x).
By (6.1) and Ext∗ , ‘eD ’ has a unique value, RD , which is the extensionD whose members
are all and only the non-self-membered extensions in D. This allows us to eliminate
the existential quantifier, replacing the bound occurrence of ‘eD ’ with ‘RD ’:
(6.2) (∀D x)(x ∈ RD ↔ x is an extensionD ∧ x ∈
/ x).
(6.2) entails:
(6.3) (∀D eD )(eD ∈ RD ↔ eD ∈
/ eD ).
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But here the derivation comes to a halt. If RD was in the range of ∀D we could
instantiate ‘eD ’ to RD in (6.3) to get the contradictory: RD ∈ RD ↔ RD ∈
/ RD .
However, since ∀D is restricted, this assumption is open to question. We conclude by
reductio that RD lies outside the range of ∀D ; consequently that:
(6.4) RD ∈
/ RD .
If we want, we can shift to a more inclusive context, in which quantification ranges
over a more inclusive domain D+ , which includes RD . In this context, the result of
instantiating FC∗ to non-self-membered extension is:
(7.1) (∃eD+ )(∀D+ x)(x ∈ eD+ ↔ x is an extensionD+ ∧ x ∈
/ x).
By the same reasoning as before, ‘eD+ ’ has a unique value, RD+ , which is the extensionD+
whose members are all and only the non-self-membered extensions in D+ . However, since ∀D+ is restricted, we cannot instantiate to RD+ to derive the contradictory
RD+ ∈ RD+ ↔ RD+ ∈
/ RD+ . Instead, we conclude by reductio that RD+ lies outside the
range of ∀D+ and consequently that RD+ ∈
/ RD+ .
Burali-Forti’s paradox is blocked in precisely the same way. FSR allows us to
define sets of the form ExtD (ordinal number ). But the existence of each of these sets
leads to a contradiction only if it is in the D over which it is defined. To see this, recall
my discussion of Burali-Forti’s contradiction (2.3.1 and 3.2.3). In these chapters, I
described the contradiction as based on the fact that the ordinal number of the initial
segment defined by any set of ordinal numbers is greater than any member of the set.
But the contradiction might equally well be described in terms of domains. Simply
replace ‘set’ with ‘domain’ above and Burali-Forti’s contradiction is based on the
fact that the ordinal number of the initial segment defined by any domain of ordinal
numbers is greater than any member of the domain. This leads to a contradiction
if this ordinal number must also be a member of the domain; but not if we are free
to infer that it is not a member of the domain. Since according to FSR, D never
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includes all the ordinals, we are always free to infer that the ordinal number of the
initial segment defined by any domain of ordinal numbers lies outside the domain.
Hence, there is no paradox.
Cantor’s paradox is also blocked.

FSR allows us to define sets of the form

ExtD (cardinal number ), ExtD (object), ExtD (extension) and ExtD (pure extension) but
none of these are contradiction-inducing. To see this, recall the derivations of contradictions from the sets K, U , V and VP (2.2.2 and 3.2.2). Consider first, the derivation
of a contradiction from K. This is based on the fact that given any set of cardinals,
we are able to define a cardinal number which is provably greater than any member
of the set. But the contradiction might equally well be described in terms of domains.
So understood, the contradiction is based on the fact that given any domain of cardinals, we are able to define a cardinal number which is provably greater than any
member of the domain. This leads to a contradiction if this cardinal number must
also be a member of the domain; but not if we are free to infer that it is not a member
of the domain. Since according to FSR, D never includes all the cardinals, we are
always free to infer that the cardinal number defined over any domain of cardinal
numbers lies outside the domain.
Next, consider the derivations of contradictions from U , V and VP . These are
based on the fact that we are able to define bijections between these sets and their
powersets, which contradicts Cantor’s theorem.21 Of course, the definition of each
bijection involves quantification over the members of the corresponding set. In the
language of FSR, this means that it presupposes the existence of a domain, D, whose
members include all members of the set. Moreover, since each of these sets necessarily
includes every set of its members as a member (including the set of all its members)—
for every set of objects is an object, every set of sets is a set and every set of pure
21

See my discussion of Cantor I, pp. 36–38
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sets is a pure set—it follows that any domain over which these sets are defined must
include every set of its members as a member. For whenever we introduce a set by
means of FC∗ , we quantify over all its members. If such a D exists, we can derive the
contradictions as before. To illustrate, let D− be any restriction on the domain D and
suppose that D contains both ExtD (object) and every set of the form ExtD- (object).
Such a D would include all its “subsets” as members. This would enable us to define
a bijection between ExtD (object) and its “powerset”, P(ExtD (object)), which would
contradict Cantor’s theorem as applied to D. FSR blocks this derivation by denying
that such a domain exists. Consequently, any attempt to define the necessary bijection
between ExtD (object) and P(ExtD (object)) fails. This amounts to a variant of the
restrictivist solution to Russell’s paradox above. Just as in that case any attempt
to derive the contradictory RD ∈ RD ↔ RD ∈
/ RD only succeeds in showing that
RD lies outside of D, so in this case any attempt to establish a bijection between
ExtD (object) and P(ExtD (object)), which would contradict Cantor’s theorem, only
proves that some “subsets” of ExtD (object) lie outside D. This means that there
can be no domain of all objects, all sets or all pure sets. For any of these domains
would—by definition—include all sets of their members as members. Similar remarks
apply to ExtD (extension) and ExtD (pure extension). Again there is no paradox.
4.6.1

A modalized variant of FC

In the interests of providing a foundation for iterative set theory, Charles Parsons
(1983, chaps. 10, 11) introduces a modalized variant of full comprehension, according
to which any property of sets can determine a set, which exists at later stages in the
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hierarchy.22 Using second-order variables for properties and first-order variables for
sets, it is tempting to formulate (the natural necessitation of) this idea as:
FC♦ (∀F )♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ F x).
However, FC♦ is inconsistent. In terms of the usual possible worlds semantics, FC♦
says that at any world, w, for every property F at w: ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ F x). This
leads to Russell’s paradox when ‘F ’ is instantiated to the property non-self-membered
set. The inconsistent instance reads:
(8.1) At w: ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈
/ x).
Applying the standard possible worlds interpretation to the ♦, (8.1) says that at w
there is an accessible world v at which the Russell set Rv = {x|x ∈
/ x} of all the
non-self-membered sets in v exists. Because Rv is one of these sets, it follows that:
(8.2) At v: Rv ∈ Rv ↔ Rv ∈
/ Rv .
The source of the trouble with FC♦ appears to be quantification into the scope of
♦. (The quantifier ∀F occurs outside of the ♦ operator, while the bound occurrence
of the variable ‘F ’ falls within it.) In response, Parsons (pp. 295, 315–318) suggests
“fully rigidifying” properties relative to worlds. F is rigidified relative to a world
w if anything that is F at w is necessarily F and anything that is not F at w is
necessarily not F . F is fully rigidified relative to a world w if in addition, there are
no F s that do not exist at w, i.e., the F s at w are all the possible F s.23 When F is
fully rigidified relative to a world w, something counts as an F at another world v
iff it is an F at w. FC♦ is consistent if F is (fully) rigidified relative to the world w

22

Parsons is motivated by the thought, which he traces back to Cantor (1899), that any “multiplicity” of sets that “can exist together” can form a set. For discussion of another modal variant of
full comprehension, according to which any property F determines the set of all things that are F
in a special way, see Fritz et al. (nd).
23

See Parsons (pp. 288, f.n. 29; 301–302) for a definition of ‘the (full) rigidification of F ’.
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to which  is instantiated. The result is that the occurrence of ‘F ’ in ‘F x’ is read
as falling outside the scope of ♦ so that instead of referring to the things that are
F at the world v to which ♦ is instantiated, it refers to the things that are F at
w. Parsons’s rigidification strategy is striking since it blocks derivations of Russell’s
paradox in a way that closely resembles FC∗ .
Let ‘Fw ’ symbolize the (full) rigidification of F to w and let ‘{x|Fw x}’ denote the
possible set—one whose existence is asserted within the context of the ♦ operator—
that is defined by “instantiating” FC♦ to the world w and the (fully) rigidified property
Fw . The result of replacing the occurrence of ‘∈’
/ in (8.1) with its (full) rigidification
to w is:
(9.1) At w: ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈
/ w x).
In terms of the usual possible worlds semantics, (9.1) says that at w there is an
accessible world v at which the Russell set Rw = {x|x ∈
/ w x} of all the non-selfmembered sets in w exists. (9.1) does not say that Rw exists at w. So (9.1) does not
entail the contradiction: At w: Rw ∈ Rw ↔ Rw ∈
/ Rw . Of course, we might apply
FC♦ a second time (“instantiating” to v instead of w) to define the Russell set Rv :
(9.2) At v: ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈
/ v x).
In terms of the usual possible worlds semantics, (9.2) says that at v there is an
accessible world u at which the Russell set Rv = {x|x ∈
/ v x} of all the non-selfmembered sets in v exists. We cannot derive a contradiction from (9.2), however, for
the same reason that we cannot derive a contradiction from (9.1). Just as Rw does
not exist at w, Rv does not exist at v, but rather at some v-accessible world, u.
The role played by possible worlds here is very much like that played by quantificational contexts under FSR. While it is always possible to define a Russell set relative
to any context (or world), there is no context (or world) that contains all the non-selfmembered sets (that exist at all possible worlds). This allows us to infer that every
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Russell set is outside of the context (or world) in terms of which it is defined, which
is how paradox is avoided. In light of these similarities, it seems that a modal set
theory based on FC♦ might constitute another type of set restrictivism (in addition to
FSR). Indeed, Parsons (1983, 288–293) endorses a variant of restrictivism, according
to which claims about all sets are “systematically ambiguous” in the sense that ‘all’
is interpreted as ranging over the sets at some stage in the iterative hierarchy, though
it is ambiguous which stage this is. But even if a modal theory based on FC♦ counts
as a type of restrictivism, it is unclear whether it can be understood as a development
of the logical conception of set, or rather whether it can only understood, as Parsons
intends, as a development of the iterative conception of set.

4.6.2

The All-in-One principle

In chapter 3, I argued that the doctrine of self-reproductive properties (SRP)
provided a plausible interpretation of Russell’s 1906 attribution of the paradoxes to
“self-reproductive processes or classes.”
SRP If φ is self-reproductive, then there is no set of all φs.
Interpreted in light of Russell’s remarks two years later—“When I say that a collection
has no total, I mean that statements about all its members are nonsense” (Russell,
1908, 63)—SRP tells us that self-reproductive properties imply restrictivism; in particular, that self-reproductive properties such as non-self-membered extension imply
set restrictivism.
In chapter 1, I argued that any restrictivist argument of this sort is committed
to the All-in-One principle, which I argued is most likely false. We might wonder
whether FSR is also committed to the All-in-One principle. The suspicion that it may
be so committed is fueled, in part, by the fact that every occurrence of the first-order
quantifier ∀ in FSR is associated with a domain of quantification. This establishes
half of the All-in-One principle, viz., that quantification is always associated with
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a domain of quantification (P1 from chapter 1). The other half of the All-in-One
principle (P2 from chapter 1) is the claim that domains are sets (or set-like). Are
they? It would be highly problematic if they were, and for reasons having to do with
explanation that are independent of the All-in-One principle. FSR is a theory of
sets which employs domains as interpretive parameters on its principles governing set
existence and set identity. If domains were sets, then a prior understanding of sets
would be needed to understand the principles governing set existence and set identity.
Such circularity in the order of explanation appears vicious.
Fortunately, there is no need to treat domains as sets, or as singular objects of
any sort. We are free to interpret ‘D’ as a plural term, referring plurally to all the
objects over which ∀ ranges. In other words, we are free to interpret reference to
domains in FSR as reference to the objects “in” these domains and quantification
over domains as plural quantification over objects “in” domains. Thus, we might
speak of an object over which ∀D ranges as being among the dd instead of being in
D. Accordingly, we might read ‘∀dd xφ(x)’ as “everything φs,” where ‘everything’ is
restricted by context to quantification over objects among dd. And we might rewrite
the FSR axioms accordingly:
FC∗ (∀F )(∃edd )(∀dd x)(x ∈ edd ↔ F x)
and
Ext∗ (∀F )(∀G)[Extdd (F ) = Extdd (G) ↔ (∀D x)(x ∈ Ext(F ) ↔ x ∈ Ext(G))].
The reason why we are free to interpret FSR in this way has to do with the role
domains play in FSR: they restrict quantification. In order to play this role, they
must allow us to refer to the objects over which a quantifier ranges. In order to do
this, it is not necessary for these objects to be the members of a singular objects such
as a set or class.
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Still, it might be thought that if not FSR itself, then certainly FSR’s solutions
to the paradoxes require identifying sets with domains. For example, in my remarks
on the Burali-Forti paradox, I claimed that if ‘set’ were uniformly replaced with ‘domain’, the derivation of Burali-Forti’s contradiction would remain intact. Doesn’t
this show that ‘domain’ and ‘set’ are simply two words for the same thing? I think
that it does not. The reason is that the derivation of Burali-Forti’s contradiction
also remains intact under a plural reconstruction. (In chapter 7, I argue that plural
reference and plural quantification over ordinals is enough to generate the paradox.)
This means that we are free to interpret domain-talk plurally. Under a plural reconstruction, Burali-Forti’s contradiction is based on the fact that the ordinal number
of the initial segment (which is understood as a plurality) defined by any plurality
of ordinal numbers is greater than any member of the plurality. This version of the
paradox cannot be blocked by placing restrictions on sets, for it is not based on the
existence of a set of all ordinals, but on the existence of a plurality of all ordinals.
However, it is blocked by FSR, given a plural interpretation of domains. The paradox
is blocked because there is no domain—which in this context must be thought of as
a plurality—that contains all ordinals. Similar remarks apply to my discussion of the
other paradoxes. I conclude that FSR has no commitment to domains as singular
objects and therefore has no commitment to the All-in-One principle.

4.6.3

Explanation and Expressibility

FSR blocks the paradoxes by restricting quantification so that there is no D
containing all instances of a big concept. Insofar as this restriction on quantification
amounts to a restriction on set-existence—there can be no set of all F s whenever it
is impossible to quantify over all F s—the FSRist appears committed to a variant of
the limitation of size doctrine. According to this variant, it is quantification rather
than FC, that is the immediate target. This is problematic; for it seems that FSR
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should then be subject to the same criticism, levied against the limitation of size
doctrine above, that the restriction imposed on quantification is unmotivated by the
logical conception of set and can provide only a pragmatic solution to the paradoxes.
I think, in fact, that there is an important difference between quantification and
existence and that limitations on quantification do not call out for explanations in
the way that limitations on existence do. However, even granting this, there is a
more fundamental problem. Not only does the FSRist appear unable to explain her
restriction, she appears unable to state it. And this is surely something that we
should require her to do.
To illustrate, let ‘F’ stand for an arbitrary big concept. A statement of the quantificational restriction imposed by FSR is:
(10) ¬(∃D)(∀x)(F x → x is in D),
or, if domains are pluralities:
(10∗ ) ¬(∃dd)(∀x)(F x → x is among dd).
However, (10) (or (10∗ )) conveys the intended thought only if ∀ ranges over absolutely
all F s, precisely what is forbidden in FSR.
Of course, the fact that (10) cannot be expressed in FSR does not mean that (10)
cannot be expressed at all. Indeed, it might be pointed out that the inexpressibility of
(10) in FSR should be expected. After all, (10) quantifies directly over FSR’s domains
of quantification. This indicates that (10) belongs to FSR’s semantic theory. And,
it is widely accepted that the semantic theory for a formal theory is only expressible
outside of the theory. Perhaps, then, (10) is expressible in a metalanguage for FSR.
Quantification in this metalanguage must be unrestricted; but that is no problem, for
acceptance of FSR doesn’t commit one to the much stronger claim that unrestricted
quantification over sets occurs in no language.
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Unfortunately, things are not so easy. For consider whether FC, expressed in
FSR’s metalanguage, is true. If quantification in the metalanguage is unrestricted,
we can interpret the occurrences of D in FC as DU , the universal domain. Since this
allows us to define the contradiction-inducing sets and leads to contradictions, we
must say that FC is false when expressed in FSR’s metalanguage. But how can this
be if anything like the logical conception of set is true? If we want to defend FSR,
we must find another way.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPRESSING RESTRICTIVISM

Inexpressibility is not unique to set restrictivism. It is taken by many authors to
be the challenge facing restrictivists in general. As David Lewis (1991, 68) puts it,
the restrictivist, “violates his own stricture in the very act of proclaiming it!” Lewis’s
challenge may be put as follows: if restrictivism is true, any attempt to state it must
fail.
Timothy Williamson (2003, 428) presents the problem in this way: the restrictivist
is committed to quantified claims with contradictory truth conditions, for example:
(1) I am not quantifying over everything,
or equivalently:
(2) Something is not being quantified over by me.
Given two plausible semantic principles governing quantification and assertion, (2)
can be shown to have a contradictory truth condition. Let S be any speaker. The
first semantic principle states that S truly utters a sentence of the form ‘something
F s’ iff something over which S quantifies satisfies the predicate expression ‘F s’. In
the present case, ‘F s’ is the predicate expression ‘is not being quantified over by me’
and so the first principle tells us that S truly utters (2) iff something over which S
quantifies satisfies ‘is not being quantified over by me’. The second semantic principle
states that something satisfies the predicate expression ‘F s’ as uttered by S iff it F s.
In the present case, this second principle tells us that something satisfies ‘is not
being quantified over by me’ as uttered by S iff it is not being quantified over by S.
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Taken together, these two principles tell us that S truly utters (2) iff something over
which S quantifies is not being quantified over by S.1 Since this truth condition is
contradictory, (2) cannot be true.

5.1

Semantic ascent

The fact that (1) and (2) have contradictory truth conditions is simply a consequence of the fact that they involve the very sort of quantification that they deny. In
the case of set restrictivism, I argued that this problem cannot be solved by shifting
to a metalanguage. My argument there appealed to special considerations involving
the logical conception of set which don’t apply in the case of restrictivism simpliciter.
However, there are more general reasons that seem to show that such a strategy of
semantic ascent cannot succeed in expressing restrictivism of any sort.
Suppose the restrictivist attempts to express her view by ascending from her object
language L to a suitable metalanguage, L∗ . In L∗ , she asserts:
(3) Something is not being quantified over by me in L.
The sort of contradiction noted above is avoided, since the occurrences of ‘something’
and ‘not being quantified over by me in L’ are evaluated relative to different languages
with different domains. The occurrence of ‘something’ is evaluated relative to L∗ ,
while the occurrence of ‘not being quantified over by me in L’ is evaluated relative to
L.
The problem with this strategy is that it is too weak to say what needs to be said.
For the restrictivist is committed to the claim that unrestricted first-order quantification occurs in no language. (Likewise, set restrictivism implies that unrestricted

1

For ease of exposition, I have left out time indices. With time indices, the first principle reads:
S truly utters a sentence of the form ‘there is something that F s’ at t iff something over which S
quantifies at t satisfies ‘F s’ at t. And the second principle reads: something satisfies the predicate
expression ‘F s’ as uttered by S at t iff it F s at t.
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first-order quantification over sets occurs in no language.) (3) leaves open the possibility that quantification in L∗ is unrestricted. Of course, the restrictivist might plug
this hole by invoking a third language, L∗∗ , and say in L∗∗ :
(4) Something is not being quantified over by me in L∗ .
But this only pushes the problem back, for it leaves open the possibility that quantification in L∗∗ is unrestricted.
The obvious way of overcoming this problem is to employ a statement that quantifies over all languages. We might try:
(5) For any language L0 , there is a language L1 such that L0 is restricted relative
to L1 .
But statements such as (5) are problematic for another reason: they are too strong.
Timothy Williamson (2003) and Kit Fine (2006b) give different arguments that purport to establish this. Williamson (2003, 429–430) argues that the strength of statements like (5) can be shown to entail statements with contradictory truth conditions.
Fine (2006b, 27–28) argues that the strength of such statements enables us to introduce unrestricted quantification and are therefore self-defeating.
5.1.1

Williamson

Using variation between contexts in a natural language instead of variation between formal languages, Williamson considers expressing restrictivism as:
(6) For any context C0 , there is a context C1 such that not everything that is
quantified over in C1 is quantified over in C0 .
Unfortunately, as he shows, (6) cannot be true. Without loss of generality, we can
assume that the restrictivist asserts (6) in the context C. In C, (6) entails:
(6C) There is a context C1 such that not everything that is quantified over in C1 is
quantified over in C,
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which in turn entails:
(7) Not everything is quantified over in C.
Assuming that commitment in a context is closed under entailment, it follows that
by asserting (6) in C, the restrictivist is committed to assert (7) in C. (7) may be
true if uttered in another context, but it cannot be true in C. This can be proved by
adapting the two semantic principles to contexts in the obvious way, and then using
them to show that (7) has a contradictory truth condition like (2). In the context
C, the first principle reads: An assertion of the form ‘not everything F s’ is true as
uttered in C iff something that is quantified over in C does not satisfy the predicate
expression ‘F s’. The second principle reads: something that is quantified over in
C does not satisfy the predicate expression ‘F s’ iff it does not F . Taken together,
these two principles tell us that (7) is true as uttered in the context C iff something
that is quantified over in C is not quantified over in C. Since this truth condition is
contradictory, (7) cannot be true. And so (6) cannot be true either.
In response, Williamson considers combining quantification over contexts with
semantic ascent:
(8) For every context C0 , there is a context C1 such that ‘Not everything is quantified over in C0 ’ is true as uttered in C1 .
This blocks the argument that (8) has a contradictory truth condition. To see this,
try applying the argument to (8). Without loss of generality, we can assume that the
restrictivist asserts (8) in C. In C, (8) entails
(8C) There is a context C1 such that ‘Not everything is quantified over in C’ is true
as uttered in C1 ,
which in turn entails
(9) ‘Not everything is quantified over in C’ is true as uttered in C1 .
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(9) has a consistent truth condition, for, intuitively, (9) is true iff something that is
quantified over in C1 is not quantified over in C. The reason (9)’s truth condition is
consistent is that the occurrence of ‘everything’ is not interpreted according to the
context of utterance, C, but according to C1 , which we might call the context of
interpretation. Notice that no matter what context of utterance we might instantiate
(8) to, we are free to hold that the context of interpretation is different. By contrast, in
(6) the occurrence of ‘everything’ is interpreted according to the context of utterance.
This is what underwrites the first semantic principle according to which something
that is quantified over in C does not F iff the utterance in C of ‘not everything F s’
is true. This principle does not hold for (8), since the occurrence of ‘everything’ in
(8) is tagged to a context outside the context of utterance.
Unfortunately, this solution raises its own problems concerning the ability of the
speaker to understand what the truth of the quoted sentence—‘Not everything is
quantified over in C0 ’—amounts to in contexts other than his own. As Williamson
(2003, 430) points out: “If the speaker does not know what the sentence ‘Not everything is quantified over in C0 ’ expresses in another context, then the claim that it is
true as uttered in that context is not very helpful.”

5.1.2

Fine

Fine (2006b, 26) considers expressing restrictivism as the thesis that necessarily,
any interpretation, I, of the first-order quantifier ∀ has an expansion, J, from which
it follows that there can be no maximal interpretation. He argues that this attempt
to express restrictivism fails since it is possible to join any number of interpretations
I, J, K, . . . to form a new sum interpretation whose domain includes everything
in any of the domains of I, K, J, . . . . Since there is no limit to the number of
interpretations that can be joined, unrestricted quantification over interpretations
leads directly to the existence of a maximal interpretation, whose domain includes
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absolutely everything. Before discussing the argument in more detail, I will say a bit
about interpretations.
Intuitively, interpretations of the first-order quantifier (henceforth: simply interpretations) are functions, whose value, I(∀), is the domain of ∀ under I. (Keep in
mind that domains needn’t be understood as singular objects and so the interpretation function can be viewed as a multi-valued function from ∀ to the objects over
which ∀ ranges under I—the dd of ∀ under I. Nevertheless, I will help myself to singular domain talk wherever grammatically convenient.) However, the identification of
interpretations with functions raises an immediate worry. On the standard analysis,
functions are sets of ordered pairs: each pair consisting of an argument and its value.
Thus, under the standard analysis, any interpretation, I, would be identified with the
ordered pair h∀, I(∀)i. Again, on the standard analysis, ordered pairs are defined as
sets; the standard definition being Kuratowski’s: hx, yi =df {{x}, {x, y}}. Applying
the Kuratowski definition to I yields: I = h∀, I(∀)i = {{∀}, {∀, I(∀)}}.
This analysis is inappropriate in the present context since it implies that absolutism is committed to the existence of a universal set. This misconstrues the
quantificational question of whether there is a maximal interpretation with the settheoretic question of whether there is a universal set. In particular, if I is a maximal
interpretation, then I(∀) is the plurality of absolutely all things, which means that
{I(∀)} is the universal set. Moreover, since ∀ is one of the things included in the
plurality of absolutely all things, the plurality of ∀ and I(∀) is identical to I(∀). Consequently, according to the Kuratowski analysis, I is a set containing the universal
set as a member.
To avoid this problem, one might replace the standard analysis of functions as sets
of ordered pairs with an “ontologically innocent” plural analysis. Under this analysis,
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functions are paraphrased away using plural quantification (and possibly mereology).2
It follows that the only ingredients needed to define an absolute interpretation are
(i) the argument, ∀, (ii) its plural value, the plurality of absolutely all things, and
(iii) plural quantification. While absolutism is committed to the existence of an
all-encompassing plurality, it is not committed to the existence of a universal set.
Alternatively, functions may be taken as primitive as in Oliver and Smiley (2013). In
what follows, I will assume that interpretations are viewed in one of these two ways.
Interpretation variables play the role of the domain variables in FSR. They are indexed to the first-order quantifiers, ∀I /∃I , ∀J /∃J , ∀K /∃K , and the expression ‘∃I xφ(x)’
is read as saying that there is some x under the interpretation I for which φ(x). Compare to FSR, in which domain variables are indexed to the first-order quantifiers,
∀D /∃D , and ‘∀D xφ(x)’ abbreviates ‘everything φs’, where ‘everything’ is interpreted
as ranging over all objects in the domain D.
For any interpretations I and J, J is an expansion of I if the things in the domain
of ∀ under I are properly among the things in the domain of ∀ under J.3
D1. J is an expansion of I =df I(∀) ≺ J(∀).
To illustrate: since all the dogs are properly among all the animals, the interpretation
that assigns all the animals to ∀ is an expansion of the interpretation that assigns all
the dogs to ∀. Assuming an infinite universe, restrictivism can then be formulated as
the thesis that every interpretation has an expansion:
(10) (∀I)(∃J)(J is an expansion of I).

2

In the Appendix to Lewis (1991), John Burgess, Alan Hazen and David Lewis show how to
replace the standard analysis with first-order plural quantification and mereology. Hazen (1997)
replaces the mereological component from Lewis (1991) with higher-order plural quantification. For
more on the resources and limitations of higher-order plural quantification, see Rayo (2006).
3

The xx are properly among the yy iff every one of the xx is one of the yy, but not visa versa.
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(10) conveys the intended thought only if it quantifies over all interpretations. (If it
does not, (10) cannot not rule out the existence of an absolute interpretation and is
therefore too weak to express restrictictivism.) But, Fine (2006b, 27) contends that
any interpretations I1 , I2 , . . . can be joined to form a sum interpretation, J, where
∃J xφ(x) iff ∃I xφ(x) for some I in I1 , I2 , . . . . Since quantification over interpretations
is unrestricted, it follows that we can join all interpretations to form an absolute
interpretation J, whose domain includes absolutely everything. (10) is therefore selfdefeating: by quantifying over all interpretations—which is necessary in order to
convey the intended thought—(10) smuggles in absolutely unrestricted quantification. Fine is not alone in this observation. Michael Glanzberg (2004, 560) considers
formulating restrictivism along the lines of (10) as the thesis that “for any domain of
quantification that can be specified in interpretation, there can be specified a wider
one.” He then goes on to observe that:
If we could ‘read through’ talk about domains to talk about the objects
in them, then we might see talk about all domains or all interpretations
as talk about whatever falls under them.
To make the argument a bit more precise, I introduce the notion of a summation
principle for interpretations. Let ‘α’ be a schematic variable for ordinal numbers.
A summation principle says that given a fixed number of interpretations, I1 , . . . , Iα ,
there exists a sum interpretation, J, where J(∀) = I1 (∀) ∪ · · · ∪ Iα (∀). There is a
family of summation principles, of various strengths. Weaker principles allow for the
summation of fewer interpretations; stronger principles allow for the summation of
more interpretations. The argument requires a maximally strong summation principle, which allows for the summation of any number of interpretations. I will refer to
this as “the absolute summation principle” (ASP).
ASP. (∀I0 )(∀I1 ) . . . (∃J)(J(∀) = I0 (∀) ∪ I1 (∀) ∪ . . . )4
4

I assume that the ellipses can be filled in by an infinite number of interpretations.
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The argument that (10) is self-defeating is derived from ASP as follows. Instantiate ASP to all interpretations to derive their sum interpretation, JALL . Since absolutely every object is included in the domain of some interpretation, absolutely every
object is among the dd = JALL (∀). Consequently, JALL is an absolute interpretation.
To block this argument, the restrictivist might advocate replacing ASP with a
weaker summation principle that limits the number of interpretations that can be
summed. The limitation may be imposed by introducing a cut-off cardinality for
interpretation summation, κ, defined as the least number of interpretations that are
too many to sum. This determines not just one, but a family of weaker summation
principles. The weaker summation principles can then be expressed by the following
“weak summation principle schema” (WSPS):
WSPS. |α| < κ → (∀I0 ) . . . (∀Iα )(∃J)(J(∀) = I0 (∀) ∪ · · · ∪ Iα (∀))
No instance of WSPS can be instantiated to all interpretations provided the number
of interpretations is equal to or greater than κ.
This response is not very satisfying. What grounds can there be for placing limits
on the number of interpretations that can be joined if no limits are to be placed on
the number of interpretations that can be quantified over? One possible answer is
that summation is a sort of mental activity: one must join interpretations one-byone, and there is a limit to how far this can be carried out. But such a constructivist
approach to summation is highly implausible. That there exists an interpretation
whose domain includes all dogs-and-cats, given that there is an interpretation whose
domain includes all dogs and an interpretation whose domain includes all cats seems
completely independent of any mental activity.
Fine seeks to replace (10) with a modal variant of restrictivism he calls “expansionism”. Expansionism involves a special postulational modality modeled on the
self-reproductive properties discussed in chapter 3. Russell’s paradox may be taken
to show that the property set is self-reproductive since it is always possible to expand
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a plurality of sets by the addition of a new set—the set of all non-self-membered sets
among the plurality—that is provably not among them. The addition of this new set
is a postulational possibility relative to the original plurality of sets. Expansionism is
the view that any interpretation I of the quantifier ∀ can be extended by the postulation of new objects which do not exist according to I but do exist according to I’s
expansion. Using  and ♦ for postulational necessity and postulational possibility,
expansionism can be expressed as:
(11) ∀I♦∃J(J is an expansion of I).
There are two problems with (11). First, it is unclear whether the postulational
modality involved is an intelligible notion. (I take up this challenge in next chapter,
when I discuss modal interpretations of set theory.) Second, assuming postulational
modality is an intelligible notion, it is unclear whether the view that (11) expresses
should count as restrictivist. In chapter 1 (p. 15) I defined restrictivism as the view
that “absolutely unrestricted quantification is impossible, or incoherent, but not because semantic indeterminism, or conceptual relativism, or mysticism is true.” Later,
(p. 27) I argued that the ontological thesis that there is no plurality of all things is not
properly restrictivist: the restrictivist “does not deny that there are some things that
are all the things. What he denies is that it is possible to quantify over all the things
there are.” Yet, some of the things Fine says when discussing postulational possibility
suggest either a conceptual relativism along the lines of Carnap and Putnam, or an
ontological conception of indefinite extensibility, such as that expressed by Spencer
(2012) and Yablo (2006).
Fine (2006b, 40) suggests that the possibility of extending any given interpretation
of ∀ is not due to any failure on our part to talk about all that there is, but rather
to a failure on the world’s part. This suggests that it is the indefinite extensibility of
the universe, not the limitations of language or logic that prevent us from quantifying
unrestrictedly. He goes on to describe his view as follows:
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We should bear in mind that, on the present view, there is no such thing
as the ontology, one that is priviledged as genuinely being the sum-total
of what there is. There are merely many different ontologies, all of which
have the same right (or perhaps we should say no right) to be regarded
as the sum-total of what there is.
This sounds strikingly like the sort of conceptual relativism espoused by Carnap
(1950) and Putnam (1977, 1981, 1987). Consider once more Putnam’s thought experiment. How many objects are there in a world containing three mereological
atoms? Relative to a conceptual framework that counts arbitrary mereological sums,
the answer is seven (or eight, if we include the null-object). Relative to a conceptual
framework that counts only atoms, the answer is three. But (we are invited to infer)
neither of these frameworks can claim to be the true framework.
Given these rather sobering difficulties, the restrictivist might feel forced to abandon the project of expressing her view and choose instead to describe herself as raising
a challenge to her absolutist opponent. Tim Button (2010, 391–392) recommends this
sort of approach, which he calls “militant quietism”:
Restrictivism should not be thought of as a positive doctrine, but rather as
a form of militant quietism . . . The restrictivist should simply pick a fight:
Give me a sentence which you think quantifies over absolutely everything;
engage with me in conversation for a while; and by the time you leave, I
will have convinced you that you failed—by your own lights—to quantify
over absolutely everything.
Alternatively, one might seek to express restrictivism in some other way. I believe
that the problems brought forward by Williamson and Fine show that restrictivism
cannot be expressed using quantification at all. However, the moral to be drawn is
not that restrictivism is inexpressible, at least not wholly inexpressible, but rather
that it must be expressed in a non-quantificational way.
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5.2

Ambiguous assertion: any and every

The restrictivist finds herself in the following predicament: in order to formulate
her view as a quantified claim about interpretations she must quantify over all interpretations, but doing so commits her to quantifying over absolutely everything.
This predicament is fatal, however, only if quantification provides the only means for
expressing generality. If there is some non-quantificational means of doing this, the
restrictivist might hope to replace (10) with a general claim about interpretations
that is quantification-free. Since this claim would not involve quantification at all,
it would not carry commitment to quantification over absolutely everything (at least
not for the reasons given above).
Famously, Russell (1908, 64–65) argues that general claims can be expressed in
two ways: (a) by quantifying over all the values of a variable and (b) by “ambiguous
assertion.” In an ambiguous assertion, the speaker asserts something about a particular object, but leaves it indeterminate what object this is. Generality arises from
the resulting indeterminacy. Russell claims that ambiguous assertions are common in
mathematical proofs. We make ambiguous assertions whenever we prove that some
property holds of all objects of some type by selecting an ambiguous particular of the
type and showing that the property holds of this particular.
If we say: ‘Let ABC be a triangle, then the sides AB, AC are together
greater than the side BC’, we are saying something about one triangle,
not about all triangles; but the one triangle concerned is absolutely ambiguous, and our statement consequently is also absolutely ambiguous.
We do not affirm any one definite proposition, but an undetermined one
of all the propositions resulting from supposing ABC to be this or that
triangle.
I have two remarks about ambiguous assertion in light of this passage. First, I
take it that what Russell means when he says that the triangle ABC is ambiguous is
not that ‘ABC’ names an ambiguous triangle—a vague object that is not definitely
identical to any one particular triangle. What he means is, rather, that it’s ambiguous
what triangle ‘ABC’ names. In other words, the ambiguity here is linguistic, not
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ontological. This linguistic ambiguity, in turn, is due to the fact that the selection
of ABC is arbitrary. Second, I take it that Russell intends ambiguous assertion to
be non-quantificational. The relevant quantified claim would be a claim about all
objects in the domain—in this case, all triangles—whereas Russell says that in this
case, “we are saying something about one triangle, not about all triangles.”
Immediately prior to the passage above, Russell notes that ‘any’ is often used to
make ambiguous assertions. In this respect, ‘any’ functions differently from related
words such as ‘all’ and ‘every’. Compare ‘let ABC be any triangle’ (which I take to be
equivalent to Russell’s statement ‘let ABC be a triangle’) to the absurd ‘let ABC be
every triangle’. In the former, ‘ABC’ refers to an arbitrarily selected triangle. In the
latter, ‘ABC’ refers non-arbitrarily to every particular triangle. Dropping the term
‘ABC’, a similar distinction might be drawn between the expressions ‘any triangle’
and ‘every triangle’. The former is used to refer to an arbitrary (and now, unnamed)
triangle. The latter is not used to refer, but to quantify over every particular triangle.
At a level of greater abstraction, we might say that expressions of the form ‘any F’
are used to refer to an arbitrary F whereas expressions of the form ‘every F’ are used
to quantify over all Fs. Finally, statements of the form ‘any F Gs’—any-statements—
involve reference to an arbitrary particular and are used to make ambiguous assertions. Statements of the form ‘every F Gs’—every-statements—involve quantification
over all Fs and are not used in this way.
If any-statements provide a viable alternative to quantificational generality, the
restrictivist might formulate her view by means of an any-statement referring to an
arbitrarily selected (but unnamed) interpretation as follows:
(12) Any interpretation has an expansion.
She might also choose a name for an arbitrary interpretation—say, Ia , and formulate
her view as:
(12a) Any interpretation, Ia , has an expansion.
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As far as I can tell, the difference between (12) and (12a) is unimportant. In what
follows, I will confine myself to (12), but what I say should hold for (12a) as well.
The first thing to notice about (12) is that it seems to have both of the features we
want: (i) it is general, due to the arbitrariness of the interpretation that is selected;
(ii) it is also non-quantificational since it is not a claim about all interpretations, but
a claim about one arbitrarily selected interpretation.
Unfortunately for the restrictivist, most philosophers doubt whether Russell’s distinction between ‘any’ and ‘every’ is of any real philosophical importance. On the
orthodox view, while ‘any’ and ‘every’ can be used to generate generalities in different ways, the generalities generated are the same. This is confirmed by examples.
Compare: ‘any triangle has three sides’ to ‘every triangle has three sides’. Each is
commonly taken to express the same universal truth about all triangles. The orthodox position is further confirmed by the practice of regimenting both claims as the
quantified claim: (∀x)(T (x) → S(x)), where ‘T (x)’ is ‘x is a triangle’ and ‘S(x)’ is ‘x
has three sides’.
According to the orthodox position, (12) expresses the same generality as:
(13) Every interpretation has an expansion.
Furthermore, the generality expressed by (12) and (13) is the same as the generality
expressed by (10), which is a standard regimentation of both.

5.3

The generality of any-statements

I believe that the orthodox view is mistaken. In this section, I review an argument
by Patrick Dieveney that any-statements and every-statements express distinct types
of generality. I will then show how his argument can be applied to (12) to support the
claim that (12) expresses a distinct sort of generality from (13) and (10). In the next
section, I will argue that (12) is properly regimented as a schema, not as a quantified
statement.
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Dieveney (2013, 123) argues that any-statements differ from every-statements in
the following two ways.
First, any-statements employ arbitrary generality whereas every-statements
employ universal generality. Second, any-statements can be ‘open’ whereas
every-statements are not.
Dieveney’s account of the difference between arbitrary and universal generality is
very similar to Russell’s account of the difference between ambiguous assertion and
quantificational assertion. Arbitrary generality and universal generality are two different mechanisms for making general claims. The mechanism of arbitrary generality
consists in selecting an arbitrary object (of the relevant sort) and showing that some
property holds of it. One then infers that the same property holds of any object of
the relevant sort. Thus, to show that any F Gs, one selects an arbitrary F and shows
that G holds of it. This is the procedure at work in Russell’s triangle example above.
The mechanism of universal generality involves considering all objects of the relevant
sort and showing that some property holds of each of these objects. To show that
every F Gs, one considers all Fs and shows that G holds of each of them.
Unfortunately, such differences between arbitrary generality and universal generality (and between ambiguous assertion and quantificational assertion) are not enough,
on their own, to settle the question of whether any-statements express a different
type of generality from every-statements. It may be that arbitrary generality and
universal generality are merely two mechanisms for generating the very same type of
generality.5
To show that the these statements generate different types of generalities, Dieveney
turns to openness. Any-statements not only employ arbitrary generality, they can be
open. What this means is that a speaker who makes an any-statement may leave
the number of its true instances undetermined. This means that he does not limit
5

As Dieveney (2013, 126) points out.
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himself to one instance, or two instances, or any determinate number of instances.
However, he does not go so far as to definitely commit himself to ‘all’ instances.
This indeterminacy is critical to the notion of generality that the speaker conveys.
By contrast, every-statements are closed. A speaker who makes an every-statement
definitely commits himself to all instances in the domain of quantification.
Dieveney (123–124) illustrates this distinction with the following example:
Imagine a scientist on a beach shoveling sand into a small bucket, weighing
it, and then dumping it out again. After watching the scientist repeating
this process, a bystander approaches him and asks the following questions:
Can any handful of sand be shoveled?
Can every handful of sand be shoveled?
Dieveney claims that the scientist might reasonably answer ‘yes’ to only the first
question. That is, he might reasonably assert:
(14a) Any handful of sand can be shoveled
while refusing to assert:
(14e) Every handful of sand can be shoveled.
If (14a) and (14e) express different types of generality—open and closed—then there
are two considerations that justify these answers. First, the scientist might worry
about the amount of sand: while he believes that any one handful can be shoveled,
and any two handfuls can be shoveled, and so on; he might doubt whether he could
ever possibly shovel all the handfuls of sand on the beach. For this reason, he might be
willing to assert (14a), which (131) “leaves open exactly how many handfuls of sand
can be shoveled,” while being unwilling to assert (14e), which makes the stronger
claim that all of them can be shoveled. Dieveney calls this the ‘Domain is Too
Large’ reason for asserting (14a) but not (14e). Second, the scientist might worry
that the intended domain of quantification, the domain containing every handful of
sand, is not well-defined. This worry is based on the thought that the boundaries
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between individual handfuls of sand as well as the boundaries of the beach are likely
to be vague. As a result, while it may be possible to make sense of the notion of
an arbitrarily selected handful of sand, it may not be possible to make sense of the
domain of all handfuls of sand. This is the ‘Domain is not Well-Defined’ reason for
asserting (14a) but not (14e).
In his discusssion of the ‘Domain is Too large’ reason, Dieveney writes (127):
This result, that one could always shovel one more, but yet never (practically speaking) run out of new handfuls to shovel is captured by understanding ‘any’ as expressing open arbitrary generality.
It is important to note the parenthetical phrase “practically speaking.” This qualification seems necessary in light of the fact that if the scientist were to continue
shoveling sand long enough, he would eventually exhaust all the sand on the beach.
In recognition of this, we might say that while, in theory, he would eventually run
out of new handfuls to shovel, practically speaking, he would not. But this raises
another worry. Practically speaking, it seems that the scientist would reach a limit:
at some point, he would be unable (out of boredom or exhaustion) to shovel even one
more bucketful of sand, or at least he would reach a point at which it was unclear
whether he was able to shovel one more bucketful. Wouldn’t these practical limitations on the extent of the beach and the scientist’s abilities undermine the claim that
he could always shovel one more bucketful of sand and consequently the claim that
(14a) expresses open generality by conveying the thought that the scientist “could
always shovel one more”?
In response, we might modify the case so as to abstract away from such “practical”
limitations. In the modified case, the scientist never reaches a point at which he is too
tired or too bored to continue shoveling. No matter how long he has been shoveling,
he can always shovel one more bucketful of sand. But the beach has become much
larger. It now contains infinitely many bucketfuls of sand. While the scientist is
tireless, the beach is inexhaustible. So long as the scientist has not been shoveling for
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an infinitely long time, he will never exhaust all the sand on the beach. Therefore,
no matter how long he shovels, he could always shovel one more bucketful of sand.
However, I believe that this is unnecessary. The openness in the assertion of (14a)
may be attributed to the scientist’s ignorance of any (definite) limitations on his
ability to shovel more, or perhaps to the nonexistence of any precise limitations on
this ability. Note that these explanations are compatible with the existence of a fixed
limit (whether or not this is a precise limit is irrelevant) to the number of bucketfuls
of sand that can be shoveled.6
5.3.1

An alternative account

There is another possible explanation for why the scientist might reasonably assert (14a) but not (14e), which does not require that these statements express different types of generality. Quine (1960, 138–140) and Geach (1962, ch. 4) treat both
every-statements and any-statements as quantified statements. They explain the felt
differences between them as arising from differences in the scope of quantification.
The rough idea is that ‘any’ signifies an occurrence of universal quantification with
wide scope; whereas ‘every’ signifies an occurrence of universal quantification with
narrow scope. One of Quine’s examples is the pair of English statements:
(15a) I do not know any poem
(15e) I do not know every poem
Using ‘P x’ and ‘Kx’ as abbreviations for ‘x is a poem’ and ‘I know x’, (15a) and
(15e) may be properly regimented as
(16a) (∀x)(P x → ¬Kx)

6

This limit is fixed either by the size of the beach (if the scientist never tires) or the strength of
the scientist (if he does tire). If the scientist never tires, then the number of true instances of (14a)
is limited by the total number of bucketfuls of sand on the beach and so (14a) is equivalent to (14e).
If the scientist does tire, then the number of true instances of (14a) is limited to something less than
the total number of bucketfuls of sand on the beach.
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(16e) ¬(∀x)(P x → Kx)
In (16a), ∀ has wider scope than it does in (16e), in which it occurs within the scope
of the negation operator ¬. Extending this account to the present case, we might
regiment (14a) as ‘For every handful of sand, it is possible that it is shoveled’—in
which the quantifier has wide scope—and (14e) as ‘It is possible that every handful of
sand is shoveled’—in which the quantifier has narrow scope, falling within the scope
of the modal operator ‘it is possible that’. Using ‘H(x)’ and ‘S(x)’ as abbreviations
for ‘x is a handful of sand’ and ‘x is shoveled’ these can be expressed as:
(14a♦ ) (∀x)(Hx → ♦Sx)
(14e♦ ) ♦(∀x)(Hx → Sx)
Dieveney (129) argues that the scoped account of the difference between anystatements and every-statements has limited explanatory force. First, while it may
accommodate the ‘domain is too large’ reason for asserting only (14a)—the scoped
translation (14e♦ ) expresses the claim that the scientist might exhaust the sand on the
beach, which is stronger than the claim expressed by (14a♦ )—it cannot accommodate
the ‘domain is not well-defined’ reason for asserting only (14a). For the occurrence of ∀
in (14a) is meaningful only if the domain of handfuls of sand is well-defined. Therefore,
according to this account, it cannot be that one of the reasons for asserting only (14a)
is that the domain of handfuls of sand is not well-defined. Second, there are cases
in which one may be willing to assert an any-statement but not the corresponding
every-statement that are not amenable to scope distinctions. Thus, a finitist may be
willing to assert:
(17a) Any number has a successor
but not
(17e) Every number has a successor
148

on the grounds that (17e) presupposes an infinite domain of numbers, but (17a) does
not. Third, there is no satisfactory explanation for why ‘any’ generally takes wider
scope than ‘every’. (As evidence of this, Dieveney quotes Quine’s (1960, 139) claim
that the correlation of these words with scope distinctions is “a simple irreducible
trait of English usage.”)
It is unclear whether these arguments succeed. In reply to the first, one might
appeal to the method of supervaluations (Lewis, 1993) and claim that under any
eligible precisification of the domain of handfuls of sand, (14e) is false. In this way,
one can preserve the thought that (14e) is false without requiring that there be
one particular domain of handfuls of sand that stands out as the unique domain of
quantification intended by (14e). In reply to the second, one might point out that a
strict finitism is untenable and that mathematics requires, if not an actual infinity,
at the very least, the notion of a potential infinity, and that this latter notion is
highly objectionable in its own right. Furthermore, any philosophical defense of the
potential infinite would seem to be unavailable, given my own criticisms of primitive
modality in the context of set theory presented in the following chapter. In reply to the
third, one might claim that a similar complaint might be brought against Dieveney’s
account: there is no satisfactory explanation for why ‘any’ expresses arbitrary open
generality and ‘every’ does not. In what follows, I will simply assume that Dieveney’s
account of open arbitrary generality is correct. The success of my proposed method
for expressing restrictivism should be understood as conditional on this assumption.

5.4

Expressing restrictivism

Recall the attempt to derive Russell’s paradox in the restrictivist set theory FSR
(ch. 4). Replacing ‘extension’ and the variable ‘e’ with ‘set’ and the variable ‘x’, this
can be described as follows: We begin with an arbitrary domain D and apply the
comprehension principle FC∗ to define the set RD by the condition: (∀D xD )(xD ∈
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RD ↔ xD ∈
/ xD ).7 Since ∀D is restricted, we are led to conclude that RD lies outside
the range of ∀D . We can then shift to a more inclusive context, in which quantification
ranges over a more inclusive domain D+ , which includes RD . Call this ‘the Russell
expansion of D’. Applying the comprehension principle a second time, we can define
the set RD+ , which is then shown to lie outside the range of ∀D+ . We can continue
in this way indefinitely to derive the existence of indefinitely many expansions of the
original domain (each domain being an expansion of its predecessor). Each of these
domains corresponds to an interpretation of the quantifier ∀. Let I be the original
interpretation—corresponding to the domain D. Denote the Russell expansion of I
by ‘r(I)’ and the Russell expansion of r(I) by ‘r(r(I))’, and so on.
With this in mind, consider the attempt to express restrictivism by means of the
any-statement (12), which (we are assuming) expresses arbitrary open generality. (12)
tells us that any arbitrarily selected interpretation I has an expansion. Because it is
open, (12) tells us that r(I) has an expansion; and r(r(I)) has an expansion, and so on;
however, (12) does not tell us that every interpretation has an expansion. According
to the restrictivist, this claim cannot be expressed on account of the size of the
purported domain of quantification (which contains absolutely all interpretations).
Moreover, we’ve seen that any attempt to make this quantificational claim is selfdefeating. But now, we might worry that insofar as it falls short of making such a
strong claim, (12) cannot rule out the existence of a maximal interpretation and is
therefore too weak to express restrictivism. I agree that there is a sense in which
(12) cannot rule out the existence of a maximal interpretation. On the other hand,
if the absolutist were to claim that there was such an interpretation, then we could
run through the reasoning of Russell’s paradox to derive its expansion.8
7

I replace ‘extension’ with ‘set’ throughout.

8

This way of speaking may suggest that (12) is to understood in terms of what the restrictivist is
able to prove. This is objectionable, for restrictivism is not a modal view about what can be proved
(as I claimed in chapter 1). Fortunately, (12) needn’t be understood in this way; rather, it should
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I contend that (12) should be viewed as making a claim that is intermediate
between the strong quantificational claim that (11) purports to make and the quietism
advocated by Button, according to which any attempt by the absolutist to quantify
over absolutely everything can be shown to fail. While (12) is too weak to say
directly that no interpretation is maximal; it is sufficiently strong to tell us that, for
any particular interpretation that the absolutist may select as absolute, is not; that
it has an expansion. Indeed, it would be mistaken to expect more than this. As
I wrote in chapter 1, “the heart of restrictivism is a picture of the world on which
ontology outstrips the resources of language and logic.” According to restrictivism,
our ability to quantify, like the scientist’s ability to shovel, is limited; however, in
this case, the limitations are not “practical” but deeply rooted in the nature of logic
and language. It is a direct consequence of this that we cannot speak about all
interpretations; nevertheless, we can say that any arbitrary interpretation has an
expansion and consequently that any interpretation that may be specified by the
absolutist cannot be absolute.
A similar strategy for expressing restrictivism is pursued by Shaughan Lavine
(1994), (2006). In place of any-statements, Lavine appeals to “full sentential schemata”.
A sentential schema (henceforth simply schema) is a sentential template, containing
free schematic variables, that is associated with a substitution rule, which specifies
what expressions from the language can be substituted for the variables. The instances of a schema are the sentences that result from appropriate substitutions. A
schema is not itself a truth-bearer; however it carries commitment to its instances
and may be called ‘true’ if its instances are true. To accept a schema is to accept all
the instances that result from the associated substitution rule.
be understood as saying that any purportedly absolute interpretation has an expansion. This may
be validated by running through the procedure described above; but the validation is one thing; the
expansion of an interpretation exists independently of its being proved to exist.
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It is generally agreed that schemas differ from quantified statements in one respect:
whereas a quantified statement carries commitment to its instances by making a
single, general claim about them, a schema carries commitment to its instances,
without making a single, general claim about them. But this difference alone does
not show that schematic generality can replace quantificational generality. There are
two reasons why most philosophers have held that it cannot.
The first stems from the fact that whereas quantified variables stand for objects,
schematic variables stand for the linguistic expressions from a suitable substitution
class. This means that schema are limited by the expressive resources of the language
to which they belong. As a result, we cannot express the generality of ‘every number
has a successor’ with a schema such as:
(18) t is a number → t has a successor
where ‘t’ is a schematic variable that can be replaced by any numeral in English.
There are not nearly enough numerals in English—or even in formalized variants of
English—to name all the numbers.
The second has to do with the fact that a schema is committed to its instances.
To illustrate, suppose we were able to solve the first problem by expanding the substitution class of numerals so that it included numerals for every number. Since
(18) is committed to its instances and there is one instance for every numeral, (18)
is committed to quantification (in the metalanguage) over all numerals. Given the
correspondence between numerals and numbers, this seems just as problematic as
commitment to numbers.
Lavine (1994, 230–232) (2006, 117–120) introduces the notion of a “full schema”
to overcome these difficulties. First, a full schema is not associated with a particular
substitution class. To accept a full scheme is to (i) to accept any of its instances that
is obtained by replacing the schematic variables with suitable expressions and (ii) to
be willing to accept more instances that may be obtained in any suitable expansion
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of one’s language. This overcomes the first problem since one is not limited by the
vocabulary of any particular language. Second, the acceptance conditions for a full
schema are not expressed quantificationally, in terms of acceptance of all its instances,
but schematically. This overcomes the second problem since (18) is not committed
to quantification over linguistic expressions (names) for every possible interpretation,
but rather to a corresponding schematic claim in the metalanguage.
If Lavine is right, restrictivism may be formulated as the full schema:
(19) r(I ) is an expansion of I
To accept (19) is (i) to accept any of its instances that is obtained by replacing the
variable expressions ‘I ’ and ‘r(I )’ with names for an interpretation and its Russell
expansion and (ii) to be willing to accept more instances that may be obtained from
suitable expansions of the language. In accepting (19), one is not committed to
quantification over all the possible names that may be substituted for these variable
expression; these are specified schematically.

5.5

Concluding Remark

It might be thought that the restrictivist owes us some sort of explanation for why
logic and language are limited as she claims. The only explanation I can think of is
that quantification is limited by size, so that some domains are simply too large to
quantify over. However, there are two problems with this account.
First, in 4.5, I objected to the limitation of size doctrine on the grounds that
there is no suitable explanation for why size should be relevant to the question of
set existence. Why think that a limitation of size doctrine for quantification fares
any better in this respect? Second, the limitation of size doctrine faces problems of
expressibility similar to those encountered by restrictivism itself. (If some things are
too many to quantify over, it would seem that we cannot say so without quantifying
over them.)
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In response to the first question, I would claim that the demand for explanation
in logic is not as pressing as the demand for explanation in set theory. In a set theory
based on the limitation of size doctrine, we are dealing directly with the existence of
sets; and it seems fair to demand some explanation for why all and only the sets that
are said to exist by this theory do indeed exist. In the theory of logic endorsed by the
set restrictivist, the case is different. We are not directly making claims about what
exists, but about what it is possible to say. According to the restrictivist, the error
of FC is precisely that it purports to say something that cannot be said. In fact, if
properly understood, FC is true as it stands. For it is the case that any sets (where
quantification is properly understood as restricted by context to a domain D) form a
set. The solution is to recognize that it is impossible to quantify over absolutely any
sets at once. However, the question of how to understand these logical truths and the
degree to which they can be explained in terms of other facts is a difficult question,
which I will not discuss further.
In response to the second question, the restrictivist might give up on the project
of expressing the limitation of size conception of quantification and contend that the
burden of doing so is unfair. After all, the absolutist has no trouble with understanding it. And isn’t the restrictivist appealing to limitation of size in order to satisfy the
absolutist’s allegation that her grounds for rejecting absolutely unrestricted quantification are ad hoc? Can’t limitation of size fulfill this role even if it is inexpressible
by the restrictivist’s own lights? In direct contrast to Wittgenstein’s claim that the
limits of language are the limits of reality9 , the heart of restrictivism is a picture of
the world on which ontology outstrips the resources of language and logic. For the
restrictivist, any assumption that language and the world go hand in hand is unjustifiably parochial. She seeks to make her view expressible in order to address the
9

Wittgenstein (2001, §5.6): “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”
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charge of incoherence. But expressibility can only go so far. She hopes to express
her view. Perhaps she should not expect to be able to express what motivates and
explains it as well.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ITERATIVE CONCEPTION OF SET

The most popular response to the set-theoretic paradoxes has been to adopt the
iterative conception of set, according to which sets are not the extensions of concepts
(or predicates) but are collections that are “formed out of” or “constituted by” their
members. This idea goes back to Cantor’s (1895, 481) definition of ‘set’ as “a collection into a whole of definite distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought.”1
The notion of a collection is intuitive and may not be fully analyzable; however, it
can be characterized as the notion of a singular object related to a unique plurality
of objects—its members—in a special, non-mereological way.2
The label ‘iterative’ refers to the process—originally encoded in the axioms of
Zermelo (1908, 1930), Fraenkel (1922) and von Neumann (1925)—by which sets are
succesively formed out of (or built up from) their members.3 Very roughly, this process
goes as follows. One begins by forming collections—sets—out of some original things
(urelements). One then proceeds to form new collections out of these collections and
urelements. Next, one forms more new collections out of the most recently formed
1
This translation is from Fraenkel et al. (1973, 15). Set theorists and philosophers who follow Cantor in identifying sets with collections include Shoenfield (1967, ch. 9), Wang (1974, 530),
Enderton (1977, 1), Potter (2004, 36), Linnebo (2010) and Oliver and Smiley (2013, ch. 14).
2
Mereological sums are also singular objects related to pluralities of objects—their parts—in a
special way. However, collections differ logically from sums in at least two important respects. First,
‘the members (of a collection)’ refers to a unique plurality whereas ‘the parts (of a mereological
sum)’ does not. Second, parthood is a transitive relation; membership in a collection is not.
3

Zermelo’s original 1908 set theory did not include the axioms of Replacement or Foundation. The
necessity of Replacement to derive large sets was discovered (independently) by Fraenkel (1922) and
Skolem (1922). Foundation was subsequently added by von Neumann (1925). Zermelo incorporated
both axioms in his revised 1930 set theory.
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collections, the earlier collections and the urelements. One goes on in this way, forming
new collections out of previously formed collections and the urelements, forever.
Building upon this foundational work in axiomatic set theory, Joseph Shoenfield
(1967), George Boolos (1998, chaps. 1 and 6) and Michael Potter (2004) have articulated alternative axiomatizations of set theory, which represent the iterative process
of set formation as occurring in a series of primitive “stages” (Shoenfield, Boolos)
or as comprising a series of successively generated “levels” (Potter). Shoenfield and
Boolos proceed to derive the traditional axioms of set theory from the set formation
rule that at each stage all pluralities of sets formed at previous stages are formed
into sets. (I discuss this rule and Boolos’s theory in greater detail below.) Potter
adopts an explicit, recursive definition of ‘level’ (originally formulated by Dana Scott
(1974)), according to which (i) the first level, V0 , is the empty set and (ii) each successive level, Vα , is the set containing all members and sub-collections of all preceding
levels Vβ for β < α.4 He then proceeds to derive the traditional axioms from a version of the Separation axiom, according to which any members of a level form a set.
All three accounts qualify as iterative: Shoenfield and Boolos’s because each consists
of repeated applications of the rule of set formation (once at every stage); Potter’s
because it involves a successive generation of levels (as he himself remarks (2004,
41)). These accounts are also iterative in the original sense according to which sets
are formed out of (or constituted by) their members: Shoenfield and Boolos’s insofar
as each application of the rule of set formation generates new sets whose members
are previously formed sets; Potter’s insofar as each level contains all members and
sub-collections of members from previous levels (and sets are defined via Separation
as sub-collections of levels).

4

In standard set theories, levels are recursively defined in terms of the operations of powerset
and union as follows: (i) V0 = ∅; (ii) for any successor ordinal, α + 1, Vα+1 = P(Vα ); (iii) for any
limit ordinal, λ, Vλ = ∪γ<λ Vγ . The novelty of Scott’s definition is that it does not presuppose the
operations of Powerset and Union.
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The iterative process of set formation suggests the existence of a real relation of
priority between members and the sets they form, which in turn provides a principled
explanation for why the contradiction-inducing sets do not exist. This explanatory
power gives the iterative conception of set an advantage over its competitor: the
logical conception of set. As we saw in chapter 4, the logical conception is inherently
vulnerable to the set-theoretic paradoxes and requires some addendum to save it
from contradiction; however, each of the solutions we considered—the limitation of
size doctrine and set restrictivism—appears either to be unmotivated by the logical
conception and consequently ad hoc, or it raises additional problems, such as the
problem of inexpressibility. The iterative conception, on the other hand, appears to
be naturally immune to the set-theoretic paradoxes and requires no special addendum
to prevent them. Gödel (1947, 518–519) praises the iterative conception for these
reasons when he writes:
This concept of set, however, according to which a set is something obtainable from the integers (or some other well-defined objects) by iterated
application of the operation “set of”, not something obtained by dividing
the totality of all existing things into two categories, has never led to any
antinomy whatsoever; that is, the perfectly “naive” and uncritical working
with this concept of set has so far proved completely self-consistent.
The iterative conception of set can be divided into two theses: (a) the identification of sets with collections; (b) the iterative process of set formation. There are
both idealist and a realist variants of (b). According to the idealist version, sets are
constructed, built up from, or formed out of their members. A proponent of this
view is Shoenfield (1967), who describes a set as a collection that is “formed at some
stage” in “the construction of sets.” According to the realist version, sets are constituted by (or ontologically depend upon) their members. A proponent of this view is
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Øystein Linnebo (2010, 149), who describes “the concept of a set” as “the concept of
a collection ‘constituted by’ its elements.”5
One might wonder about the connection between (a) and (b) and, in particular,
whether (b) is independent of (a). Two observations support the claim that this is
so. The first is that, in a more or less formal sense, we can grasp the nature of the
iterative process without forming any beliefs about the intrinsic nature of sets. The
second is that philosophers sometimes describe the iterative conception of set in terms
of (b) alone. The excerpt from Gödel above is one example of this. Donald Martin
(2001, 6) provides a second:
When I talk of the concept of set, I mean the iterative concept, according to
which sets are viewed as being formed in a transfinite “process,” starting
with a perhaps empty domain of non-sets (urelements).
On the other hand, it might be argued that merely grasping the formal process of set
formation is not enough. In order to have a satisfactory conception of set, we must
understand not only what sets are formed according to this process, but why it is
precisely these sets (no more and no less) that are so formed. Arguably, an answer
to the second question requires identifying sets with collections.
In this chapter, I show how the restrictions the iterative conception of set imposes on the existence axioms of iterative set theories prevent the formation of the
contradiction-inducing sets, with special attention being paid to the two existence
axioms—Class Comprehension and Separation—that are closest to the inconsistent
axiom of full comprehension (FC) from SN. I then raise two objections to the iterative
conception: the first concerns its ability to motivate the empty set axiom of iterative
5

He goes on to describe three aspects of this:

One aspect of this idea is that part of the nature of a set is what elements
it has . . . Another aspect is the converse, namely, that the nature of a
set is exhausted by what elements it has. . . . A third aspect is that the
elements of a set are “prior to” the set itself.
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set theory; the second concerns the nature of the priority relation. My plan is the
following. In 6.1, I present the iterative process of set formation as a stage theory
(ala Boolos) and I show how this process can be used to motivate a No Set solution to
the paradoxes. In 6.2, I consider two standard iterative set theories that express the
iterative conception: Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and Von-Neuman-Bernays-Gödel
set theory; and I show how restrictions incorporated into the existence axioms of
these theories prevent derivations of the paradoxes. In 6.3, I argue that (a liberalized
version of) the iterative conception motivates all the existence axioms that are common to these two theories with the exception of the empty set axiom (and two other
axioms that depend on this). In 6.4, I discuss problems concerning the nature of the
priority relation. I argue that understanding this in a straightforwardly constructivist
sense threatens mathematical realism; but the leading realist interpretations—modal
and ontological interpretations of priority—are problematic as well.

6.1

The process of set formation

Sets are formed in a series of stages according to the rule that at each stage, every
plurality, xx, consisting of sets formed at earlier stages and/or urelements is formed
into a set X = {x|x ≺ xx}.6 If we ignore urelements, this rule can be expressed as
the following principle of set formation at a stage (SFS):
SFS: (∀s)(∀xx)[{x|x ≺ xx} is formed at s ↔ (∀x)(x ≺ xx → x is formed at some
stage earlier than s)].
The ordering of stages is partially described by the following three axioms:
Ax1. There is a first stage.
Ax2. Every stage is immediately earlier than some stage (its successor stage).

6

This means that each set gets formed repeatedly: at each stage after the stage at which it is
first formed.
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Ax3. The stages are well-ordered under the relation earlier than.7
Ax1 tells us that there is a first stage (stage 0). Ax2 then tells us that stage 0 has a
successor (stage 1) and that stage 1 has a successor (stage 2) and that stage 2 has a
successor (stage 3) and so on. Finally, Ax3 tells us that each of these stages is distinct
from the others. In this way, Ax1–Ax3 entail the existence of the infinite sequence:
stage 0, stage 1, stage 2, stage 3, . . . which is bounded by the first infinite ordinal ω.
SFS tells us what sets are formed at each stage. At stage 0, no sets have been
formed at earlier stages, so the only plurality to be formed into a set is the empty
plurality, which forms the set ∅. At stage 1, ∅ has been formed at an earlier stage, so
two sets are formed: ∅ and {∅}. At stage 2, ∅ and {∅} have been formed at earlier
stages, so four sets are formed: ∅, {∅}, {{∅}} and {∅, {∅}}. This process continues
for as long as the stages go.8
The process of set formation captured by SFS is exhaustive: absolutely every set is
formed according to this process at some stage. This establishes an iterative existence
principle for sets (ISE), according to which {x|x ≺ xx} exists iff there is some stage
s later than any stage at which any x ≺ xx is first formed. ISE can be formulated as:
7

Well-orderings are typically defined on sets; but the standard definition can easily be extended
to pluralities as follows:
Any xx are well-ordered under the relation R iff:
• R is transitive on the xx
• The xx satisfy trichotomy (i.e., for any x1 , x2 ≺ xx, exactly one of the cases (a) x1 is
earlier than x2 , (b) x2 is earlier than x1 , (c) x1 = x2 holds)
• Any yy ≺ xx have a least element under R.
8

If there are urelements, things get a bit more complex. Suppose we begin with two urelements,
a and b. Then at stage 0, four sets are formed: ∅, {a}, {b}, and {a, b}. At stage 1, six elements are
available to form new sets, the two urelements a and b, and the four sets from stage 0. Therefore,
at stage 1, 22+4 sets are formed. In general, if k is the number of urelements and m sets are formed
at stage n, then 2k+m sets are formed at stage n + 1. When urelements are included, it is common
to delay the formation of sets by one stage so that at stage 0 only urelements exist and no sets are
formed. See for example, Studd (2013, 698) and Linnebo (2010, 144).
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ISE: (∀xx)[(∃y)(y = {x|x ≺ xx}) ↔ (∃s)(∀x)(x ≺ xx → s is later than any stage at
which x is first formed)].
The right-to-left direction of ISE is a plural version of Boolos’s (1998, 21, 91–93)
axiom schema of specification (Spec), which uses the schematic predicate φ in place
of the quantified plural variable ‘xx’.
Spec: (∃s)(∀x)(φ(x) → s is later than any stage at which x is first formed) →
(∃y)(y = {x|φ(x)}).9
A direct consequence of ISE is that questions of what sets there are, e.g., whether
there is an infinite set, whether every set has a powerset, whether there is a set of
cardinality ℵω , and so on, are determined by the length of the series of stages. It is
generally agreed that there are infinitely many stages; however, their exact number
and even whether this is something that is determined by the iterative conception is
open to question.
In order to secure the existence of infinite stages (stages that are infinitely far
removed from the first stage) an axiom of infinity is required. Boolos (1998, 21)
proposes the following:
Ax4. There is a limit stage, ω, later than all successors of the first stage but not
immediately later than any stage.
Repeated applications of Ax2–Ax3 then deliver the infinite sequence of infinite stages:
stage ω, stage ω + 1, stage ω + 2, stage ω + 3, . . . Nevertheless, without additional
axioms, the stages will still be bounded by the second order of infinity ω + ω (ω · 2).

9

Boolos (1998, 91) introduces the dyadic predicate B(x, s)—read: “x is formed at a stage prior
to s”—to express the condition that s is later than the stage at which x is first formed. This allows
him to formulate Spec as: (∃s)(∀x)(φ(x) → B(x, s)) → (∃y)(y = {x|φ(x)}) Although his official
formulation involves only singular quantification, he writes (p. 92) that the thought behind Spec
“can be put better” using plural quantification as: “for any stage s and any sets (notice the plural)
that have all been formed before s, there is a set to which exactly those belong.” This in turn can
be expressed by a plural variant of Spec in which occurrences of φ are replaced with plural variables:
(∀xx)[(∃s)(∀x)(x ≺ xx → B(x, s)) → (∃y)(y = {x|x ≺ xx})].
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Boolos, who views every axiom of infinity stronger than Ax4 as exceeding the
proper content of the iterative conception, is satisfied with this boundary; however,
most set theorists and philosophers of set theory would argue that the series of stages
goes much further. This requires a stronger axiom of infinity. We might try:
Ax4∗ . For any successor stage, s, there is a limit stage, l(s), later than all successors
of s but not immediately later than any stage.
Ax4∗ entails the existence of an infinite sequence of limit stages: stage ω, stage ω · 2,
stage ω · 3, . . . Each has the form ω · n and so repeated applications of Ax2–Ax3
deliver infinitely many infinite sequences of the form: stage ω · n, stage (ω · n) + 1,
stage (ω · n) + 2, stage (ω · n) + 3, . . . Note that for every one of these sequences
in which n > 1, every stage in the sequence either reaches or exceeds the previous
boundary ω ·2. Not only that, each of these sequences has its own boundary, and each
of the members of the next sequence (in which the value of n is one greater) either
reaches or exceeds this boundary. Nevertheless, the addition of Ax4∗ is still not strong
enough to break though all boundaries. For instance, Ax1–Ax4∗ do not entail the
existence of the limit stage ω 2 and so, if we restrict ourselves to these axioms, we must
conclude that the stages are bounded by the order of infinity ω 2 . We might decide to
adopt progressively stronger axioms, according to which the stages are bounded by
progressively higher orders of infinity, e.g., ω ω , 0 and ω1 ).10 How strong should our
axiom of infinity be?
The iterative conception is frequently described as one according to which the
process of set formation (or the hierarchy of levels, or the height of the set-theoretic
universe) is absolutely infinite and surpasses all boundaries. This opinion is bolstered
by an argument that only a maximally strong axiom of infinity is defensible.
10

ω

0 is the limit of the sequence ω, ω ω , ω ω , . . . ; ω1 is the least uncountable ordinal.
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P1. Anything less than a maximally strong axiom of infinity imposes a fixed boundary on the universe of sets.
P2. Any fixed boundary is arbitrary.
C. Therefore, only a maximally strong axiom of infinity is defensible.
Fraenkel et al. (1973, 118) appeal to this argument when they object to an “axiom
of restriction” which would impose a fixed boundary on the universe of sets:
The axiom of restriction points to the existence of some fixed natural
universe of sets, but if the collection of all sets in this universe is again
a Platonistic entity, then why should it not be admitted as a new set by
allowing a wider universe than that allowed by the axiom of restriction?
The crux of the argument is P2, which can be motivated as follows. Suppose a
restricted axiom of infinity, R, is adopted. Since R is restricted, it imposes a boundary
on the stages. Whatever the boundary is, ISE tells us that the sets formed in all the
stages leading up to it do not form a set. (Such a set could only be formed at the
boundary itself, which by assumption is never reached.) Now it seems that we could
always have selected a more liberal axiom of infinity, in which case the aforementioned
sets would have formed a set. And why shouldn’t we? Unless there is an answer to
this, the choice of R appears arbitrary. (It will not do to reply that there can be no
set of all sets. For in arguing that it is arbitrary to deny that all the sets formed prior
to some boundary form a set, we are not arguing that it is arbitrary to deny that all
the sets form a set, but rather that it is arbitrary to assert that all the sets formed
prior to the boundary are all the sets.)
The same idea is sometimes used as a reductio against an actualist conception of
the universe of sets. Thus Linnebo (2013, 206) writes:
According to the actualist conception, the set-theoretic quantifiers range
over a definite totality of sets. Why should the objects that make up this
totality not themselves form a set? . . . To disallow such a set would be to
truncate the iterative hierarchy at an arbitrary level.
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As I understand him, Linnebo is pointing out a very general difficulty that is inherent
in the notion of an actual sequence that “surpasses all boundaries.”11 Just as Russell’s
yacht determines a length—say 20 meters—that it does not exceed; so it might be
argued, the sequence of stages itself determines a length—whatever this might be—
that it does not exceed. It might be replied that Burali-Forti’s paradox has taught us
that there is no ordinal number of all the ordinal numbers and so also that there is no
length determined by the sequence of all the stages (for what else could this be if not
an ordinal number?). However, this reply is a bit perplexing; for if we cannot assign
a definite ordinal to the sequence of stages, then how can we be justified in referring
to its length? And if we cannot refer to the length of this sequence, then how can we
be justified in saying that it surpasses all boundaries? Perhaps the best we can do is
to say that the sequence of stages surpasses every independently specifiable boundary
(even if, strictly speaking, it does not surpass every boundary). This implies that
the sequence of stages surpasses every independently given ordinal and therefore that
the sequence of stages is at least “as long as” the ordinals. It would seem that this is
informative only insofar as the ordinals can be grasped independently of set theory.
Is it possible to express the absolute infinity of the stages without presupposing
the ordinals? Shoenfield (1967, 239) proposes a strong “cofinality principle” which is
equivalent to the following “boundary schema” for stages which Boolos (1998, 26–27)
considers (but rejects):
If each set is correlated with at least one stage (no matter how), then for
any set z there is a stage s such that for each member w of z, s is later
than some stage with which w is correlated.12
11

I discuss the potentialist conception that Linnebo favors later in 6.4.

12

Boolos (1998, 97) also discusses a second principle of infinity, according to which any sets
injectable into a plurality of sets formed before some stage s form a set. He rejects both principles
on the grounds that they express thoughts about the length of stages that go beyond whatever is
plausibly taken to be implied by the iterative conception.
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This schema might be described as stating that there is always a stage later than any
stage among a given set-sized plurality of stages; however, this is a heuristic and not
an analysis, for under the iterative conception, it is the length of the stages that fixes
the limits on set-size (and not the other way round). If quantification over functions
is permitted,13 Boolos’s schema can be expressed in axiom form as:
(B) For any set x and any function f from sets into stages: (∃t)(∀z ∈ x)(t is later
than any stage s = f (z)).
A simple implication of (B) is that there is a stage later than any stage among any
given countable sequence of stages s1 , s2 , . . . Proof : Let a1 , a2 , . . . be sets first formed
at the stages 1, 2, . . . By Ax4, there is a stage ω at which the set, A, containing every
ai is formed. Let fa be the function that maps each ai to the stage si . (B) then tells
us that there is a stage t later than every si .
Another idea, recommended by Tait (2005, ch. 6), Paseau (2007, 33), Welch and
Horsten (2016) and (arguably) Burgess (2008, 117–124) is to use a principle of reflection, according to which any statement of set theory, in particular, any statement
involving quantification over all sets, is “reflected down” onto initial segments of the
set-theoretic hierarchy. This is done by means of truth-value preserving reinterpretations under which quantification is restricted to those sets formed prior to some
definite stage t. Intuitively, reflection conveys the thought that the stages are absolutely infinite: they go on for so long that initial segments of the domain of all sets
become indiscernible from the domain of all sets.14 To formalize reflection, let ‘φt ’
13

Presumably, this requires a plural analysis of functions, according to which their domains and
ranges are identified with pluralities of arguments and values (instead of sets of these).
14

The discovery and development of Reflection principles is largely due to the work of Richard
Montague (1957, 1961) and Paul Bernays (1961). For a comparison of various Reflection principles
and an overview of some more recent developments, see Incurvati (nd, sec. 2). Reflection is commonly
formulated as a schema of ZF set theory, in which particular sets (levels) play the role of stages (see
p. 157, f.n. 4). Unlike Tait and Paseau, Burgess presents Reflection as expressing a version of the
limitation of size doctrine according to which some xx are too many to form a set if any true
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stand for the result of restricting the quantifiers in φ to sets formed prior to t and let
∀xt /∃xt symbolize quantification over all sets formed prior to t. Reflection can then
be formulated as the following schema:
(Ref) For any stage s, there is a later stage t such that: (∀t x1 , . . . , xn )(φ(x1 , . . . , xn ) →
φt (x1 , . . . , xn )).
To illustrate, replace φ with the formula ¬(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y) (read: there is no set that
contains all the sets). (Ref) tells us that for any stage s there is a later stage t such
that: φ implies the restricted formula φt = ¬(∃y t )(∀xt )(x ∈ y) (read: there is no set
formed prior to t that contains all sets formed prior to t).
6.1.1

Priority and Explanation

The iterative conception of set provides a satisfactory response to the paradoxes
only if it provides an explanation for why the contradiction-inducing sets (U , V , VP ,
O and K) do not exist (2.5, pp. 52–56). In this section, I will show how SFS blocks
the formation of each of these sets (from which it follows, by ISE, that none of them
exist). I will then argue that this provides an explanation for why the contradictioninducing sets do not exist only if either SFS is literally true and sets really are formed
from their members in stages or SFS is not literally true, but is a metaphor that aptly
models the real facts about set existence.
The non-existence of the contradiction-inducing sets follows from two premises: (i)
each of these sets (if it exists) is self-membered and (ii) there can be no self-membered
sets according to SFS and ISE. To establish (ii), it suffices to note that according to
SFS, if x is a self-membered set that is formed at a stage s, then x is also formed at
a stage prior to s. Therefore, no stage can be the stage at which x is first-formed.
But since the stages are well-ordered, if there were any stages at which x was formed,

statement φ that involves quantification over all of them has a reflection that involves quantification
over only those xx belonging to some level V .
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there would be a first stage at which x was formed. Therefore, there are no stages at
which x is formed. So, by ISE, x does not exist. Below, I will give some arguments
in support of (i).

• The universal set: Since U is defined as the set of all things, and U , if it exists,
is a thing, U is self-membered (if it exists). Similar remarks apply to the set of
all sets, V , and the set of all pure sets, VP . (V , if it exists, is a set and hence a
self-member. VP , if it exists, is a pure set, and hence a self-member.)
• The Russell set: Since self-membership is impossible, R, if it exists, is identical
to the set of all sets, V . Therefore, R, if it exists, is self-membered.
• The set of all ordinals: In iterative set theories, ordinals are defined as transitive
sets (all their members are subsets) that are well-ordered by ∈. We can prove
that O, if it exists, meets these conditions, so O is an ordinal.15 It follows that
O is a self-member (since O is the set of all ordinals).
• The set of all cardinals: The explanation for the nonexistence of K follows suit.
In iterative set theories, each cardinal κ is identified with the least ordinal of
15

Proof sketch: ∈ is transitive on O since its members are all the ordinals and, by definition, all
ordinals are transitive. To show that O is well-ordered by ∈, we need to show two more things:
1. ∈ satisfies trichotomy on O
2. Any nonempty subset X ⊆ O has a least element under ∈.
To prove 1, we use the definition of ‘ordinal’ to show that for any ordinals α, β: (i) if α ⊂ β then
α ∈ β and (ii) either α ⊆ β or β ⊆ α. (See Jech (2003, 19) for proofs.) From (i) and (ii), it follows
that at least one of the cases: (a) α = β, (b) α ∈ β or (c) β ∈ α holds. The well-ordering of α and
β under ∈ ensures that at most one of these cases holds. (If more than one of (a)–(c) holds, then
α ∈ α and β ∈ β, which contradicts trichotomy on α and β.)
To prove 2, take an arbitrary α ∈ X. If α ∩ X = ∅, then α is least, since for any distinct β ∈ X:
β ∈
/ α and therefore α ∈ β by (i) and (ii) above. Next suppose α ∩ X 6= ∅. Since α ∩ X ⊂ α, it
contains a least element γ. We now show that γ is the least member of X. For any β 6= α ∈ X,
either β ∈ α or β ∈
/ α. If β ∈ α, then β ∈ α ∩ X and so γ ∈ β. If β ∈
/ α, then α ∈ β by (i) and (ii)
above, and therefore γ ∈ β. Either way, γ is least.

168

cardinality κ. Given the isomorphism of the cardinals with the ordinals, the
nonexistence of O entails the nonexistence of K.
These remarks explain why none of the contradiction-inducing sets exists according
to the iterative conception. Our goal, however, is to explain why none of these sets
exists simpliciter. To achieve this, we must show that the iterative conception is true;
in particular that SFS and ISE are true. There are two possibilities to consider:
(a) SFS and ISE are literally true: this would mean that all sets really are formed
from their members in stages, just as SFS and ISE say they are
(b) SFS and ISE are literally false but metaphorically true: sets are not really
formed from their members in stages; however, talk of set formation at a stage
is a true metaphor that aptly models the real facts about set existence.
Note that the process of set formation imposes a priority relation between any elements and the set they form. I claim that it is this core idea of priority that provides
the explanatory backbone in our account of why certain sets exist or do not exist
(and which must be preserved by any metaphorical renditions of these principles).
Priority: The set A = {x|x ≺ xx} exists iff and because the xx are prior to A.
In order to provide a satisfactory response to the paradoxes, we must give an
account of this priority relation. Doing so is simple if (a) obtains; for then the priority
of the xx to A just is the fact that there is a stage later than any stage at which any
x ≺ xx is first formed. It is more difficult if (b) obtains. In that case, priority must
be understood in terms of the real facts about set existence that the metaphor of set
formation at a stage aptly models. One idea is that talk of set formation at a stage
models real facts about mathematical modality. Priority emerges from the fact that
each set is merely possible relative to its members. Another idea is that talk of set
formation at a stage models real facts about ontological dependence. Priority emerges
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from the fact that each set ontologically depends upon its members. I will evaluate
each of these ideas in 6.4. At present, my goal is to show that some account must be
given; that we cannot just leave the metaphor of set formation at a stage as a useful
heuristic, informing us of what sets there are according to the iterative conception.
The contrary position is defended by Luca Incurvati (2012, 82), who describes her
own view as a type of “minimalism,” according to which the iterative conception, “is
exhausted by saying that it is the conception of set according to which sets are the
objects that occur at one level or another of the cumulative hierarchy.” I take it that
the idea is that principles such as SFS and ISE are purely heuristic, and do not stand
for any genuinely explanatory relation. Of course, one might still say that the xx
are prior to A, but this is not to be taken in an explanatory sense as providing an
account of why the set A exists; rather, it is simply a means of conveying the fact
that A exists.
A similar perspective is suggested by George Boolos’s (1998, 91) remarks (which
Incurvati cites) that it is possible to explain the iterative conception without invoking
a priority relation.
In any case, for the purpose of explaining the conception, the metaphor
is thoroughly unnecessary, for we can say instead: there are the null set
and the set containing just the null set, sets of all those, sets of all those,
sets of all Those, . . . There are also sets of all THOSE Let us now refer
to these sets as “those”. Then there are sets of those, sets of those, . . .
Let’s grant that Boolos’s recursive list provides a feasible means of conveying what
sets there are. In other words, let’s grant that Boolos has provided a recursive list of
the sets that exist according to standard, iterative set theory.
I say that this is not enough. Boolos’s recursive list includes a great many sets.
Why think that all sets on this list exist? It also leaves out a great many contenders
to set-hood, for example, the self-membered sets and the non-well-founded sets. Why
think that none of these contenders to set-hood is a set? Stripped of the metaphor
of set formation at a stage, we have no assurance that the list is even extensionally
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correct. Among the excluded contenders to set-hood are the contradiction-inducing
sets. That’s certainly a good thing. But stripped of any real priority relation, we have
no satisfactory explanation for why these are left out. It’s not much help to stress
that they must be ruled out to avoid inconsistencies. Excluding them for this reason
is, in Michael Dummett’s words, “to wield the big stick, not to offer an explanation”
(1991, 316).
The shortcomings of minimalism might be further illustrated by comparing it to
an imaginary “fix” to naive set theory (SN) which consists of restricting the comprehension principle (FC) to all and only the “safe properties.” A property is safe if it
leads to no contradiction-inducing sets. Such a theory would be consistent and, it
seems, at least as powerful as standard set theory. The problem is that we would be
left with no satisfactory explanation for why the “unsafe properties” are excluded.
Again, it will not do to observe that they must be excluded to avoid inconsistencies.
Minimalism cannot guarantee that the sets that exist according to standard set theory are all and only the sets that there are. Nor, supposing standard set theory gets
the right results, can it explain why this is the case. I conclude that minimalism is
unacceptable.

6.2

Iterative set theories

There are two standard set theories that are said to express the iterative conception: Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) and Von-Neuman-Bernays-Gödel set theory
(NBG). Up to this point, I have used ‘set’ as a generic label for objects that include
extensions and classes, as well as the sets of standard set theory. I have done this in
order to frame questions about competing conceptions of these objects (the logical
and iterative conceptions). In this section, it will be convenient to use ‘set’ in a more
specific way to refer to the objects of ZF. Following standard practice, I use ‘class’ to
refer to the objects of NBG. Thus, ZF is (by definition) a theory of sets; whereas NBG
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is (by definition) a theory of classes. Every set is a class and so the NBG universe
includes all the sets in the ZF universe. It is therefore unsurprising that NBG incorporates all the ZF axioms with little or no change. However, the NBG universe also
includes certain large classes—proper classes—that are not sets and consequently do
not exist in the ZF universe. The existence of classes is handled by a class comprehension schema unique to NBG. I will first present the ZF axioms in full and then
discuss their NBG variants and the NBG class comprehension schema. At the end of
this section, I will argue that this schema is philosophically problematic.
ZF is a first-order theory whose quantifiers range over all sets. The ZF axioms
are:
ZF1. Extensionality (∀x)(∀y)[(∀z)(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y]
Read: coextensional sets are identical.
ZF2. Empty Set (∃y)(∀x)(x ∈
/ y)
Read: there exists the empty set ∅.16
ZF3. Pairing (∀x)(∀z)(∃y)(y = {x, z})
Read: any two sets x and z define the set y = {x, z}.
ZF4. Union (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)(z ∈ y ↔ ∃w(w ∈ x ∧ z ∈ w))
Read: for any set x, there exists the set y of all members of members of x (

S

x).

ZF5. Power Set (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ x)
Read: for any set x, there exists the set y of all subsets of x (Px).
ZF6. Infinity (∃y)(∅ ∈ y ∧ (∀x)(x ∈ y → x ∪ {x} ∈ y))
Read: there exists the infinite set ω = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, ...}.

16

Uniqueness (the empty set) follows from ZF1. Without ZF1, ZF2 only asserts that there is an
empty set. Similar remarks apply to ZF3–ZF8.
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ZF7. Separation (∀x)(∃y)(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ φz))
Read: for any set x, there exists the (sub)set y of all z ∈ x such that φz.
ZF8. Replacement (∀x)[(∀z ∈ x)(∃!w)(φ(z) = w) →
(∃y)(∀w)(w ∈ y ↔ (∃z ∈ x)(φ(z) = w))]
Read: if the condition φ is functional on x, then there exists the set y of all
φ(z) such that z ∈ x.17
ZF9. Foundation (∀x)(x 6= ∅ → (∃y)(y ∈ x ∧ y ∩ x = ∅)).
Read: any nonempty set has a member from which it is disjoint.
While most of these axioms have positive existential import, the first and last
do not. ZF1 provides the standard extensional identity conditions for sets (and says
nothing about whether any sets exist). ZF9 too says nothing about whether any sets
exist; rather, it says that certain sets do not exist. These include self-membered sets
as well as sets with infinitely descending chains of membership, i.e., any set x0 for
which there is an infinite series of the form: . . . ∈ x3 ∈ x2 ∈ x1 ∈ x0 . Both types
of sets violate SFS (the latter because SFS asserts that every xj in the series, where
j > i, must be formed at an earlier stage than xi ; and this is impossible given the
ordering of stages). The remaining seven axioms, which I call “existence axioms”,
have positive existential import. These are of two kinds. Some, like ZF2 and ZF6,
directly posit the existence of a particular set. Others are conditional: they lay out a
procedure for defining “new” sets given the existence of other sets. ZF3, ZF4, ZF5,
ZF7 and ZF8 are existence axioms of this kind.
NBG is a two-sorted theory, with distinct variables for sets (‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’) and classes
(‘X’, ‘Y ’, ‘Z’). The NBG axioms consist of the nine ZF axioms, either entirely un-

17

For a definition of ‘φ is functional on x’, see 2.1, p. 32.
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changed or slightly modified, plus a new class comprehension axiom schema.18 The
NBG set existence axioms (NBG2–NBG8) are exact duplicates of their ZF counterparts (ZF2–ZF8). The NBG axioms of Extensionality and Foundation (NBG1 and
NBG9) are slightly modified so that they apply to classes.
NBG1. Extensionality (∀X)(∀Y )((∀z)(z ∈ X ↔ z ∈ Y ) → X = Y )
Read: coextensional classes are identical.
NBG9. Foundation ∀X(X 6= ∅ → ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ x ∩ X = ∅)).
Read: any nonempty class has a member from which it is disjoint.
The NBG class existence axiom is:
NBG10. Class Comprehension (∃X)(∀x)(x ∈ X ↔ φ(x)), where φ(x) is any
predicative wff.
Read: any predicative wff φ defines the class X = {x|φ(x)}.
NBG10 has no ZF counterpart; instead it resembles the full comprehension schema
FC of the naive set theory SN (see 4.4 pp. 105–106).
6.2.1

How Class Comprehension blocks the paradoxes

What saves NBG10 from the paradoxes that FC engenders is the restriction to
sets imposed by the restricted quantifier ∀x. This means that substitutions for φ
in NBG10 determine classes of sets, not classes of classes. As a result, while the
existence conditions for classes of sets correspond to something very much like the
logical conception—every predicative wff φ defines the class of all sets such that φ—
the existence conditions for classes of classes do not—it’s not the case that every
predicative wff φ defines the class of all classes such that φ—for proper classes are
18

This formulation of NBG follows Mendelson (1997, chap. 4). In his 1925 axiomatization, von
Neumann leaves out Separation and Replacement. Instead, he employs a limitation of size axiom,
which says that any class X defines a set x = X iff there is no surjection from X onto the class of
all (pure) sets VP . Separation and Replacement are derived as theorems from this axiom.
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never members of other classes. This prevents the existence of any contradictioninducing classes.
To illustrate, consider the NBG formulas ‘x is a non-self-membered class’, ‘x is a
class’, ‘x is a cardinal’ and ‘x is an ordinal’. NBG10 tells us that each defines a class.
These are: the class of all non-self-membered sets, the class of all sets, the class of
all cardinals (which are defined as particular ordinals) and the class of all ordinals
(which are defined as particular transitive, well-ordered sets). Contradictions are
avoided because these are proper classes and therefore not self-members even if they
satisfy the relevant defining formulas (for proper classes are outside the range of the
restricted quantifier ∀x). It is on account of this restriction that we are not forced
to infer from the fact that the Russell class defined by replacing φ with ‘x is a nonself-membered class’ in NBG10 is not a self-member that it also is a self-member
(even though it does satisfy the formula ‘x is a non-self-membered class’). Similarly,
we are not forced to infer that the class defined by replacing φ with ‘x is a class’ is
a self-member (even though it satisfies the formula ‘x is a class’). Instead, we infer
that because it is a proper class and therefore outside of the range of the restricted
quantifier ∀x that not all of its subclasses are members (even though each of them
satisfies the formula ‘x is a class’). Since not all its subclasses are members, we cannot
use identity to define an injection (from the powerclass of the class of all sets into the
class of all sets) that contradicts Cantor’s theorem (see 2.2, pp. 36–37). Nor can we
derive Cantor’s paradox from the existence of the class of all cardinals. In iterative
set theories, only sets have cardinal numbers. Since the class of all cardinals is not
a set, it has no cardinal number. Similarly, because the class of all ordinals is not a
set, it has no ordinal number.
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6.2.2

Is NBG set theory restrictivist?

If we think of NBG classes as extensions of concepts (and not as collections of their
members), then NBG10 may be thought of as the result of restricting quantification in
FC. Earlier (in ch. 4), I described the comprehension principle FC∗ of the restrictivist
set theory FSR in the same way: as the result of restricting quantification in FC.
Since both these theories (NBG and FSR) are the result of restricting quantification
in FC, we might be led to believe that both theories should count as restrictivist set
theories. However, this would only invite confusion; for there are two senses in which
a theory might be called ‘restrictivist’: an ontological sense and a quantificational
sense (up to this point, I have used ‘restrictivism’ in only the quantificational sense).
I will now attempt to draw this distinction in the present case by comparing the
pictures of set-theoretic reality which underlie the principles NBG10 and FC∗ . I will
argue that NBG is ontologically restrictivist but not quantificationally restrictivist,
whereas FSR is quantificationally restrictivist but not ontologically restrictivist.
The picture underlying NBG10 is one on which there are two kinds of class-like
objects: sets (extensions of small concepts) and proper classes (extensions of big
concepts). (In what follows, I use these pairs of terms interchangeably.) NBG10
is restricted because it applies only to sets, specifying the conditions under which
any sets form a class (they do iff they share a property expressible by a predicative
formula). The picture underlying FSR is quite different. On this picture, there is
only one kind of class-like object: extensions (classes). FC∗ specifies the conditions
under which any extension ExtD (F ) exists (it does iff the property F exists). The
restriction to D does not reflect the ontological fact that there are special extensions
(the proper classes) to which FC∗ does not apply, but rather the quantificational fact
that there is no single context in which FC∗ quantifies over all extensions at once.
These two pictures provide two different accounts of where FC goes wrong. On the
NBG picture, FC fails to recognize the distinction between sets and proper classes.
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FC says (falsely) that any classes (which may include proper classes) form a class
(provided they share a property F ). In so doing, it mistakenly attempts to apply
the principle of comprehension to pluralities of which it does not hold. The solution
is to recognize that the principle of comprehension only applies to sets. This is the
sense in which FC is to be restricted. On the FSR picture, the error of FC is that it
purports to say something that cannot be said. FC purports to say that absolutely
any extensions (classes), which may be all the extensions, form an extension (provided
they share a property F ). But this cannot be said. In fact, if properly understood,
FC is true as it stands. For it is the case that any extensions (where ‘any’ is properly
understood as restricted by context to a domain D) that fall under a single property
form an extension. The solution is to recognize that it is impossible to quantify over
absolutely all extensions at once. There is no all-inclusive D.
The fact that NBG10 employs a restricted quantifier where FC employs an unrestricted quantifier does not reflect any important disagreement between these principles regarding quantification (whether or not it is possible to quantify over all
classes/extensions); rather, it reflects an important disagreement between these principles regarding ontology—whether every class (or extension in SN) is governed by
NBG10 or FC. The fact that this ontological restriction is expressed by means of a
quantificational restriction is irrelevant. This is merely a means for expressing a restriction that is not itself quantificational, but ontological in nature. Concerning the
quantificational question, only FSR is restrictivist: both the inconsistent SN based
on FC and NBG based on NBG10 agree that it is possible to quantify over absolutely
all objects treated by these theories (extensions for SN; classes for NBG). Concerning
the ontological question, only NBG is restrictivist: SN and FSR (but not NBG) agree
that comprehension determines the existence conditions for every object treated by
these theories.
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6.2.3

How Separation blocks the paradoxes

Another axiom that bears similarities to the problematic FC is the axiom schema
of Separation, which is common to both ZF and NBG (ZF7/NBG7). Here, the
critical difference is the restriction to the members of a given set. This restriction
means that substitutions for φ in Separation determine subsets of sets. In effect,
while the existence conditions for subsets of sets correspond to something very much
like the logical conception—relative to any set z, every wff φ defines the subset of all
members of z such that φ—the existence conditions for sets do not—it’s not the case
that every wff φ defines the set of all sets such that φ. This prevents the derivation
of contradiction-inducing sets.
To illustrate, consider once more the formulas ‘x is a non-self-membered set’, ‘x is
a set’, ‘x is a cardinal’ and ‘x is an ordinal’. Separation tells us that each defines a set,
by “separating” out all the members from a given set that satisfy it. But unless we
can prove that there are maximal sets whose members include all the sets satisfying
these formulas, this procedure will never yield the contradiction-inducing sets. We
know, at least in an informal way, that there can be no such maximal sets, since
the process of set formation is always churning out new sets satisfying each of these
formulas.
Separation’s restriction to the members of a given set bears striking similarities
to FC∗ ’s restriction to the elements from a given domain of quantification (see 4.6,
pp. 117–122). To further appreciate this similarity between iterative set theories and
FSR, consider the following attempt to derive Russell’s paradox from Separation. We
start with a set, a. By Separation, we can define the Russell set on a, by replacing φ
with x ∈
/ x.
(1.1) (∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ a ∧ x ∈
/ x).
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By (1.1) and ZF1/NBG1, ‘y’ has a unique value, Ra , which is the set of all non-selfmembered sets in a.19 This allows us to eliminate the existential quantifier, replacing
the bound occurrence of ‘y’ with ‘Ra ’ (the Russell set on a):
(1.2) (∀x)(x ∈ Ra ↔ x ∈ a ∧ x ∈
/ x).
Since ∀x ranges over all sets, we can instantiate ‘x’ to Ra :
(1.3) Ra ∈ Ra ↔ Ra ∈ a ∧ Ra ∈
/ Ra .
If Ra ∈ a, then (1.3) would entail the contradictory:
(1.4) Ra ∈ Ra ↔ Ra ∈
/ Ra .
However, we know, at least in an informal way, that a cannot be maximal with respect
to the non-self-membered sets because the process of set formation is always churning
out new non-self-membered sets. Consequently, we are free to infer that Ra ∈
/ a.
Compare this conclusion and the role played by Separation in the attempt to derive
Russell’s paradox in ZF/NBG to the conclusion and the role played by FC∗ in the
attempt to derive Russell’s paradox in FSR. In that argument, it was the restriction
on quantification in FC∗ that licensed the conclusion that RD —the Russell extension
defined on D—lies outside the range of ∀D (pp. 119–120). In the present case, it is the
restriction to subsets in Separation that licenses the conclusion that Ra ∈
/ a. Indeed,
throughout both arguments, a and D play the same role: they limit a principle of set
existence (FC or Separation) by restricting the application of the items that define
sets (concepts in FC; predicates in Separation) to those sets in a or in D. It is the fact
that these entities are not all-inclusive, or maximal, that blocks the paradox. Notice,
however, that the restrictions imposed by Separation, like the restrictions imposed by
NBG10, are ontological, not quantificational in nature. Separation places restrictions
19

I retain use of capital ‘R’ for the Russell set for stylistic reasons.
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on which sets can be defined by predicates (only subsets); it does not place restrictions
on quantification over sets. As the preceding discussion of NBG10 makes clear, even
if Separation were expressed using restricted quantifiers (by restricting quantification
to the members of a given set), this restriction would only be the means of expressing
an ontological restriction.

6.2.4

Expressing the Iterative Conception: ZF vs. NBG

At the beginning of this section, I wrote that both ZF and NBG are said to express
the iterative conception. But NBG does more than this. Its class comprehension
schema (NBG10) reflects (a restriction of) the logical conception and the proper
classes whose existence is entailed by NBG10 cannot be attributed to any iterative
process of class formation. Thus, NBG is a sort of mixed theory, in which both
conceptions are at work: the existence axioms NBG2–NBG8 reflecting the iterative
conception (applying to all sets), while NBG10 reflects a limited version of the logical
conception (applying to all classes).
The addition of proper classes has some advantages. For one, it provides a theory
that can be finitely axiomatized.20 For another, it provides a more inclusive theory,
one whose domain includes the entire ZF universe as a single object (viz., the class
of all sets). Nevertheless, it is philosophically objectionable for two reasons. First,
the NBG axioms reflect two very different conceptions—NBG2–NBG10 reflect an
iterative conception of set, while NBG10 reflects a logical conception of class. This
causes the theory to be both overdetermined and disunified. The overlap between
‘set’ and ‘class’ means that the existence conditions for sets are overdetermined: once
by each conception. The non-overlap between ‘set’ and ‘proper class’ makes for a
20

It can be proved that NBG10 is equivalent to a small number of its instances, in which the
schematic φ is replaced by quantification over classes. Mendelson (1997) proves that NBG10 is
equivalent to seven of its instances, which he calls “axioms of class existence.” If the occurrence of
the schematic φ in Separation and Replacement is also replaced with quantification over classes, we
get a finite axiomatization of NBG (the nine ZF axioms plus the seven axioms of class existence).
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disjunctive, disunified account of ‘class’ as ‘either a set or a proper class’. John
Burgess (2008, 112) goes so far as to call the distinction between sets and proper
classes “mystifying”.
Second, the version of the logical conception of class that NBG10 reflects is a
restricted one according to which all predicative wffs determine classes of sets but
not classes of classes. Like the limitation of size doctrine (see 4.5.1), this restriction
appears to be arbitrary and ad hoc. If classes are really the extensions of (predicative)
predicates, then any proper classes that satisfy such a predicate should be among the
members of the class the predicate defines. (If, on the other hand, classes are not the
extensions of predicates, then what reason do we have to think that every predicate
determines the class of all the sets that satisfy it? In other words, what reason do
we have to think that NBG10 is true?) If NBG10 is true and the wff ‘x is a set’
determines the proper class whose members are all the sets, then shouldn’t the wff ‘x
is a class’ determine the proper class whose members are all the classes? How is it that
these formulas determine the same class? To answer that classes are the extensions
of predicates defined in terms of quantification over sets, but not over classes is to
impose an arbitrary and ad hoc restriction on the logical conception of class.
For these reasons, I conclude that ZF is philosophically on better footing than
NBG. But we’ve seen that NBG is really just ZF set theory plus NBG10; in other
words that the theory of sets expressed by the ZF axioms is common to ZF and
NBG. Henceforth, I will refer to this theory as ‘iterative set theory’. It is with the
set existence axioms of iterative set theory that I will be concerned for the remainder
of this chapter.

6.3

Motivating the set existence axioms

The claim that iterative set theory expresses the iterative conception is an interpretive one. The theory itself does not mention the process of set formation: it
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includes expressions for sets and the membership relation, not for stages or the operation of set formation. Consequently, the explanation offered on pp. 167–169 above for
why there can be no contradiction-inducing sets—viz., because (i) each of these sets
(if it exists) is self-membered and (ii) there can be no self-membered sets according
to SFS and ISE—cannot be applied to the theory directly. The immediate reason
why there can be no contradiction-inducing sets in iterative set theory is because
none of these sets can be derived from the existence axioms of iterative set theory.21
Alternative explanations that make explicit appeal to the process of set formation
(and principles such as SFS and ISE) are appropriate only if, and only insofar as, the
process of set formation motivates the existence axioms. Boolos (1998, chaps. 1 and
6) argues that this precess does motivate (nearly) every existence axiom of iterative
set theory. The notable exception is Replacement.22 In singling out replacement, he
is not alone. For example, Putnam (2000) writes:
Quite frankly, I see no intuitive basis at all for . . . the axiom of replacement. Better put, I do not see that a notion of set on which that axiom
is clearly true has ever been explained.
Boolos’s own position on Replacement follows from his conservatism on the axioms
of infinity for stages. In this section, I take issue with Boolos on two points: first, I
21

Self-membered sets are inconsistent with the axiom of Foundation (ZF9/NBG9), and therefore
it might be thought that it is the prohibition of this single axiom (ZF9/NBG9) and not the limited
reach of the seven existence axioms (ZF2/NBG2–ZF8/NBG8) that provides the immediate reason
why there can be no contradiction-inducing sets in iterative set theory. There is certainly a reading
of ‘immediate’ under which this is correct; however, note that Foundation’s prohibition is effective
only if it is not contravened by the existence axioms. Considered in isolation, Foundation can only
secure a disjunction: either there are no self-membered sets or iterative set theory is inconsistent.
The limited reach of the existence axioms is needed to rule out the second disjunct.
22

Boolos also argues that the axioms of Extensionality and Choice are not properly motivated
by the iterative conception. Extensionality is not properly motivated by the iterative conception
because it is analytic (given the meaning of ‘set’), or, if not analytic, then an obvious truth that is
largely independent of the iterative conception (1998, 27–28; 93–94). Choice cannot be motivated by
the iterative conception because it cannot be derived from the axioms of stage theory (1998, 28–29;
96–97). These are not exceptions to the claim that every existence axiom (but Replacement) can
be justified. Extensionality is not an existence axiom (6.2 p. 173). Choice is an addition to iterative
set theory (ZF + Choice yields ZFC; NBG + Choice yields NBGC).

182

argue for a “liberalized”23 version of the iterative conception, which licenses axioms
of infinity for stages that are strong enough to justify Replacement; second, I argue
that the iterative conception has difficulty making sense of the notion of a set with no
members and therefore has trouble justifying the axioms of Empty Set and Infinity,
which directly assert that ∅ exists, and Separation, which conditionally asserts that
∅ exists (it does if at least one set exists).
Before discussing these cases of disagreement, however, I will run through the
cases of agreement (Pairing, Union and Powerset). My strategy will be to attempt
to informally derive each axiom from the principles governing the iterative process of
set formation: Ax1–Ax3, together with the appropriate axiom(s) of infinity and the
principles SFS and ISE.

Pairing: For any sets a and b, Pairing asserts the existence of the set {a, b}. Because
the process of set formation is exhaustive and well-ordered, there are some stages s
and t at which a and b are first formed. Without loss of generality, let t be no earlier
than s. Instantiate ISE to a and b so that {a, b} exists iff there is a stage later than t.
By Ax2, t has a successor stage, t + 1, which is later than t. So the set {a, b} exists.

Union: For any set a, Union asserts the existence of the set of the members of
members of a. Because the process of set formation is exhaustive, there is a stage
t at which a is formed. Instantiate ISE to the members of members of a so that
{x|(∃y)(x ∈ y ∈ a)} exists iff there is a stage later than any stage at which any
x ∈ y ∈ a is first formed. Instantiate SFS to the stage t and the yy such that y ∈ a
(i.e., the yy such that (∀y)(y ≺ yy ↔ y ∈ a)). Since a is formed at t, it follows that
each y ∈ a is formed at a stage earlier than t. Given an arbitrary y0 ≺ yy, instantiate
23

The label comes from Paseau (2007, 33).
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SFS to the stage s0 at which y0 is first formed and the x0 x0 such that x0 ∈ y0 . Since
y0 is formed at s0 , it follows that each x0 ∈ y0 is formed at a stage earlier than s0
and therefore at a stage earlier than t. Generalizing, t is a stage later than any stage
S
at which any x ∈ y ∈ a is first formed. So the set {x|(∃y)(x ∈ y ∈ a)} = a exists.

Powerset: For any set a, Powerset asserts the existence of the set of all subsets of a.
Instantiate ISE to the members of a. Since a exists, there is a stage s later than any
stage at which any x ∈ a is first formed. Next, instantiate ISE to the subsets of a so
that {x|x ⊆ a} exists iff there is a stage later than any stage at which any x ⊆ a is
first formed. Let x0 be an arbitrary subset of a. Since x0 ’s members are members of
a, they are first formed at stages prior to s. So, by SFS, it follows that x0 is formed
at s. Since x0 is an arbitrary subset, every x ⊆ a is formed at s. By Ax2, s has
a successor stage, s + 1, which is later than s and therefore later than any stage at
which any x ⊆ a is first formed. So the set {x|x ⊆ a} = Pa exists.

Replacement: For any functional condition φ defined on a set a, Replacement asserts
the existence of the set y = {φ(x)|x ∈ a}. Alternatively, if ‘φ’s domain’ and ‘φ’s range’
are understood as referring directly to the objects in a and their values (not sets of
these), Replacement can be understood as saying that φ’s range forms a set if φ’s
domain does.24 The limitation of size doctrine provides a simple and straightforward
motivation for Replacement: the range of a functional condition can be no larger
than its domain and so the former forms a set if the latter does. However, this
motivation is objectionable in the present context, since considerations of size seem
to be independent of the iterative conception of set.
24

The domain and range of a function are typically defined as sets (see ch. 1), in which case ‘φ’s
range forms a set if φ’s domain does’ is trivially true.
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Replacement entails the existence of sets, which, according to the iterative conception can only be formed at various infinite stages beyond ω. So any successful
motivation of Replacement based on the iterative conception must show that all
these stages exist. One such set is {ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), . . . }, which can be derived
by applying Replacement to the condition F , defined on the set N of natural numbers
by the sequence:

• F (0) = ω
• F (1) = P(ω)
• F (2) = P(P(ω))
..
.
F is clearly functional and so Replacement asserts the existence of the set {F (n)|n ∈
N} = {ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), . . . }. Let ‘ω ∗ ’ name this set. Because each F (n) ∈ ω ∗ is
first formed at the stage ω + n, SFS tells us that ω ∗ is not formed before the stage
ω · 2. ISE then tells us that ω ∗ exists only if the stage ω · 2 exists. It follows that
Replacement is true only if the stage ω · 2 exists. If the axioms of infinity for stages
to which the iterative conception is committed are too weak to entail the existence
of this stage, they are too weak to motivate Replacement.
We’ve seen that Boolos accepts only the weakest axiom of infinity for stages (Ax4).
Since Ax4 is too weak to entail the existence of stage ω · 2, it is too weak to support
(this instance of) Replacement and so Boolos concludes that Replacement cannot
be motivated by the iterative conception. We’ve also seen (p. 163) that each of the
stages ω, ω · 2, ω · 3, . . . can be derived from the stronger axiom Ax4∗ . Under
such a strengthening of stage theory, the set {ω, P(ω), P(P(ω)), . . . } exists and the
instance of Replacement currently under discussion is true. But it is easy to come up
with other instances of Replacement that entail the existence of sets that can only be
formed at infinite stages beyond these.
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Let ω ∗∗ name the set {ω ∗ , P(ω ∗ ), P(P(ω ∗ )), . . . }. For the same reason that ω ∗
is not formed until stage ω · 2, ω ∗∗ is not formed until stage ω · 3. We can continue in
this way. Let ω ∗∗∗ name the set {ω ∗∗ , P(ω ∗∗ ), P(P(ω ∗∗ )), . . . }. ω ∗∗∗ is not formed
until stage ω · 4. And so on. Now, consider the sets ω, ω ∗ , ω ∗∗ , . . . and the condition
F ∗ , defined on N by:
• F ∗ (0) = ω
• F ∗ (1) = ω ∗
• F ∗ (2) = ω ∗∗
..
.
F ∗ is clearly functional. So the corresponding instance of Replacement asserts the
existence of the set {F ∗ (n)|n ∈ N} = {ω, ω ∗ , ω ∗∗ , . . . } By SFS, this set cannot be
formed before the stage ω 2 and so, by ISE, it exists only if the stage ω 2 exists. But
Ax4∗ does not entail the existence of this stage. So, unless we further strengthen the
stage theory by adding additional axioms of infinity, this instance of Replacement is
false.
The choice of which axioms of infinity to adopt is governed by how one thinks
about the iterative conception of set. It’s possible to distinguish two general approaches. According to the first, which we might call the sociological view, the iterative conception reflects actual beliefs about the set-theoretic hierarchy held by
practicing set theorists, philosophers of mathematics and their students. According
to the second, which we might call the rational idealization view, the iterative conception is a rational idealization based (to some extent) on these beliefs.25 For someone
who thinks of the iterative conception in the first way, there may be no compelling
reason to adopt a maximal axiom of infinity. Although set theorists, philosophers and
25

Paseau (2007, 36–40) makes a similar distinction between two types of justification (internal and
external) for the axioms of set theory. Very roughly put, an internalist justification for the axioms
is responsive to the actual beliefs of practitioners in a way that an externalist justification is not.
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students of set theory generally agree that the iterative hierarchy is infinite (consisting of infinitely many stages, or levels); there is no consensus on its precise height.
This is reflected in the fact that proofs requiring strong axioms of infinity explicitly
include the axioms as premises. Thus, a proof of ∆ from a strong axiom of infinity γ
would be written γ ` ∆. On the other hand, if we think of the iterative conception
in an idealized sense, the lack of actual consensus on the height of the iterative hierarchy is irrelevant and it is reasonable to adopt a maximally strong axiom of infinity
in order to avoid the problems of arbitrariness discussed earlier (pp. 163–165). This
“liberalization” of the iterative conception entails principles such as (B) or (Ref) from
which Replacement can easily be derived.
To derive Replacement from (B), assume for conditional proof that φ is functional
on an arbitrary set A:
(2.1) (∀z ∈ A)(∃!w)(φ(z) = w).
Define fA on A as the function that maps every z ∈ A to the stage s at which the set
φ(z) is first formed. Instantiate (B) to the set A and the function fA to get:
(2.2) (∃t)(∀z ∈ A)(t is later than any stage s = fA (z)).
(2.2) tells us that for every z ∈ A, the set φ(z) is formed prior to t. It therefore
follows by SFS that the set {φ(z)|z ∈ A} is formed at t. So {φ(z)|z ∈ A} exists.
Discharging our assumption,
(2.3) ((∀z ∈ A)(∃!w)(φ(z) = w)) → (∃y)(y = {φ(z)|z ∈ A}).
Since A is arbitrary, Replacement follows by generalization.
To derive Replacement from (Ref), we introduce the notation ‘At ’ to denote an
arbitrary set A that is formed prior to some stage t. (‘At ’ can stand for an arbitrary
set just as well as ‘A’ since every set is formed prior to some stage.) We then proceed
as before: assume for conditional proof that φ is functional on At :
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(3.1) (∀z ∈ At )(∃!w)(φ(z) = w))
Next, apply (Ref) to the monadic predicate ‘(∀z)(z ∈ x → (∃!w)(φ(z) = w))’ to get:
(3.2) (∀xt )[(∀z)(z ∈ x → (∃!w)(φ(z) = w)) → (∀z t )(z ∈ x → (∃!wt )(φ(z) = w))].
Instantiate (3.2) to At to get:
(3.3) (∀z)(z ∈ At → (∃!w)(φ(z) = w)) → (∀z t )(z ∈ At → (∃!wt )(φ(z) = w)).
By modus ponens:
(3.4) (∀z t )(z ∈ At → (∃!wt )(φ(z) = w)).
Since At is formed prior to t, it follows from (3.4) that for every z ∈ At , the set φ(z)
is formed prior to t. (The possibility that there is some z ∈ At which is not formed
prior to t is ruled out by SFS.) It then follows by SFS that the set {φ(z)|z ∈ At } is
formed at s. So {φ(z)|z ∈ At } exists. Discharging our assumption,
(3.5) ((∀z ∈ At )(∃!w)(φ(z) = w)) → (∃y)(y = {φ(z)|z ∈ At }).
Since At is arbitrary, Replacement follows by generalization.26

Empty Set: Empty Set asserts the existence of the set ∅. In 6.1, I described ∅ as
being formed at stage 0 from “the empty plurality.” This is the consequence of two
premises:
(4) At stage 0, all pluralities xx of previously formed sets are formed into sets of
the form {x|x ≺ xx}. (This is simply an instance of SFS.)
(5) The empty plurality, consisting of all and only the sets formed prior to stage 0,
is among the “all pluralities of previously formed sets” quantified over in (4).

26

This proof is suggested Paseau (2007, 33; f.n. 6).
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Together (4) and (5) entail that the empty plurality is formed into a (memberless)
set at stage 0. This set is ∅.
A very similar argument is endorsed by Penelope Maddy (1997, 42–43), who
describes the process of set formation as one according to which “at every stage, all
possible collections of things [sets] at previous stages are formed.” Since (presumably)
(a) “forming a collection” is equivalent to “forming a set” and (b) at any stage and
the maximal collection of all sets at previous stages is among “all possible collections
of sets at previous stages,” she infers that “at any stage, the set of all previouslyformed sets is formed.” Finally, since at stage 0, ‘all previously-formed sets’ refers to
the empty plurality (the plurality of no sets), Maddy concludes that at stage 0, the
set of all previously-formed sets is the set ∅:
At the first stage, the set of all previously-formed sets is the empty set.
It follows that ∅ is formed at stage 0.
Notice, however, that this conclusion follows from Maddy’s description of the process of set formation only if the empty plurality is a “possible collection” of things.
This calls for some explanation. The expression ‘possible collection’ involves a modal
term—‘possible’—along with a (grammatically) singular noun—‘collection’. The latter seems to be used (in a rather peculiar sense) to refer to pluralities of sets as protosets: a mere collection is a proto-set which “becomes” a set when it is “formed.” One
possible advantage of speaking this way is that it allows Maddy to avoid irreducible
(collective) plural quantification: in place of ‘the F s are formed into a set’, which
cannot be analyzed in terms of singular quantification as ‘every F is formed into a
set’, she can say ‘the collection of F s is formed (into a set)’, which can be analyzed
in terms of singular quantification as ‘the collection consisting of every F is formed
(into a set)’. Still, a question remains: if collections are pluralities of sets, is every
plurality of sets a collection? One might think that ‘collection’ is more demanding
than ‘plurality’ so that in order to qualify as ‘a collection’, a plurality must meet some
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additional condition, e.g., being definable by a distributive predicate, which might be
formulated as the condition: (∀x)(x ≺ xx ↔ F x). Given widely accepted limitations
of language, not all pluralities of objects from an infinite domain can be ‘collections’
in this restricted sense. This explains the need for the additional term ‘possible’,
which is used to make it clear that no such restriction is intended: intuitively, every
plurality of (previously-formed) sets is to count as a possible collection of sets.27
Under this interpretation, ‘possible collection’ is a singular replacement for plural
quantification and so Maddy’s statement that “at every stage, all possible collections
of things at previous stages are formed (into sets),” is equivalent to: “at every stage
all things at previous stages are formed into sets.” This is just the (right-to-left
direction of) SFS:
SFS← : (∀s)(∀xx)[({x|x ≺ xx} is formed at s) ← ((∀x)(x ≺ xx → x is formed at
some stage earlier than s))].
Maddy’s argument for the empty set then depends entirely on the assumption that
the empty plurality of all things formed prior to stage 0 is among the values of the
plural quantifier in SFS← , which is to say that her argument depends entirely on (5).
(5) is logically controversial since it requires a reading of SFS under which the
plural variables take empty values; and it is generally held that plural variables cannot
take empty values (Linnebo, 2014, 1.2). This standard view is typically enforced by
including an existential antecedent in the plural comprehension schema:
27

This interpretation of ‘possible collection’ is endorsed by Boolos (1998, 92), who uses the expression in his 1971 discussion of set formation. After describing Spec as an attempt to capture the
thought that “the sets formed at any stage are ‘all possible collections’ of sets formed at the stages
earlier than that one,” he asks: “What is the modal term “possible” doing?” He answers that it is
used to say what might be better expressed using plural quantification as (the right-to-left direction
of) ISE: “for any stage s and any sets (notice the plural) that have all been formed before s, there
is a set to which exactly those sets belong.”
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Plural Comprehension (∃x)(φ(x)) → (∃xx)(∀y)(y ≺ xx ↔ φ(y))
Read: there are some things that are all and only the φs if there is at least one
φ.
and possibly by adding an axiom stating that every plurality is non-empty
(6) (∀xx)(∃y)(y ≺ xx).
However, this does not settle the question, as it has been shown that plural logic can
also be formulated in a way that allows for empty pluralities (Boolos, 1998, 67–68).
The fundamental difference between this and the standard view comes down to a
difference between how we read the plural existential quantifier ∃xx. According to
the standard view, ∃xx is read as ‘there are one or more objects xx’. According to
the alternative view, ∃xx is read as ‘there are zero or more objects xx’. These two
readings are interdefinable.
If one wishes to keep (5) but also to avoid tinkering with plural logic, one might formulate the iterative conception in a way that avoids plural quantification altogether.
The basic idea here is to use schematic predicate variables in place of quantified plural
variables. We can easily derive the existence of ∅ from the following schematic variant
of ISE:
ISEφ (∃y)(y = {x|φ(x)}) ↔ (∃s)(∀x)(φ(x) → s is later than any stage at which x is
first formed).28
Substitute ‘x 6= x’ for φ to get:
(7.1) (∃y)(y = {x|x 6= x}) ↔ (∃s)(∀x)(x 6= x → s is later than any stage at which x
is first formed).

28

ISEφ is the result of replacing the quantified plural variable ‘xx’ in ISE with the schematic
predicate variable φ. The right-to-left direction is equivalent to Spec. Boolos (1998, 22) derives the
Empty Set axiom by substituting ‘x = x’ for φ in an equivalent reformulation of Spec.
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Every stage trivially satisfies the condition on the right side, so the left side
(7.2) (∃y)(y = {x|x 6= x})
follows by modus ponens.
However, even if we can so derive the existence of the empty set from the iterative conception, we face deeper, conceptual problems. According to the iterative
conception, sets are collections, and so the empty set is an empty collection. Yet, it is
doubtful whether the notion of an empty collection is coherent. For it seems evident
that
(8) Part of what it is to be a collection is to have some members.
Since, in this context at least, ‘some members’ cannot be empty, it follows that a
“collection of no things” is not a special type of collection—an “empty collection”—
rather, it is no collection at all. Consequently, under the iterative conception, there
cannot be an empty set; for according to this conception, the notion of an empty set
is simply the (incoherent) notion of an empty collection.
Nevertheless, the empty set is almost universally accepted today by set theorists
and those philosophers of mathematics who endorse the iterative conception of set.
Yet, I find it hard to believe that their acceptance of the empty set reflects a considered
rejection of (8). To deny (8) is to countenance collections of what there is not. Seventy
years ago, Quine taught us the error of countenancing things that are not; surely,
having taken this lesson to heart, we should also recognize the error of countenancing
collections of such things. But if (8) has not been so widely denied, then why has the
argument above been so ineffective?
One answer is historical. Many arguments against the empty set from the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were based on claims such as, “sets are mere
aggregates,” or “sets consist entirely of their members,” which appear to confuse sets
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with either mereological sums or pluralities. If either sort of confusion played an essential role in the historical arguments, it would not be unreasonable for philosophers
to ignore them today. A famous example is from Frege (1895, 212):
A class, in the sense in which we have so far used the word, consists of
objects; it is an aggregate, a collective unity, of them; if so, it must vanish
when these objects vanish. If we burn down all the trees of a wood, we
thereby burn down the wood. Thus there can be no empty class.
Context here is critical. This passage is taken from Frege’s own critical review of
Schröder’s logical treatise (Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik ). In that work,
Schröder had endorsed a pseudo-mereological view of classes as aggregates and had
also accepted the empty class. Frege is pointing out that these positions are inconsistent: there can be no aggregate of what is not. This argument is quite straightforward;
however, it is not so clear what is needed to provide a satisfactory response. Donald
Gillies (2011, 55) provides a typical gloss when he identifies the underlying problem
as a failure by Schröder to adequately distinguish the membership relation ∈ from the
subset relation ⊆ (a set can be thought of as the mereological sum of its subsets, but
not its members). This evaluation leads Gillies to sum up his discussion of Frege’s
argument as follows:
Once the distinction between ‘∈’ and ‘⊆’ had been clearly made (and this
was no easy task historically), then the difficulties concerned with the
empty set disappeared.
If Gillies is right, then Frege’s objection poses no threat to the iterative conception,
for surely the iterative conception invites no confusion between ∈ and ⊆. However,
I think that Gillies’s evaluation fails to register the full force of Frege’s point. To
see this, consider Frege’s example once more. According to the iterative conception,
classes are collections and so the class of trees that survive the fire is the collection of
trees that survive the fire. It is certainly true that we must be careful to distinguish
this collection from the mereological sum of surviving trees (as well as the plurality
of surviving trees); but merely making this distinction isn’t enough to ensure that
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the collection of surviving trees exists if no trees survive. Indeed, (8) provides us
with a good reason for thinking it does not. It is at least plausible, that collections,
while being distinct from sums (and pluralities), nevertheless share with these entities
a relation of dependence on their members (or parts) and that as a result, Frege’s
argument succeeds not only in establishing that there can be no empty sum or empty
plurality; but also that there can be no empty collection.
Russell (1903, ch. 6) presents a similar argument against the empty set; though,
unlike Frege, he seems sympathetic to the view of sets he targets. He begins by
observing that finite classes can be defined by simply enumerating their members.
Infinite classes, of course, are an exception, but Russell places little importance on
this, since he attributes our inability to define infinite classes by enumeration to
theoretically unimportant physical limitations, such as not having enough time. He
concludes (p. 67) that sets simply are their members:
Thus Brown and Jones are a class, and Brown singly is a class.
If classes are to be identified with their members, it follows that when there are no
members there is no class (as Frege observed). Thus, Russell (1903, 68) notes that a
consequence of his view is:
there is no such thing as the null-class, though there are null class-concepts.
(A null class-concept is a property with no instances, e.g., non-self-identity.)
Insofar as this argument seems to depend entirely on the identification of sets
with their members, it is bound to strike the contemporary reader as a non-starter.
But, as with Frege’s argument above, it would be overly hasty to simply dismiss the
argument at this point. The crux of Russell’s argument is the inference from no
members to no class; and while this inference certainly holds if classes are identical
to their members, it is not obvious that it holds only if classes are identical to their
members. It may be enough if classes are dependent on their members. Later, Russell
(1903, 74) expresses the objection in slightly different words:
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A class which has no terms fails to be anything at all: what is merely and
solely a collection of terms cannot subsist when all the terms have been
removed.
It’s unlikely that Russell meant to distinguish the claim that a class is ‘merely and
solely a collection’ of its members from his earlier identity claim; but it’s noteworthy
that his argument against the empty class seems to hold good if the former claim is
interpreted as the weaker dependence claim that classes are distinct from but wholly
dependent on their members. In other words, it’s possible to disentangle Russell’s
argument against the empty set from the identity claim that classes are their members.
The critical inference—from no members to no class—holds even if a class (collection)
is not identical to its members, provided that it is entirely dependent on them.
A second reason why the argument from (8) has been ineffective is that many
have viewed the identity of sets with collections as a mere metaphor, not a serious
claim about the nature of sets. Metaphors are only rough guides to truth, and are
bound to falter in at least some cases and in at least some respects. In this case,
the ‘sets are collections’ metaphor falters when it comes to the limiting case of the
empty set. But this is not evidence that the empty set is not really a set; it is merely
an unsurprising consequence of the fact that sets are not really collections. At the
beginning of this chapter, I distinguished two components of the iterative conception:
(a) the identification of sets with collections; (b) the iterative process of set formation.
The view that collection-talk is metaphorical suggests an alternate interpretation of
the iterative conception which maintains (b) but denies (a). According to this view,
sets are not really collections, but the iterative process of set formation either literally
describes or at least aptly models the real facts about set existence. An immediate
benefit is immunity from the preceding criticisms of the empty set based on (8). The
denial of (a), however, leaves a crucial question unanswered. If sets are not collections,
then what shall we say about the nature of sets? There are three possibilities:
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(9) Sets have a primitive nature and the notion of what it is to be a set cannot be
analyzed in terms of any other type of entity;
(10) Sets have a non-primitive nature and the notion of what it is to be a set can be
analyzed in terms of some type of entity (other than ‘collection’);
(11) Sets have no intrinsic nature.
(9), if true, would mark an end to certain explanations. In particular, if ‘set’ is a
primitive notion then it is hard to see what (non-pragmatic, non-external) reason we
could give for believing that (b) is either the literal truth or an apt model for the real
facts about set existence. Similarly, it is difficult to see how we could explain why
the sets that exist according to the iterative conception are all and only the sets that
there are. These things, it would seem, would just be primitive facts.
Sets have been likened to a number of entities other than collections, which may
lend some support to (10). To take one fairly well-known example, Dedekind (1897)
described sets as closed sacks, containing their elements. Arguably, it was in the
interest of making sense of the empty set that he did so.29 Sacks, unlike collections,
are not essentially non-empty, and so there is no argument against empty sacks that
parallels the argument from (8) against empty collections. However, Dedekind’s proposal invites new problems. One concerns the uniqueness of the empty set (Oliver
and Smiley, 2006, 137). Is there any reason why there can be only one empty sack?
A second problem is that relations between sacks and their elements are ill-suited to
the relations modeled by the process of set formation. A sack’s contents are in no
plausible sense “prior” to the sack (see 5.1.1). Such observations, of course, are symptoms of a more fundamental problem: Dedekind’s comparison is clearly intended as a
metaphor. Sacks are physical objects, after all! Other proposals: lassos, corrals, etc.,
29

Dedekind expressed this view in an 1897 conversation with Felix Bernstein, later published his
recollections of the conversation. See Ewald (2005, 836) for an English translation.
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are alike in this regard. Each may have its merits as a metaphor, but none provides
the slightest plausibility as a genuine proposal about the nature of sets. Of course,
it might be possible to abstract away from the physical characteristics of “sacks” so
as to formulate a more eligible candidate for a serious identity. The discussion of
“containerized” sets in Oliver and Smiley (2006, 138–140) is a good example.
(11) is the view favored by mathematical structuralists, who are much impressed
by the observation that for purposes of mathematics all that matters is structure. This
observation suggests that the singular terms in mathematics are properly treated as
general terms, referring indifferently to any ordinary (non-mathematical) objects that
exemplify the requisite mathematical structure. When we speak of “mathematical
objects” we refer to ordinary objects without attending to their intrinsic natures.30
Thus, “the sets” refers to any sufficiently numerous plurality of objects that exhibits
the right structural properties. In particular, whatever object (from this plurality) is
selected for the empty set must not bear the membership relation to any other object
(from the same plurality). This structuralist perspective is championed by David
Lewis (1991, 13):
We needn’t be ontologically serious about the null set. It is useful to have
a name that is guaranteed to denote some individual [=urelement], but
it needn’t be a special individual with a whiff of nothingness about it.
Ordinary individuals will suffice. In fact, any individual will do for the
null set—even Possum. Like any individual, he has the main qualification
for the job—memberlessness.
Since (11) is motivated by an independently popular view in the philosophy of mathematics, it is likely to be viewed more favorably than (9) and (10). One might then
wonder whether a new structuralist version of the iterative conception can be formed
30

By ‘structuralism’ I mean ‘eliminative structuralism’. According to the sort of non-eliminative
structuralism advocated by Michael Resnik (1997) and Stewart Shapiro (1997), mathematical objects
constitute a special ontological category of structural objects that serve as the unique referents of
mathematical expressions. I do not consider non-eliminative structuralism here, since it is highly
controversial whether it implies, or is even compatible with (11). See MacBride (2005), Shapiro
(2006) and Keränen (2006) for discussion.
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by joining (11) to (b). However, there is an immediate tension between structuralism
and (b). According to structuralism, an object is only considered to be a set relative
to the requisite set-theoretical structure. Consequently, it would seem to follow that
the existence of each set depends on the entire set-theoretic hierarchy (the entire
structure) and therefore on every set in the hierarchy. On the other hand, if sets
are formed in stages, as they are according to the iterative conception, then it would
seem that the only sets on which a particular set depends are its members. Perhaps
this tension between structuralism and the iterative conception can resolved. If not,
then we may have to choose between abandoning the iterative conception in order to
save the empty set or abandoning the empty set in the interests of saving the iterative
conception.
The latter strategy is pursued by Oliver and Smiley (2006, 2013). In lieu of an
empty set, they propose a domain of urelements and an axiom asserting the existence
of these urelements to replace the empty set axiom. Sets are then formed from this
base according to the iterative process. But there are two problems with this. The
first is that the existence of urelements appears to be contingent in a way in which
mathematics is not.31 A second problem arises from the possibility that there are so
many urelements that the assumption that they form a set leads to contradictions in
the iterative set theory that is built upon them. This is particularly problematic since
there does not appear to be anything in the iterative conception of set that would
prevent the formation of such a set or urelements (Lewis, 1986, 104).32

Separation: Like the axioms of Pairing, Union and Powerset, Separation can be
straightforwardly derived from SFS and ISE; however restrictions must be imposed in
31

Oliver and Smiley (2006, 151) bite the bullet here and conclude that set theory cannot provide
a foundation for mathematics.
32

Christopher Menzel (2014) considers several modifications to the axioms that would alleviate
this tension.
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order to prevent instances of Separation from entailing the existence of the empty set.
I will run through the derivation of Separation first and then will discuss restrictions.
For any set a, Separation asserts the existence of the (sub)set of all x ∈ a such
that φx. Because the process of set formation is exhaustive, a is formed at some stage
s. Instantiate ISE to the xx such that x ∈ a ∧ φ(x). It follows that {x|x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)}
exists iff there is a stage later than any stage at which any x such that x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)
is first formed. So {x|x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)} exists if there is a stage later than any stage at
which any x ∈ a is first formed. Instantiate SFS to the stage s and the members of
a. Since a is formed at s, s is later than any stage at which any x ∈ a is first formed.
So the set {x|x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)} exists.
If there is no empty set then Separation must be restricted. Otherwise, given the
existence of at least one set, a, and a predicate such as x 6= x that applies to no sets,
Separation asserts the existence of the (sub)set of all x ∈ a such that a 6= a, which is
the empty set. There are two ways to prevent this. The first imposes the usual restriction of plural variables to pluralities of one or more objects from the domain. Note
that in the derivation of Separation from ISE above, the problematic instances require
instantiating ISE to empty pluralities (e.g., the xx such that x ∈ a ∧ x 6= x). Banning
empty values for the plural variables is therefore one way to block the unwanted instances of Separation. Alternatively, one might restrict permissible substitutions for
φ to predicates that apply to at least one object in the domain.

Infinity: Infinity depends directly on the existence of ∅. Consequently, without the
Empty Set axiom, Infinity is false. However, it is possible to give a conditional
justification. And this is what I will do here. I will show that Infinity can be derived
from the iterative conception if ∅ exists.
Infinity asserts the existence of the set ω = {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, ...}. Given ∅, it
can be shown that ω exists by showing (i) how to derive its members by repeated

199

applications of Pairing and Union and then showing (ii) that there is a stage later
than all stages at which any of the sets derived in this way is first formed. (i) By
Pairing, every set x has a singleton, {x}, and any sets x, {x} form a pair set {x, {x}}.
S
By Union, the set: {x, {x}} = x ∪ {x} exists. If we replace x with ∅, repeated
applications of these axioms generate the countably infinite series:

• ∅
• {∅} = ∅ ∪ {∅}
• {∅, {∅}} = {∅} ∪ {{∅}}
• {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}} = {∅, {∅}} ∪ {{∅, {∅}}}
..
.
(ii) Since Each set in this series is formed at a finite stage. We know that if x is
formed at a finite stage s, then x ∪ {x} is formed at the next finite stage s + 1. If ∅ is
formed at stage 0, then each of these sets will be formed at a finite stage. Instantiate
ISE to all sets in this series so that ω exists iff there is a stage later than any stage at
which any of these sets is first formed. By Ax4, there is such a stage, viz., the infinite
stage ω. So the set {∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, ...} = ω exists.

6.4

Accounts of Priority

In this section, I discuss three accounts of the priority relation between sets and
their members (6.1.1): (i) a constructivist account, according to which SFS and ISE
are (more or less) literally true; (ii) a modal account, according to which SFS and ISE
are metaphorical for the fact that sets are merely potential relative to their members;
(iii) a dependence account, according to which SFS and ISE are metaphorical for the
fact that sets ontologically depend on their members (and on nothing else).
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6.4.1

The constructivist account of priority

The constructivist account of priority may be motivated by Cantor’s (1895, 481)
definition of set (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) as “a collection into a whole
of definite distinct objects of our intuition or of our thought.” The identification of
sets with collections whose members are objects “of our intuition or of our thought,”
suggests a mental process according to which new sets are formed by acts of mentally
conceiving, or collecting, previously formed sets. This, in turn, suggests a temporal
interpretation of the stages of set formation, according to which the priority of members to their set is to be understood as the temporal priority of mental construction:
the members must be temporally available as objects of intuition or thought before
it is possible to mentally collect them. If in addition, it is possible to mentally collect
any elements that are temporally available, it follows that any available elements
form a set. Availability may then be understood as equivalent to existence at a stage
in the process of set formation. There are a number of objections that have been
raised against this view.
The first concerns the empty set. It is based on the thought that if sets are
formed by acts of collecting their members, then the act of collecting nothing ought
to result in the failure to form any set at all, not in the formation of the empty set.
Consequently, if we wish to maintain the coherence of an empty set, we must reject
constructivism (Black, 1971, 618–622). In reply, it might be noted that all versions
of the iterative conception identify sets with collections and are therefore subject
to the original objection against the empty set based on (8) above. As a result, the
relative force of this objection as an argument against constructivism in particular (as
compared to other more realist interpretations of the iterative conception) is unclear.
The second objection concerns time. Since (presumably) mental acts take place
in time, constructivism has the implication that the existence of infinite sets (at least,
sets, such as ω, of infinite rank) depends on the existence of infinite sequences of tem-
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porally ordered mental acts. This is problematic for two reasons. First, it is doubtful
whether such sequences are possible for finite creatures, and so constructivism may
be committed to immortal minds. Second, even granting the existence of immortal
minds, time itself may not be long enough for the construction of sets larger than the
continuum.
Instead of an actual sequence of mental acts, the constructivist might try understanding set formation in terms of a more abstract, idealized possibility of mentally
collecting (Wang, 1974). She might then reason as follows. Assume that ∅ is formed.
Then it’s possible to mentally collect ∅. So {∅} is formed. Then it’s possible to mentally collect ∅ and {∅} (individually and jointly). So {{∅}} and {∅, {∅}} are formed.
And so on. Since none of these possible acts need to be understood as actually occurring in time, there is no longer any reason to doubt the existence of sets that can
only be formed after continuum-many steps.
However, this notion is quite obscure. Given the availability of a countable infinity
of sets, e.g., the countable sequence ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, . . . , is it possible to mentally
collect them in the relevant idealized sense, thereby forming an infinite set? What if
we are given an uncountable infinity of sets? Is it possible to mentally collect these,
thereby forming an uncountably infinite set? Wang (1974) answers that it is possible
in both cases; but it seems more likely that his answer is guided by prior commitments
to standard set theory than by an independent grasp of what it is possible to mentally
collect. It is of little help when he equates the ability to collect the sets falling under
a concept with the ability to “look through” or “run through” them “in an idealized
sense, . . . in such a way that there are no surprises as to the objects which fall under
the concept” (1974, 531).
Individual axioms of set theory raise additional questions. The axiom of Separation states that given a set, x, any set-theoretic predicate φ defines the subset
y = {z|z ∈ x ∧ φ(z)}. Moreover, Separation is true, according to the constructivist,
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only if it is possible to mentally collect the members of each of these subsets. Is it?
What if φ involves quantification over all sets? Must it then be possible to mentally
“look through” or “run through” every set in order to determine which sets belong to
y? In order to answer this, the constructivist must clarify her notion of an idealized
(possible) act of mentally collecting available elements. The prospects of doing so are
dim.

6.4.2

The modal account of priority

Modal accounts of the priority relation are presented by Parsons (1983, chaps. 10,
11), Linnebo (2010, 2013) and Studd (2013). The goal of these accounts is, in Parsons’s words, to maintain the idea that “any available objects can be formed into a
set” but “to replace the language of time and activity by the more bloodless language
of potentiality and actuality” (1983, 293). More specifically, talk of an infinite process
of set formation in stages is to be treated as a metaphor for the underlying modal
facts: a potential hierarchy of sets in which each set “is an immediate possibility
given its elements” (1983, 294). Linnebo describes the modal account similarly, as
one “based on the idea that the hierarchy of sets is a potential one, not a completed
or actual one” in which “the existence of a set is potential relative to its elements”
(2010, 155). And Studd writes that the tensed language used to characterize the iterative conception of set is to be taken “seriously,” but not “literally” (as describing
an actual, temporal process of set construction); rather, the tense is to be “replaced
with suitable modal operators governed by a tense-like logic” in which the potential nature of sets is expressed by the thesis that “any sets can form a set” (2013,
699–700). (This thesis may appear stronger than Parsons’s qualified claim that any
available objects can be formed into a set. However, a similar qualification is built
into the modal context in which Studd’s statement applies so that the occurrence of
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‘any sets’ in this context has the force of ‘any actual sets’ outside of it.) In what
follows, I shall refer to this as “the core thesis” of the modal account.33
In order to properly characterize the potential nature of sets, and to properly
formulate the core thesis, we need a suitable modal logic. Recall that according to
the iterative process of set formation—which will serve as our intuitive guide for the
underlying modal facts—(a) new sets are formed at every stage and (b) sets, once
formed at a stage s, are formed at every later stage t. (a) and (b) can be represented
in a modal logic by an ordering on possible worlds (of sets) under the relation >,
where wj > wi iff wj ’s domain is a proper expansion of wi ’s domain. Intuitively, the
sets that exist at wj are (b) all the sets that have been formed at previous stages
and which therefore exist at every preceding world wi , as well as (a) any (new) sets
that can be formed out of these. This ordering is captured by a directed, S4 logic, in
which the accessibility relation is defined as ≥ (a relation that is transitive, reflexive,
and anti-symmetric).34
The greatest challenge for the modal account is explicating the relevant notions of
possibility and necessity. Linnebo represents these by means of the standard modal
operators  and ♦, which are semantically modeled by quantification over possible
worlds in the usual way:
• φ is true at w iff φ is true at every w-accessible world.
• ♦φ is true at w iff φ is true at some w-accessible world.
33

Studd (2013, 699) calls it “the maximality thesis.” Linnebo (2010, 157) refers to it as
“Collapse♦ ”: a modal interpretation of the inconsistent “Collapse” principle, according to which
any things do form a set. Parsons (1983, 280–297) traces this back to the claim, which he attributes
to Cantor (1899), that any “consistent multiplicity” can form a set. That any sets can form a set
is also a consequence of Kit Fine’s (2006a; 2006b) modal formulation of restrictivism, according to
which any mathematical domain can be “expanded” by appropriate procedural postulates.
34

In the interests of deriving a modal set theory, Linnebo strengthens this logic to S4.2, in which
accessibility is also convergent. (Accessibility between worlds is convergent if whenever a world w1
accesses worlds w2 and w3 , there is a world, w4 , that w2 and w3 both access.) Studd strengthens
the logic to S4.3, in which accessibility is also connected. (Accessibility between worlds is connected
if for any distinct worlds w1 and w2 , either w1 accesses w2 or w2 accesses w1 .)
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In the interests of deriving the well-foundedness of sets, Studd complicates things
slightly by employing a “bi-modal” logic, in which  is replaced by a pair of operators: the (strictly) forwards looking operator > and the (strictly) backwards looking
operator < . Similarly, ♦ is replaced by the (strictly) forwards looking operator ♦>
and the (strictly) backwards looking operator ♦< . These four operators can be semantically modeled analogously to  and ♦ as follows:
• > φ is true at w iff φ is true at every w-accessible world (other than w).
• < φ is true at w iff φ is true at every world that accesses w (other than w).
• ♦> φ is true at w iff φ is true at some w-accessible world (other than w).
• ♦< φ is true at w iff φ is true at some world that accesses w (other than w).
Using these operators in a suitable S4 modal logic, it’s possible to formulate the
core thesis that any sets can form a set in several ways: (i) as a single formula in
a second-order language (Parsons); (ii) schematically in a singular, first-order language (Parsons and Studd); (iii) as a single formula in a plural, first-order language
(Linnebo). I will briefly discuss each in turn.
(i): In ch. 4., I presented Parsons’s second-order formulation of the core thesis as
FC♦ (∀F )♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ F x).
Intuitively, FC♦ says that (necessarily) any property F determines the possible existence of the set of all F s. To avoid paradox, ‘all F s’ must be read in such a way that
it refers to all the F s there actually are (at w), not to all the F s that there would be
(at w) if these F s formed a set. Parsons enforces such a reading by “fully rigidifying”
properties relative to worlds, as I showed (pp. 123–124).
(ii): The idea that (necessarily) any formula φ determines the possible existence
of the set of all φs is naturally formalized as (the necessitation of):
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(12) ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x)).
If φ is rigid, or as Studd calls it “modally invariant” (INV[φ]), so that at any stage in
the process of set formation, everything is necessarily φ or necessarily not φ, this idea
may be strengthened to the idea that any formula φ determines the possible existence
of the set of all the φs there could possibly be. This is naturally formalized as:
(13) ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x)).
Unfortunately, both (12) and (13) are false. Under a substitution of ‘x ∈
/ x’ for φ, they
each imply the possible existence of the Russell set R from which the contradiction
R∈R∧R∈
/ R is derivable. Additional contradictions arise under substitutions of
the formulas that define the sets: U , V , VP , O and K.
In an effort to diagnose the problem, Studd notes that these contradiction-inducing
formulas share a property, which is intuitively characterized by the observation that
at every stage, φ defines new sets that do not exist at earlier stages. Studd dubs this
property “indefinite extensibility” which he formally defines as follows:
• A formula φ(x) is extensible (EXTx [φ(x)]) =df. φ(x) is satisfied by sets that are
merely possible (intuitively, they will be formed only at a later stage)
• A formula φ(x) is indefinitely extensible (EXTx [φ(x)]) =df. φ(x) is necessarily
extensible (intuitively, φ(x) is extensible at every stage).35
He proceeds to modify (13) by restricting φ to those formulas that are not only
invariant but also not indefinitely extensible. He dubs the modification “Max” for
the core thesis (which he calls “the maximality thesis”) that any sets can form a set.
Max INV[φ] ∧ ¬EXTx [φ(x)] → ♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ φ(x)).36
35

See 1.4.3 and 3.1 for discussion of indefinite extensibility.

36

In the context of a modal set theory, statements of the form ‘x = y’ and ‘x ∈ y’ are only true if
both x and y actually exist. In order to avoid treating instances of such statements in the language
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Intuitively, the restriction to formulas that are not indefinitely extensible means
that any sets that might be determined by such formulas, such as (all) the non-selfmembered sets, are excluded from consideration: how then can Studd maintain that
Max captures the core thesis that any things can form a set? His answer (p. 699) is
that the proper interpretation of ‘any sets’ in the context of the iterative conception
of set is ‘any sets formed at some stage in the iterative process’.
No matter how far we’ve proceeded up the hierarchy, the sets formed so
far are all the sets there are: (otherwise) unrestricted quantification over
sets ranges only over the ones formed so far.
Isn’t this a type of restrictivism? The answer depends on perspective. From a nonmodal perspective, according to which absolutely all sets are actual, Studd’s “proper
interpretation” imposes a quantificational restriction under which ‘any sets’ is understood as ranging over only those sets that are formed at some stage. However, from
the modal perspective, according to which the set-theoretic hierarchy is potential,
Studd’s “proper interpretation” does not impose a quantificational restriction. The
fact that ‘any sets’ cannot take certain pluralities as its value—such as absolutely all
the sets, i.e., all the sets that will ever be formed—is simply due to the modal fact
that for any indefinitely extensible formula φ, there is no point at which the plurality
of all φs is actual.
(iii): Linnebo formulates the core thesis in a plural, first-order modal logic as:
FPC♦ (∀zz)♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ≺ zz).
FPC♦ is a modalized version of the inconsistent full plural comprehension principle:
FPC (∀zz)(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ x ≺ zz)37

of standard set theory as being contingent (true or false depending on the stage at which they are
evaluated), Studd translates them into the language of modal set theory by adding a ♦ operator out
front: ♦(x = y) and ♦(x ∈ y). Taking this into account, his official statement of Max, is: INV[φ] ∧
¬EXTx [φ(x)] → ♦(∃y)(∀x)(♦(x ∈ y) ↔ φ(x)).
37

FPC is the pluralization of FC (i.e., the result of replacing the quantification over properties
in FC with plural quantification over objects). It is not surprising, therefore, that FPC leads to
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and a “pluralization” of FC♦ :
FC♦ (∀F )♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ↔ F x).
Like FC♦ , FPC♦ involves quantification into the scope of the modal operator ♦
(though in this case the quantification is plural, not second-order). To avoid paradox,
the plural variables must be “fully rigidified” so that they refer to the same things
both inside and outside the scope of this operator (like the property variables in FC♦ ).
The definition of full rigidity for plurals is analogous to Parsons’s definition of full
rigidity for properties.
• The xx are rigidified relative to a world w =df. anything that is among the xx
at w is necessarily among the xx and anything that is not among the xx at w
is necessarily not among the xx.
• The xx are fully rigidified relative to a world w =df. (i) the xx are rigidified
relative to w and (ii) the xx at w are all the possible xx.38
FPC♦ is consistent if the zz are (fully) rigidified relative to the world w to which
the outermost  in FPC♦ is instantiated. The result is that the occurrence of ‘zz’
in ‘x ≺ zz’ is read as falling outside the scope of ♦. This blocks the derivation of
Russell’s paradox when ‘∀zz’ is instantiated to the non-self-membered sets (at w).

Russell’s paradox when ∀zz is instantiated to the non-self-membered sets. The derivation, which
requires the plural comprehension principle (p. 191), parallels the derivation of Russell’s paradox
from FC presented in chapter 4. See Linnebo (2010, 146–147) for a clear presentation.
38

Conditions (i) and (ii) correspond to Studd’s notions of invariance and (the denial of) extensibility. Linnebo (2013, 211) uses the terms “stability” and “inextensibility” and shows that each can
be expressed formally in the language of plural modal logic. The modal “stability” principles for
pluralities are:
Nec≺ x ≺ xx → (x ≺ xx)
Nec⊀ x ⊀ xx → (x ⊀ xx)
Inextensibility for pluralities is expressed by “relativizing” the Barcan formula, which guarantees
that the domains of accessible worlds contain no additional objects, to the condition x ≺ xx:
BF≺ ∀x(x ≺ xx → φ) → ∀x(x ≺ xx → φ).
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Instead of referring to the non-self-membered sets that exist at the world v to which ♦
is instantiated, the occurrence of ‘zz’ in ‘x ≺ zz’ now refers to the non-self-membered
sets that exist at w.
As with Studd’s restriction to formulas that are not indefinitely extensible, Linnebo’s rigidification of the plural variables excludes any “contradiction-inducing pluralities” from consideration. Like Studd, Linnebo argues that this is justified by the
potential character of the set-theoretic hierarchy. He acknowledges that this has the
unintuitive result that, for example, we cannot refer plurally to absolutely all the sets;
however, such limitations are not quantificational in nature; rather, they are necessary consequences of the modal fact that certain pluralities are never actual. Thus,
Linnebo (2010, 159–160) writes that “you cannot lose something you never had.” He
goes on to explain:
A plurality consists of a fixed range of objects, but the set-theoretic hierarchy is inherently potential and thus resists being summed up by a fixed
range of objects.

6.4.2.1

Modal set theory

The core thesis, together with supplemental modal principles, provides the basis
for a modalized version of iterative set theory (MST) in which all quantified formulas
of ordinary iterative set theory are rewritten according to the translation scheme:
• (∀x)φ(x) 7−→ (∀x)φ(x)
• (∃x)φ(x) 7−→ ♦(∃x)φ(x).39
When φ is a predicate satisfied by every set in the language of standard set theory, the
modal theorist will say that φ is necessarily satisfied by every set in the language of
modal set theory, i.e., φ is satisfied by every set at every stage. Intuitively, this allows
39

Putnam (1979, 56–59) may have been the first to suggest this strategy. See also Hellman (1989,
65–79).
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the modal theorist to make general claims about “all sets” without presupposing their
actual existence.
Of particular interest are the modal translations of the iterative existence axioms:
Empty Set♦

♦(∃y)(∀x)(x ∈
/ y)

Pairing♦

(∀x)(∀z)♦(∃y)(y = {x, z})

Union♦

(∀x)♦(∃y)(∀z)(z ∈ y ↔ ♦∃w(w ∈ x ∧ z ∈ w))

Power Set♦
Infinity♦

(∀x)♦(∃y)(∀z)(z ∈ y ↔ z ⊆ x)
♦(∃y)(∅ ∈ y ∧ (∀x)(x ∈ y → x ∪ {x} ∈ y))

Separation♦

(∀x)♦(∃y)(∀z(z ∈ y ↔ z ∈ x ∧ φz))

Replacement♦

(∀x)[(∀z ∈ x)♦(∃!w)(φ(z) = w) →
♦(∃y)(∀w)(w ∈ y ↔ ♦(∃z ∈ x)(φ(z) = w))]

The project of deriving these axioms from the core thesis, supplemented with additional axioms that express the iterative conception of set in the modal context
parallels the project described in 6.3 of deriving the existence axioms of (non-modal)
iterative set theory from axioms that express the iterative conception in a non-modal
context (Ax1–Ax4, SFS, ISE). Following upon earlier work by Parsons, Linnebo and
Studd execute this project with great technical skill.40 However, the significance of
40

Linnebo adds four axioms: the first two are (the necessitation of) the ordinary axioms of Extensionality and Foundation:
(Ext) (∀x)(∀y)[(∀z)(z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y]
(F) (∀x)(x 6= ∅ → (∃y)(y ∈ x ∧ y ∩ x = ∅)).
The second two exploit the full rigidity of plurals to express the full rigidity—or, as he calls it,
“extensional definiteness”—of membership and subsethood:
ED-∈ (∀x)(∃yy)(∀z)(z ≺ yy ↔ z ∈ x)
ED-⊆ (∀x)(∃yy)(∀z)(z ≺ yy ↔ z ⊆ x).
Intuitively (ED-∈) says that any set x has the same members at any world in which it exists and
(ED-⊆) says that any set x has the same subsets at any world in which it exists. From these, together
with FPC♦ , Linnebo is able to derive all the axioms above except Infinity♦ and Replacement♦ . To
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their achievement rests in large part upon the prior question of the intelligibility of
the modal notions in play. To this question, I now turn.
6.4.2.2

Understanding the modal operators

Insofar as we think of worlds as stages of set formation and of the modal operators as quantifiers over worlds, we may be inclined to define the latter in terms of
quantification over the stages of set formation as follows:
D1. φ is true at stage s =df. φ is true at s and at every later stage t.
D2. ♦φ is true at stage s =df. φ is true at some later stage t.
Clearly, these definitions are inadequate for the modal theorist. His hope is to use
modality to provide a non-constructivist interpretation of the priority relation. This
is impossible if the modal operators he employs are defined in terms of the stages
in a constructivist process. Of course, D1 and D2 do not offer an analysis of stages
(constructivist or not) and so they are compatible with a non-constructivist analysis
of stage theory. But, at best, what this shows is that D1 and D2 do not go far enough.
The modal theorist might replace quantification over stages in D1 and D2 with a
tensed language and use this to define the modal operators as temporal operators as
follows:
D3. φ is true (now) =df. φ is true (now) and will remain true, no matter how many
sets are formed.
D4. ♦φ is true (now) =df. φ will become true when enough sets have been formed.
derive Infinity♦ , he adds a limitation of size principle for pluralities. To derive Replacement♦ , he
adds a modal variant of (Ref).
Studd adds three axioms: a modalization of the axiom of Extensionality (intuitively: sets are
identical if they have the same members at all stages) and axioms of Priority (intuitively: any set
formed at a stage has its members formed at earlier stages) and Plentitude (intuitively: any sets
ever formed will form a set at every later stage). From these, together with Max, Studd is able to
derive all the axioms above except Infinity♦ and Replacement♦ . To derive these, he adds a modal
variant of (Ref) (which is stronger than Linnebo’s).
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But this does not help. Rather than replacing “the language of time and activity”
with “the language of potentiality and actuality,” D3 and D4 proceed in the opposite
direction, reducing “the language of potentiality and actuality” to “the language of
time and activity”.
The modal theorist might seek to preserve whatever insight D1–D2, or D3–D4,
provide, by “downgrading” them from official definitions to unofficial glosses. Both
Linnebo and Studd are attracted by this idea. For example, while Linnebo (2010,
155) acknowledges that “officially” the modal operators are “new primitives governed
only by a modal logic” he suggests that—“for heuristic purposes”—‘φ’ may be read
as: “no matter what sets we go on to form it will remain the case that φ,” and ‘♦φ’
may be read as “it is possible to go on to form sets so as to make it the case that φ.”
Studd (2013, 701) suggests a similar unofficial reading of ‘> φ’ and ‘< φ’ as: “it will
be the case at every later stage that φ” and “it was the case at every earlier stage
that φ”. (Under the obvious extension to ♦> and ♦> , ‘♦> φ’ is unofficially read as
‘it will be the case at some later stage that φ’ and ‘♦< φ’ as ‘it was the case at some
earlier stage that φ’.)
Such paraphrases mislead in certain cases. Consider the (non-modal) statement
‘no sets include every set’, which may be expressed in a plural first-order language
as:
(14) (∀xx)(∃y)(y ⊀ xx).
Following Linnebo, let φ♦ denote the result of applying the modal translation scheme
to the non-modal formula φ of (plural) iterative set theory. The modal translation of
(14) is:
(14)♦ (∀xx)♦(∃y)(y ⊀ xx).
Applying Linnebo’s paraphrase, this may be expressed as: ‘no matter what sets we
go on to form, it will remain the case that, for any sets xx, it is possible to go on
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to form a set y such that y ⊀ xx’. The original sentence (14) is false in standard
iterative set theory, since the open formula ‘(∃y)(y ⊀ xx)’ is not satisfied when ‘xx’
is assigned to all the sets. But (14)♦ is true in the corresponding modal set theory,
in which FPC♦ holds (and so, intuitively, it’s always possible to form new sets).41
How serious an objection is this? It might be noted that (14) involves plural
quantification, and consequently, even if it provides grounds for questioning Linnebo’s
gloss on modal operators, which is intended as a bridge between non-modal and modal
formulations of set theory in a plural language, it does not apply to Studd’s gloss on
the modal operators, which is limited to singular formulations of set theory. On the
other hand, it is now well known that iterative set theory can be formalized in a firstorder plural language in which the use of schematic variables is replaced by plural
quantification. Doing so has a number of advantages and has been subsequently
adopted by a number of philosophers of set theory.42 Consequently, I maintain that
it would be unacceptably arbitrary to adopt a modal interpretation of singular set
theory and refuse to extend this to plural set theory. Studd cannot evade the objection
by simply ignoring plural set theory.
Instead of explicating the operators by means of an official definition or an unofficial paraphrase, we might attempt to describe the intended modality more directly.
For starters, we should note that this modality cannot be metaphysical. It is a
widely held belief that mathematical objects are either metaphysically necessary or
metaphysically impossible, and consequently that there is no middle ground which
would allow for any sets to be metaphysically possible, but not metaphysically ac41

Note that the same result holds if we replace (14)♦ with its interpretation under a standard
semantic model. The interpretation of (14)♦ (at a world w0 ) may be expressed as: ‘for any (w0 accessible) world w, for any xx in w, there is a (w-accessible) world v at which there exists a set
y such that y ⊀ xx’. The interpretation of (14)♦ is true since every world (in the model) accesses
worlds containing additional sets.
42

These include Lewis (1991), Uzquiano (2003), Burgess (2008), Linnebo (2010, 2013) and Oliver
and Smiley (2013).
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tual. Without such a middle ground, FPC♦ leads to contradictions. To see this, it
suffices to note that relative to any sets, xx, considered to be actual, FPC♦ asserts
the possible existence of their universal set Uxx . If Uxx ’s possible existence implies
its actual existence, then when xx are all sets considered to be actual, FPC♦ entails
the actual existence of Uxx , which in this context is the (actual) universal set. This
leads to familiar derivations of Cantor’s and Russell’s paradoxes. (Cantor’s paradox
is derived by considering Uxx ’s subsets, which must paradoxically be more numerous
than Uxx ’s members; Russell’s paradox is derived by substituting ‘x ∈
/ x’ for ‘φ’ in
the Separation schema.) To restore consistency, we must understand ♦ in a way in
which sets are (merely) possible relative to their elements. Doing so requires a special
non-metaphysical modality.
A number of proposals have been made. Studd (2013, 706) suggests a linguistic
modality, according to which the possible existence of a set relative to its members is
to be understood in terms of a possible expansion of the set-theoretic vocabulary.43
Since, under the intended interpretation, the set-theoretic vocabulary can always be
expanded to accommodate new sets, there can be no interpretation of ‘set’ that is absolutely unrestricted and therefore the linguistic interpretation amounts to a form of
modal restrictivism. This makes it unhelpful in the present context, in which discussion of the iterative conception, and hence the priority relation, is driven primarily by
the goal of providing an absolutist reply to the set-theoretic paradoxes. Such a reply
must provide an explanation for why the paradoxes are blocked that is not based on
the premise that quantification over sets is restricted.
Linnebo (2010, 158) writes that he favors understanding the modalities in terms
of a process of “individuating mathematical objects.” He describes this process as
follows:
43

See also Williamson (1998).
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To individuate a mathematical object is to provide it with clear and determinate identity conditions. This is done in a stepwise manner, where
at any stage we can make use of any objects already individuated in our
attempts to individuate further objects.
I find this description to be rather puzzling. Is the individuation of mathematical
objects something that we do? If so, then the modal account under Linnebo’s interpretation would appear to devolve into a constructivist account, according to which
sets are formed (or individuated) by some sort of mental activity. On the other hand,
if the individuation of mathematical objects is not something that we do, then how
might it be understood?
Simon Hewitt (2015, 325) writes that Linnebo’s process of individuating mathematical objects should be understood in terms of possible extensions of a language.
What is meant by ‘individuation’ ? Just this: I can individuate an x such
that φ(x) iff there is a possible extension of my language such that there
is a singular term ‘a’ such that ‘φ(a)’ is true.
Whatever its merits, Hewitt’s interpretation reverts to the linguistic model for modality suggested by Studd, and we’ve already seen the inadequacy of this in the present
context.
Alternatively, one might seek to understand the notion of individuation in a more
robust, extra-linguistic sense, in terms of the metaphysical relation of grounding or
dependence.44
Let’s grant for the sake of argument that these metaphysical relations provide
a viable account of the priority relation. The question is whether this should be
considered as an interpretation of the modal account of the priority relation. I think
the answer must be no. The modal profile of dependence (or grounding) does not

44

In other writing, Linnebo expresses skepticism about such an approach. See Linnebo (2009,
222).
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fit that of the modalities required by the modal account.45 This is evidenced by the
fact that in saying that one thing depends on some other things, or that one thing’s
identity is grounded in the identity of some other things, we are not generally taken
to imply that the one thing is in any sense merely possible relative to these others.
Thus, one would not be accused of inconsistency if he said both (a) that Socrates’s
singleton depends on Socrates and (b) that Socrates’s singleton must actually exist if
Socrates does; but one would likely be so accused if instead of (a) he said (a*) that
Socrates’s singleton is merely possible relative to Socrates.46 I conclude that while
it may be possible to provide a metaphysical account of the priority relation, this is
best viewed as a non-modal alternative to the modal account of priority. I discuss
this alternative in the next section.
In related work on the question of unrestricted quantification in mathematics, Fine
(2006a,b) recommends a special “postulational” mathematical modality according to
which the possible existence of a set relative to its members is to be understood in
terms of a rule, or “procedural postulate”, for introducing it. An instance of such a
rule is the procedural postulate
(15) Introduce the set of all sets (in the domain D).
Fine shows how (15) forces the expansion of D by introducing a universal set that
(on pain of paradox) falls outside D. In Fine’s terms, this universal set is a (mere)
postulational possibility relative to D.
In his (2013), Linnebo also advocates for a special mathematical modality. He
likens this to the modality employed in the historical distinction between the notions
of potential and actual infinity. He goes on to remark (207–208):

45

In speaking of “the modal profile” of dependence, I do not mean to suggest that dependence
can be given a modal analysis.
46

For a modal set theory that seeks to capture the metaphysical modality expressed by claims
such as (b), see Fine (1981).
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This modality is tied to a process of building up larger and larger domains
of mathematical objects. A claim is possible in this sense, if it can be made
to hold by a permissible extension of the mathematical ontology; and it
is necessary if it holds under any permissible such extension.
(Notice that here he does not speak about individuating objects but of extending
mathematical ontology.)
For both Fine and Linnebo, the intelligibility of mathematical modality appears to
be tied to the ability to understand a particular process (for Fine, this is the process
by which new sets are postulated; for Linnebo it is the process by which mathematical
domains are extended). Taken literally, these views are constructivist. However, any
constructivist process effects a change in the world and Fine, at least, denies that
postulation has this consequence. By postulating objects, we do not change the
world; rather we change which world is under consideration. Fine explains:
On the present view, there is no such thing as the ontology, one that is
privileged as genuinely being the sum-total of what there is. There are
merely many different ontologies, all of which have the same right (or
perhaps we should say no right) to be regarded as the sum-total of what
there is.
This explanation is troubling insofar as it seems to involve a form of ontological
relativism, according to which there are multiple (mathematical) ontologies and no
principled way to privilege one over the others. In response, it might be argued
that this is precisely how we should understand the modal account; that part of
what it is for the set-theoretic hierarchy to be potential is for there to be no fact
of the matter as to just how many sets are actual. Even if this is right, we are left
with an interpretive dilemma: on the one hand, postulation is not to be understood
in a constructivist sense, as effecting a genuine change in the world; on the other
hand, it cannot be described in more familiar objectivist terms, such as grounding or
metaphysical possibility. Similar remarks apply to Linnebo’s notion of the extension
of mathematical domains. If this is not a constructivist process and it is not to be
understood in terms of grounding or metaphysical possibility, then how is it to be
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understood? Perhaps there is a way that I have not considered; but I cannot think
of what this might be. I conclude that none of the attempts by Studd, Linnebo and
Fine to elucidate the modal operators succeeds.

6.4.3

The dependence account of priority

The dependence account of priority may be motivated by reflection on the extensional identity conditions for sets. Recall that according to the axiom of extensionality, two sets are identical iff their members are identical. Viewed metaphysically,
extensionality may be taken to suggest that sets depend (fully) on their members,
or equivalently, that the identity of sets is (fully) grounded in the identity of their
members.47 One may then claim that the priority of the members to their set consists
in the metaphysical fact that while their set depends fully on them (and partially on
each one of them), they do not depend on it (either fully or partially).
Unfortunately, this account of priority entails the existence of the contradictioninducing sets. To see this, note that if x fully depends on yy (perhaps related in some
way), it is natural to think of x as nothing over and above the yy (and the relations
holding between them). All God has to do to create x is to create yy (and to relate
them in the right way). Thus, plausibly, a table fully depends on its parts (related in
the right way). It is nothing over and above them (arranged in the right way). All
God must do to create the table is to create the parts (and to arrange them in the
right way). This presents an immediate problem for the iterative conception. If the
set x fully depends on its members yy, then all God has to do to create x is to create
the yy. (Unlike the table, any additional relations between the yy are irrelevant,
since the identity conditions for sets do not mention them.) Thus, all God must do

47
Intuitively, x depends on y if what it is to be x involves y. See Fine (1994), Fine (1995a), Fine
(1995b), and Tahko and Lowe (2015) for more detail. For a somewhat different formulation, see
Schaffer (2009) and Rosen (2010). When an individual x depends on a (possibly infinite) number of
distinct individuals, yy, perhaps related in some way, and on nothing else, x fully depends on yy so
related. If x fully depends on yy, then x partially depends on each y among yy.
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to create the universal set is create all the sets. But the quantifiers in iterative set
theory are taken to range over all the sets. So if priority is understood as dependence,
iterative set theory is committed to the existence of a universal set.
One might reply that the universal set cannot possibly exist, since it if did, there
would a set which contained itself as a member and which therefore depended (partially) upon itself. Since this is impossible (for dependence is generally held to be
irreflexive), the universal set cannot possibly exist. However, what this shows is not
that the derivation of the universal set from the dependence account of priority fails,
but rather that the dependence account is inconsistent, entailing both that the universal set exists and that it does not exist. It seems, therefore, that the only suitable
response to the argument above is to reject the claim that a set is nothing over and
above its members. Creating the members of a set is not all that God must do to
create the set. What else must God do? Form the set? Collect its members? It seems
that any natural answer to this question forces a new metaphor on us. If dependence
can make sense of priority only by forcing us to accept another metaphor, it is an
unsatisfactory answer to our initial project of freeing the iterative conception from
metaphor.

6.5

Conclusion

The iterative conception of set purports to motivate a consistent set theory in
which quantification over sets is absolutely unrestricted. I have argued that it fails
in two respects: (1) it is unable to satisfactorily motivate the Empty Set axiom of
iterative set theory (and consequently is also unable to motivate the axiom of Infinity);
(2) it is unable to provide a satisfactory account of the priority relation. As a result,
the iterative conception cannot explain the extensional correctness of iterative set
theory: it can neither explain why all the sets that exist according to iterative set
theory exist, nor why these are all the sets that exist. In particular, it cannot provide
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a satisfactory explanation for why none of the contradiction-inducing sets exists. I
conclude that the iterative conception fails to provide the absolutist with a theory of
sets that is superior to the theory of set restrictivism presented in chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 7
SETLESS VARIANTS OF THE PARADOXES

In this chapter, I argue that unrestricted quantification together with “naive”
comprehension principles governing the existence of interpretations, propositions and
ordinals lead to setless variants of the paradoxes of Russell, Cantor and Burali-Forti.
One might seek to block these paradoxes by extending the orthodox strategy for sets
(discussed in ch. 6). This approach would consist of replacing these naive comprehension principles with restricted comprehension principles. However, such restrictions
are unintuitive and ad hoc. Alternatively, one might seek to block these paradoxes by
restricting quantification. This latter strategy is attractive since it provides a uniform
solution to the paradoxes (in both their original and setless forms) that eludes the
absolutist.
The outline for this chapter is the following. In 7.1, I apply unrestricted singular
quantification over interpretations to derive a setless (semantic) version of Russell’s
paradox. In 7.2, I apply unrestricted plural quantification over objects to derive a
setless version of Cantor’s paradox. In 7.3, I apply unrestricted plural quantification
over ordinals to derive a setless version of Burali-Forti’s paradox. These derivations
are not new and much of the work in this chapter consists in applying previous
work to the question of absolutism and restrictivism. In particular, 7.1 is based on
Williamson (2003); 7.2 is based (more loosely) on Spencer (2012) and 7.3 is organized
around Hellman (2011).
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7.1

Russell’s Paradox: Semantic Version

Timothy Williamson (2003) presents a setless version of Russell’s paradox, which
employs a “naive” comprehension principle for interpretations of the predicate expressions of a language. The principle, which I dub ‘Interpretation Comprehension’
(IC), states that if ‘P’ is a predicate letter of an uninterpreted object language L and
φ is a meaningful predicate (of the right form) in L’s metalanguage, then there exists
an interpretation of L on which ‘P’ means φ. IC is officially defined as follows:
IC. If (i) L is an object language containing the n-place predicate letter ‘P’, (ii)
L is a metalanguage used to interpret L, and (iii) L contains the meaningful
n-place predicate letter P, then there is an interpretation, IP , under which ‘P’
means P.
Several quick observations are in order. First, IC is limited in scope to interpretations of the predicate expressions of a language. In what follows, I will refer to these
simply as ‘interpretations’. Second, IC does not purport to offer necessary conditions
on the existence of interpretations. In this sense, IC is not as informative about interpretations as FC is about sets. Third, IC is relativized to metalanguages. As a
result, if there are possible meanings for the predicate vocabulary in L which are not
captured by the predicates in any metalanguage, L , then, for all IC says, there may
be fewer interpretations of L than possible assignments of meanings to its nonlogical
expressions.1 Fourth, if we restrict ourselves to extensional languages, we can define
(in L ) what it is for a predicate ‘P’ to mean P under an interpretation I.
D1. ‘P’ means P under I =df. (∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under I iff Px)
1

This seems wrong. But it would refute IC only if IC purported to offer necessary conditions on
the existence of interpretations. These last two observations suggest that a strengthened version of
IC, one that would provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of interpretations, is
possible only given two modifications. First, the strengthened principle must say something about
semantic assignments to names. Second, there must be some guarantee that the metalanguages
contain enough predicates. Would it be acceptable to simply postulate a maximal metalanguage
L + containing a predicate for every possible meaning?
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IC is quite intuitive. Suppose you’re considering possible interpretations of the
uninterpreted predicate letter ‘P’ relative to English. Is it possible to interpret ‘P’
as meaning ‘is a philosopher’ ? Is it possible to interpret ‘P’ as meaning ‘runs’ ?
It’s difficult to see why not. Generalizing, it follows that for any meaningful English
predicate φ of the correct form, it’s possible to interpret ‘P’ as meaning φ. In addition
to its intuitveness, Williamson (426) argues that this principle is presupposed by
the model-theoretic (Tarskian) definition of logical consequence in terms of truthpreservation under all interpretations.
In principle, when we apply the definition of logical consequence, it must
be possible to interpret a predicate letter according to any contentful
predicate, since otherwise we are not generalizing over all the contentful
arguments of the right form. Thus, whatever predicate we substitute for
[‘φ’], some legitimate interpretation (say, I[(φ)]) interprets the predicate
letter [‘P’] accordingly.
In what follows, I will assume that L is an extensional first-order language, containing the one-place predicate letter ‘P’, and that English (or a simple extension of
English) is the metalanguage L in which L is interpreted. These assumptions satisfy
conditions (i)–(ii) of IC. If, in addition, a meaningful one-place predicate of English
(or a simple extension of English) is substituted for P, then condition (iii) of IC is
satisfied. For example, if the English predicate ‘is a cat’ is substituted for P, then lC
entails that there is an interpretation, Icat , under with ‘P’ means ‘is a cat’. Applying
D1, IC entails:
• (∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under Icat iff x is a cat).
Or suppose that we select the English predicate ‘runs’. Then IC entails that there is
an interpretation, Iruns , under with ‘P’ means ‘runs’. Applying D1, IC entails:
• (∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under Iruns iff x runs).
In general, for any meaningful one-place English predicate φ, IC entails the schema
(1) (∃y)(∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under yφ ↔ φx).
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7.1.1

Derivation of the contradiction

To derive the paradox, we introduce an extension of English (English+) by the
addition of the predicate ‘R’ which is defined by the condition:
(2) (∀x)(Rx ↔ x does not satisfy ‘P’ under x).
Since R is a meaningful predicate in English+, it can be substituted for ‘φ’ in (1) to
get:
(3.1) (∃y)(∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under yR ↔ Rx).
Since L is extensional, there is a unique value of y that make (3.1) true. This is the
interpretation under which ‘P’ means ‘R’, which I dub ‘IR ’. We then have
(3.2) (∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under IR ↔ Rx).
By (2) and (3.2), it follows that:
(3.3) (∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under IR ↔ x does not satisfy ‘P’ under x).
Instantiation to IR then yields the inconsistent
(3.4) IR satisfies ‘P’ under IR ↔ IR does not satisfy ‘P’ under IR ).
7.1.2

Evaluation

One might seek to block the argument by claiming that R is not a meaningful
predicate and therefore (3.1) is not a permissible substitution instance of the schema
(1). Bennet and Karlsson (2008) take this approach, arguing that since IC says
nothing about what predicates are meaningful, we are free to view the derivation
of the contradictory (3.4) as a reductio of the meaningfulness of R. On their view,
Williamson’s argument is a “pseudo-paradox” similar to Russell’s “pseudo-paradox”
of the barber.2
2

The paradox the barber consists in defining some individual, b, as the barber who shaves all and
only those who don’t shave themselves and proving that if b exists, the contradiction follows that he
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[IC] does not seem to have anything to do with [R] being a contentful
predicate. We may deny this without giving up [IC] as a true principle
. . . In this sense Williamson’s argument is more like the non-paradox of
the barber, i.e., it is a reductio of R being a contentful predicate (324)
It is true that IC does says nothing about whether R is meaningful. But note
that in the derivation of Russell’s original paradox, FC likewise says nothing about
the meaningfulness of the predicate ‘x ∈
/ x’. If Williamson’s argument is a pseudoparadox, then why isn’t Russell’s original argument a pseudo-paradox as well? The
original derivation of the contradictory R ∈ R ↔ R ∈
/ R is startling because, prior to
recognizing its implications, no one would doubt that ‘x ∈
/ x’ is meaningful. We do
not require a principle for the meaningfulness of predicates in order for this to strike
us as a genuine paradox. It just seems so obvious that the contradiction-inducing
predicates are meaningful. This appearance is confirmed by the fact that we can
easily run through cases and see what sets would satisfy ‘x ∈
/ x’ and what sets would
not. The set of all Greek philosophers is not a Greek philosopher and therefore is
not a member of itself. But the set of all sets is a set and therefore (if it exists) is a
member of itself. Similarly with the set of all not-men (which is not a man) and the
set of all abstract objects (which, presumably, is abstract).
In Williamson’s argument, (2) clearly states the conditions under which something
Rs (and the conditions under which something does not R). Something Rs if (a) it
is an interpretation of ‘P’ that does not fall under ‘P’ so interpreted (this is true of
the interpretation Icat , which is not itself a cat) or (b) it is not an interpretation (if
x is not an interpretation, then a fortiori, x is not an interpretation under which x
satisfies ‘P’). On the other hand, something doesn’t R if it is an interpretation of ‘P’

shaves himself if and only if he does not. However, there is no independent reason for believing in
the existence of b. In particular, there is no “comprehension principle” for barbers to which we find
ourselves antecedently committed. In the absence of some good reason for believing that b exists,
we can take the argument as a reductio of this assumption.
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that does fall under ‘P’ so interpreted. An example is the interpretation Iint (which
interprets ‘P’ as meaning ‘is an interpretation’). For Iint is an interpretation.
I conclude that (2) provides us with powerful evidence—which is independent of
IC—that R is a meaningful predicate. Consequently, Bennet and Karlsson have failed
to provide a convincing case for denying (3.1). But once we grant this premise, the rest
of the reasoning is simply a matter of applying the rules of quantified logic. For if (3.1)
is true, then IR exists and is within the range of the unrestricted quantifier ∀ in (2)
and (3.2). Consequently, IR is within the range of the unrestricted quantifier in (3.3)
as well. This is all that is required to justify the instantiation to the contradictory
(3.4).
Williamson’s own solution is to treat quantification over interpretations as secondorder. Thus, (1) is to be rewritten as
(4) (∃Y )(∀x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under Yφ ↔ φx)
in which Y is a second-order variable. In order to preserve the absolutist thesis that
absolutely unrestricted quantification is possible, Williamson argues that interpretations are not objects of any kind; the second-order quantification used to interpret L
is ontologically innocent. However, this strategy leads to a version of the inexpressibility problem levied against restrictivism. For, in order to understand this secondorder quantification, we must have some way of providing a semantics for it. If we
attempt to do this by second-order quantification over interpretations of this secondorder language, the contradiction re-emerges. Williamson must therefore appeal to
interpretations from a higher (third-order language). In order to provide a semantics for this third-order language, he must appeal to interpretations of a still higher
(fourth-order) language and so on. At each type, the contradiction would re-emerge
if interpretations of the nth-order variables had type n. To avoid this, we continually
promote them to higher and higher types. The generalization of Williamson’s solution
therefore amounts to the adoption of a simple type theory in which type-restrictions
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prevent the paradox from being reinstated. But then there are certain semantic facts
about this type theory that go inexpressible. Linnebo (2006) describes two:
• Infinity: there are infinitely many different kinds of semantic value, and
• Compositionality: the semantic value of a complex expression is determined as
a function of the semantic values of the expression’s simpler constituents.
Within the type restrictions needed to block the paradox we cannot express either
(since these involve quantification over semantic values of different logical types).
Insofar as the absolutist’s solution to this paradox commits her to semantic inexpressibility, she seems to fare no better than the restrictivist. Indeed, she may fare
worse. For the restrictivist is able provide a uniform solution to Russell’s paradox
in both its original and semantic forms; whereas the absolutist must now rely on a
two very different solutions. She solves Russell’s original paradox by rejecting the
intuitive principle of FC; but solves the semantic variant by adopting a simple type
theory.
The restrictivist solves Williamson’s paradox by restricting quantification over
interpretations in (1) and therefore also its instance (3.1). The mirrors the solution
to Russell’s original paradox, which consisted in restricting quantification over sets
in FC (and in its instances). (3.1) is rewritten as:
(3.1∗ ) (∃y)(∀D x)(x satisfies ‘P’ under yR ↔ φx)
Since quantification is restricted, we are free to infer that the interpretation IR falls
outside of D in (3.1) and consequently that the instantiation to IR at (3.4) is illegitimate.

7.2

Cantor’s Paradox: Plural Version

I have used plural quantification and plural logic previously in my discussions of
extensions (4.3.1) and iterative set theory (ch. 6); however a brief restatement is in
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order here. Plural logic enriches singular logic with devices for plural reference. Add
first-order plural variables (‘xx ’, ‘yy’), plural quantifiers (‘∃xx’ and ‘∀xx’) and a logical
connective ‘≺’. The plural variables can take individuals as minimal (singular) values.
This accords with English, in which plural expressions sometimes refer to individuals
(e.g., ‘the even prime numbers’). When an individual is understood as the singular
value of a plural variable, I will call it a singular plurality. Read ‘∃xx ...’ as ‘there are
some—i.e., one or more—xx ...’. Read ‘∀xx’ as ‘for any—i.e., one or more—xx ...’.
Officially, the connective ≺ takes only singular terms in its first argument place and
plural terms in its second argument place. Read ‘x ≺ yy’ as ‘x is one of (among) yy’.
Unofficially, ≺ can take plural terms in its first argument place. Read ‘xx ≺ yy’ as
an abbreviation for ‘(∀x)(x ≺ xx → x ≺ yy)’. Thus, we read ‘The even numbers ≺
the numbers’ as an abbreviation of ‘for any x: if x is one of the even numbers, then
x is one of the numbers’.

7.2.1

Cantor’s theorem: plural version

The plural variant of Cantor’s paradox (henceforth, simply Cantor’s paradox)
consists of applying a plural variant of Cantor’s theorem (henceforth, simply Cantor’s
theorem) to the plurality of all things. Call the yy a sub-plurality of the xx if (∀z)(z ≺
yy → z ≺ xx)3 and let P(xx) denote the plurality of all sub-pluralities of the xx,
i.e., (∀yy)(yy ≺ P(xx) ↔ (∀z)(z ≺ yy → z ≺ xx)). We might read P(xx) as ‘the
power plurality of the xx’. If, for example, xx = the odd numbers, then P(xx) is the
plurality of all pluralities of odd numbers. The odd numbers less than 10 are one of
these pluralities; the odd numbers identical to 15 are another; the odd prime numbers
a third. Intuitively, Cantor’s theorem tells us that any plurality of (individual) things
contains more sub-pluralities than things and so there can be no bijection between
3

Note that according to this definition, every plurality is an (improper) sub-plurality of itself.
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the plurality and its power plurality. The proof has two features that are worth
mentioning.
First, it makes use of higher-order plural quantification (plural quantification over
pluralities, i.e., plural quantification over things plurally). The cogency of such quantification has been called into question and this makes the proof controversial.
Second, the plural variant of Cantor’s theorem is not necessarily as general as
the singular version. In particular, if there is no empty plurality, it does not hold
for “singular” pluralities, which consist of a single element. Such pluralities have the
same size as their power plurality, namely 1.
Let us then assume that the aa are a plurality of at least two elements. Assume,
in addition, that the notion of a cardinality is extended to pluralities in the natural
way, as a measure of size, so that:
D2. Card(xx) = Card(yy) =df there is a bijection between xx and yy.
D3. Card(xx) ≤ Card(yy) =df there is an injection from xx to yy.
D4. Card(xx) < Card(yy) =df (i) Card(xx) ≤ Card(yy) and
(ii) Card(xx) 6= Card(yy).4
To show Card(aa) < Card(Paa) it suffices to show (i) Card(aa) ≤ Card(Paa) and
(ii) Card(aa) 6= CardP(aa). Since every individual a is a minimal plurality, the first
part is quite simple. Map every a ≺ aa to itself. To prove the second part, we will
show that there can be no bijection between Paa and aa.
Assume for reductio that f is a bijection between Paa and aa, i.e., f pairs every
sub-plurality xx ≺ aa with a distinct individual f (xx) = y, where y ≺ aa. Define
the ww as the sub-plurality consisting of every y ≺ aa that is not among the xx with
4

See discussion of cardinalities in ch. 2.
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which it is paired by f . If we let ‘y’ range (singly) over the aa, we can state this
definition more succinctly as follows:
(5.1) (∀y)(y ≺ ww ↔ y ⊀ f −1 (y))
The proof has two parts. First, we show that the ww exist, i.e., that the plurality
defined by (5.1) is nonempty. Next, we instantiate the ww to the individual paired
with them to derive a contradiction.
Consider the singular pluralities xx1 = y1 and xx2 = y2 . Either y1 ≺ f −1 (y1 ) or
y1 ⊀ f −1 (y1 ). Similarly, either y2 ≺ f −1 (y2 ) or y2 ⊀ f −1 (y2 ). If either y1 ⊀ f −1 (y1 )
or y2 ⊀ f −1 (y2 ), then there is at least one y ⊀ f −1 (y) and consequently, the ww are
nonempty. On the other hand, if y1 ≺ f −1 (y1 ) and y2 ≺ f −1 (y2 ), then consider the
plurality xx3 = y1 , y2 . Since f is a bijection, f (xx3 ) = y3 , where y3 is distinct from
both y1 and y2 . Since y3 ⊀ xx3 and xx3 = f −1 (y3 ), it follows that y3 ⊀ f −1 (y3 ).
Again, there is at least one y ⊀ f −1 (y) and consequently, the ww are nonempty.
Since the ww are a sub-plurality of the aa, they are included in the mapping f .
Consider the individual—call it yww —that f pairs with the ww. Instantiating (5.1)
to yww , it follows that
(5.2) yww ≺ ww ↔ yww ⊀ f −1 (yww ).
But f −1 (yww ) = ww, so
(5.3) yww ≺ ww ↔ yww ⊀ ww.
Contradiction. By reductio, we conclude that f is not a bijection. Consequently,
Card(aa) < Card(Paa).
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7.2.2

Derivation of the contradiction

The plural variant of Cantor’s paradox follows the reasoning of Cantor’s paradox
I.5 It consists of a proof that a particular plurality of propositions has the same size
as its power plurality. This proof is based on an existence principle for propositions,
which states that for any things, there is a distinct proposition which states that these
are all the things there are. Following Joshua Spencer (2012), I will refer to this as
the Existential Propositions Thesis (EPT).6 Officially, PT is formulated as follows:
(PT) (∀xx)((i) there is a proposition p stating that xx are all the things there are
and (ii) p is distinct from any proposition q stating that (∃yy)(yy 6= xx ∧ yy are
all the things there are)).
I will refer to the propositions whose existence PT asserts as ‘existence propositions’.
PT implies that there is an injection f from the power plurality of all things, P(uu),
into the plurality of all things, uu. Define f so that it pairs every sub-plurality
xx ≺ uu with the existence proposition f (xx) = p, which states that the xx are all
the things there are. Given PT, distinct sub-pluralities must be paired with distinct
propositions. Hence, by D3,
(6.1) Card(P(uu)) ≤ Card(uu).
This contradicts Cantor’s theorem, according to which
(6.2) Card(uu) < Card(Puu).7

5
It should also be possible to derive a plural variant following the reasoning of Cantor’s paradox
III. Since (by D2–D4) cardinal numbers are attached to pluralities of the requisite cardinality (not
sets), the argument works by (i) replacing each cardinal number, κ, among the plurality of all
cardinals, κκ, with a plurality f (κ) of cardinality κ and (ii) forming the union of these pluralities,
S
(∀κ)f (κ). This union has the greatest cardinal number; yet, by Cantor’s theorem, its power
plurality has an even greater cardinal number. Therefore, there can be no plurality κκ of all cardinal
numbers.
6
Spencer’s principle is slightly different. He expresses it as follows (77): “for any xs, (i) there
is the proposition that those xs exist and (ii) for any ys which are not the same as the xs, the
proposition that those ys exist is distinct from the proposition that those xs exist.”
7

I am assuming the natural extension of SBT (see ch. 2) from sets to pluralities.
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7.2.3

Evaluation

What does this argument show? Spencer takes it as a proof of the ontological
thesis that there is no all-inclusive plurality. If there is no all-inclusive plurality,
then it is impossible to quantify plurally over all things and consequently impossible
to define the injection from all pluralities of things into all things that is needed to
derive the contradiction above. The restrictivist solution I recommend is importantly
different. I do not deny the existence of an all-inclusive plurality; but directly deny
the possibly of unrestricted quantification over all things.
The crux of the argument is PT. What reasons—other than the threat of paradox—
are there for doubting it? Given that the universe is populated by a unique plurality,
all existence propositions but one are false; but this is not a reason to doubt PT. False
propositions exist just as much as true propositions. Moreover, there are numerous
other principles that entail the existence of an injection from P(uu), into uu. Joshua
Spencer (2012, 78–79) mentions two: the Compositional Propositions Thesis (CPT)
and the Doxastic Propositions Thesis (DPT), which he formulates as follows:

(CPT) For any xs, (i) there is the proposition that those xs compose something and (ii) for any ys which are not the same as the xs, the
proposition that those ys compose something is distinct from the
proposition that these xs compose something.
(DPT) For any xs, (i) there is the proposition that those xs are thought
about by someone and (ii) for any ys which are not the same as
the xs, the proposition that those ys are thought about by someone
is distinct from the proposition that those xs are thought about by
someone.
It is difficult to see how these principles might be reasonably denied. Any restriction
on them would appear to be ad hoc. To illustrate, if (EPT) is false, then there
are some peculiar things such that there is no proposition asserting that they are
all the things. Why is there no such proposition for these things, when there are
such propositions for other pluralities? Certainly, we would not deny the existence
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of existential propositions for most familiar pluralities. For example, we would not
deny that there is a proposition that asserts that the items on my desk are all the
things that there are. Of course, this proposition is false, but that does not matter.
Similar remarks apply to CPT and DPT. A more principled approach is to adopt a
sparse account of propositions, according to which propositions are identified with
sets (or pluralities) of possible worlds. But this view has some rather unintuitive
consequences. Perhaps the most serious is that it implies that every necessarily true
proposition is identical (and that every necessarily false proposition is identical).
There is an argument (due to Spencer) that PT is inconsistent. Some terminology
is needed. Say that an existential proposition p selects an individual x iff x is among
the things that p says there are. Define a self-effacing proposition as an existential
proposition that does not select itself. Clearly, some existential propositions are selfeffacing. An example is the existential proposition mentioned above which selects
only items on my desk. Let the pp refer to all the self-effacing propositions and let
r name the existential proposition which selects all and only those propositions that
do not select themselves, i.e., r selects the pp. Given the obvious parallels between r
and the Russell set, call r the Russell proposition. Then the following is true:
(7.1) (∀p)(r selects p ↔ p does not select p.
By instantiation on (7.1), it follows that:
(7.2) r selects r ↔ r does not select r.
Given standard propositional reasoning, (7.2) entails the contradiction:
(7.3) r selects r ∧ r does not select r.
This argument is clearly a variant of Russell’s paradox. If the reasoning is sound,
it would show that PT was inconsistent on its own, which would undermine the
derivation of Cantor’s paradox above.
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Russell’s paradox in its original form is typically understood as a proof that the
Russell set does not exist and consequently that FC is false. This is the No Set
solution to described in ch. 2. We might be tempted to regard this argument in the
same way: as a proof that the Russell proposition does not exist and consequently
that PT is false. This is not what Spencer does. To rescue PT from this argument,
Spencer recommends abandoning the relevant instance of excluded middle—either r
selects r or r does not select r—needed to derive (7.3) from (7.2). His solution is a
version of the No Function solution to Russell’s paradox described in ch. 2.
In ch. 4, I recommended a restrictivist solution to Russell’s paradox, according to
which FC may be regarded as true, provided it is always interpreted in contexts in
which quantification over sets is restricted. It’s possible to extend this solution to the
present case so that PT may be regarded as true, provided it is always interpreted in
contexts in which quantification over propositions is restricted. Whenever we speak
of ‘all’ self-effacing propositions, we are speaking of all the self-effacing propositions
that belong to a restricted domain. To represent this, replace the (purportedly)
unrestricted plural term ‘pp’ with the (explicitly) restricted plural term ‘ppD ’ and
replace the unrestricted plural quantifier ∀xx with the restricted plural quantifier
∀D xx. PT may then be rewritten as:
PT∗ (∀D xx)(there is a proposition p stating that xx are all the things there are and
p is distinct from any proposition q stating that: (∃D yy)(yy 6= xx ∧ yy are all
the things there are)).
Given any domain, D, PT∗ determines a corresponding domain, Dp , of existential
propositions. Relative to Dp , it is possible to define the Russell proposition, rD , by:
(8.1) (∀Dp p)(rD selects p ↔ p does not select p).
But here the derivation comes to a halt. If rD was in the range of ∀Dp we could
instantiate ‘p’ to rD in (8.1) to get:
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(8.2) rD selects rD ↔ rD does not select rD .
However, since ∀Dp is restricted, this assumption is open to question. We conclude by
reductio that rD lies outside the range of ∀Dp ; consequently that:
(8.3) rD does not select rD .
As before, we can shift to a more inclusive context, in which PT∗ determines a
more inclusive domain of existential propositions, which includes rD ; relative to this
domain, (8.1) defines a different Russell proposition. We conclude by reductio that
this Russell proposition lies outside the expanded range of quantification.

7.3

Burali-Forti Paradox: Plural Version

The plural variant of Burali-Forti’s paradox is based on the natural extension
of well-orderings to pluralities and of ordinal numbers to well-ordered pluralities, as
measures of length. Say that any xx are well-ordered by the relation R just in case:
• R is transitive on the xx (i.e., for any x1 , x2 , x3 ≺ xx: if x1 Rx2 and x2 Rx3 , then
x1 Rx3 )
• The xx satisfy trichotomy (i.e., for any x1 , x2 ≺ xx: exactly one of the cases
(a) x1 Rx2 , (b) x2 Rx1 , (c) x1 = x2 holds)
• Any yy ≺ xx have a least element under R
In what follows, I will use ‘<’ (with or without subscripts) as a symbol for wellordering relations. When speaking of the ordinal numbers, < (without subscripts) will
be used to denote the “less than” relation defined on the ordinals. This is appropriate
since this relation can be shown to be a well-ordering of the ordinals (see PBF1
below). I write ‘<xx ’ to denote the well-ordering relation < on the xx and ‘(xx, <xx )’
to denote the xx when they are well-ordered by <xx . Relations are typically identified
with sets; however, here they are identified with pluralities of ordered pairs. Thus,
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<xx is identified with the plurality of ordered pairs hx1 , x2 i where x1 , x2 ≺ xx and
x1 < x2 .8
Ordinal numbers are governed by the following two definitions:
D5. Ord(xx, <xx ) = Ord(yy, <yy ) =df there is an isomorphism between (xx, <xx )
and (yy, <yy ).
D6. Ord(xx, <xx ) < Ord(yy, <yy ) =df there is a y ≺ yy such that (xx, <xx ) ∼
= seg(y).
Intuitively, an isomorphism is an order-preserving bijection. This can be defined more
formally in the plural context as follows: (xx, <xx ) are isomorphic to (yy, <yy ) =df
there is a bijection f between xx and yy that satisfies the condition hx1 , x2 i ≺ (xx, <xx
) iff hf (x1 ), f (x2 )i ≺ (yy, <yy ). An initial segment is defined in the plural context as
follows: if x ≺ (xx, <xx ), then the zz defined by the condition z ≺ zz ↔ z <xx x
are an initial segment of (xx, <xx ), written ‘seg(x)’. Intuitively, if (xx, <xx ) are
isomorphic to an initial segment of (yy, <yy ), then (xx, <xx ) are “longer” and have a
greater ordinal number. From D5 and D6, it’s possible to establish plural variants of
BF1 and BF2. Using ‘α’ and ‘αα’ as singular and plural variables for ordinals, these
may be stated as:
PBF1. (∀αα)(αα are well-ordered by <)
PBF2. (∀α)(α = Ord(αα, <).9

7.3.1

Derivation of the contradiction

The derivation of a contradiction follows the pattern of Burali-Forti III. Let ‘oo’
denote all the ordinals. By instantiation of PBF1 to oo, it follows that the oo are
8

See Hellman (2011). We needn’t take a stand on what ordered pairs are. If we want, we can
adopt the standard Kuratowski definition of ordered pairs with sets.
9

For any ordinal number α, ‘αα’ denotes the ordinals < α.
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well-ordered by <, so (oo, <) have an ordinal number. Call this ‘Ω’. So we have it that
Ord(oo, <) = Ω. By instantiation of PBF2 to Ω, it follows that Ω = Ord(ΩΩ, <).
These results establish the identity
(9.1) Ord(ΩΩ, <) = Ω = Ord(oo, <).
But (ΩΩ, <) is an initial segment of (oo, <) (intuitively, (oo, <) are longer than ΩΩ<
by having Ω tacked on at the end.) So, by D6
(9.2) Ord(ΩΩ, <) < Ord(oo, <).
(9.1) and (9.2) immediately imply
(9.3) Ω < Ω,
which contradicts PBF1, according to which
(9.4) Ω 6< Ω.

7.3.2

Evaluation

As I noted in ch. 2, Burali-Forti’s paradox has many moving parts and each of
these may be singled out as the source of the contradiction. The immediate premises
used in the derivation are PBF1 and PBF2. However, rejecting either of these is
tantamount to abandoning a theory of ordinals in this plural context. If there is no
theory of ordinals, then there is no inconsistent theory of ordinals, but surely it is
preferable to find a less draconian solution.
In the set-theoretic case, there are two familiar solutions. One is to deny that the
set of all ordinals exists. This is the No Set solution favored by iterative theorists. The
analogue in this case would be to deny that all the ordinals exist. Arguably, the idea
that all the ordinals do not exist may be sussed out, along the lines suggested by modal
interpretations of the iterative conception of set as the idea that all the ordinals do
not actually exist. However, we’ve seen the problems faced by such modal accounts.
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Alternatively, one might adopt a version of the limitation of size doctrine and claim
that some pluralities of well-ordered ordinal numbers are absolutely infinite and do
not have an ordinal number. This is a version of the No Function solution. It would
amount to denying PBF2 and is therefore highly revisionist. In addition, it strikes
me as unacceptably ad hoc. Intuitively, all that is needed to have an ordinal is to be
well-ordered. Being well-ordered seems to have very little to do with size.
Alternatively, the argument may suggest that it is the linguistic assumption that
‘all the ordinals’ are a permissible value of the plural quantifier ‘any ordinals’ in PBF1
that is at fault. Whenever we speak of ‘all’ ordinals, we are speaking of all the ordinals
that belong to a restricted domain. To represent this, replace the (purportedly)
unrestricted plural term ‘oo’ with the (explicitly) restricted plural term ‘ooD ’ and
replace the unrestricted quantifiers ∀α and ∀αα with the restricted quantifiers ∀D α
and ∀D αα. PBF1 and PBF2 may then be rewritten as:
PBF1∗ . (∀D αα)(αα are well-ordered by <)
PBF2∗ . (∀α)(α = Ord(αα, <).
If all the ordinals were a permissible value of αα in PBF1∗ , we could derive the
problematic Ord(oo, <) = Ω by instantiation. But αα is restricted and so all the
ordinals are not a permissible value of αα in PBF1∗ . We cannot say that all the
ordinals are well-ordered. But it would be a mistake to infer that all the ordinals are
not well-ordered. Rather, the restrictivist solution consists in the doctrine that we
simply cannot speak of all the ordinals at all.
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